"Health Professionals for a New Century": Calling for "Ethical Conduct," a "New Professionalism," and Improved "Stewardship" and "Social Accountability"

A major article just published in the Lancet urged global reform of health care education  [Frenk J, Chen L, Bhutta ZA, Cohen J, Crisp N, Evans T et al. Health professionals for a new century: transforming education to strengthen health systems in an interdependent world.  Lancet 2010; 376: 1923-1958.  Link here.]

The problems it recognized included

• "Pitifully modest" spending for health professional education, compared to overall health spending
• Health care systems that are "dysfunctional and inequitable," due in part to "commercialism in the professions," leading to "breakdown ... especially noteworthy within primary care, in both poor and rich countries."
• For profit medical education leading to "a so-called de-Flexnerisation process ... in which low-quality professional schools might be proliferating...."
• Health care corruption, e.g., "the Indian press has reported illegal payments by new private schools seeking accreditation...."

The solutions it advocated included
- Fostering "ethical conduct" by professionals, developing a "new professionalism," earning trust "steered by ethical commitment and social accountability."
- Improving "stewardship mechanisms, including socially accountable accreditation"

It is nice to be in such good company.  While the report was written in the subtle, diplomatic language of international public health, it was the only such authoritative report to appear in a widely circulated, highly respected medical journal that I can recall that was this direct about the seriousness of such problems.

In fact, not only is little spent on actual medical education within academic medical institutions, but faculty members are valued more for the money they bring in than for their teaching.  Commercialism in health care has been institutionalized in the last 30 years (for discussion of its history in the US, look here, here, and here.)  The Transparency International Global Corruption Report of 2006 asserted "the scale of corruption is vast in both rich and poor countries," yet has gotten almost no notice in medical, health care research, and health care policy circles.  In 2009, the US Institute of Medicine published a detailed report including fairly strong recommendations on Conflict of Interest in Research, Education and Practice.  The anechoic effect, however, has dictated that discussion of striking examples of mission-hostile management, conflicts of interest, and outright crime and corruption is simply not done, especially in medical, health care, or health policy venues and journals.  The 2006 TI and 2009 IOM reports have infrequently been cited, and their recommendations have widely been ignored.

I do hope that the appearance of a publication as authoritative as the article by Frenk et al leads to some soul-searching by the leaders of health care around the world.  They need to realize that despite the article's measured tones, the problems really are severe, and even more broad than the article implied.  We have discussed in detail how health care education (and all of health care) are hurt by concentration and abuse of power, by governance that lacks accountability, integrity, and transparency; by leadership that ignores the context, core values and mission, promotes self-interest and conflicts of interest, and sneers at ethics; and by results such as suppressed and manipulated research, deceptive and dishonest education (look here, here, and here for examples), stifling of academic freedom and whistle-blowers, then dissatisfied, burned out faculty (here), and finally the final common pathway of rising costs, declining access, and poor quality.  

It is heartening that the importance of our concerns has been corroborated in such a notable venue.  I hope this report gathers less dust than the 2006 Transparency International Global Corruption Report and the 2009 Institute of Medicine conflict of interest report.

I suggest that to truly reform health care education (and health care itself), we will have to attend to the sorts of problems we write about on Health Care Renewal.  On one hand, we will need to improve the stewardship, governance, and leadership of health care education itself, and reduce the pervasive conflicts of interest that ensnare the faculty.  On the other, we will need to make sure education prepares students to deal with these problems in health care at large.

It would be nice if the appearance of the Lancet article signifies that help will soon be at hand to tackle the huge amount of work that needs to be done, in the face of likely withering opposition from those who have enriched themselves from the dysfunctionality of the current system.  We at Health Care Renewal will continue to try to draw attention to these issues, accompanied I am sure by our fellow bloggers (as are listed in the right hand column).  However, a small group of voluntary "citizen journalists," and health care professional curmudgeons cannot solve this problem on our own. I hope we will soon have some more support.

ADDENDUM (14 December, 2010) - See also comments by Paul Levy on the Running a Hospital blog.

"This is Really Going to Set People's Hair on Fire" - the Justice Department Indicts a Pharmaceutical Company Vice President and Associate General Counsel

We have been posting nearly every week about the parade of legal settlements, sometimes including guilty pleas to criminal charges, made by health care organizations.  The settlements have involved charges of kickbacks, fraud, conspiracy, and other colorful offenses. Most of these settlements entailed fines or other payments by the organizations that may seem huge, but were fractions of the amounts made by the practices that lead to the charges that were settled.  Almost never have the cases involved penalties for any individuals who authorized, directed, or implemented the misbehavior.  We have also been saying (seemingly endlessly, but most recently here) that such settlements may be viewed by organizations as merely the costs of doing business, and so until the actual people who were involved in the bad behavior suffer some negative incentive or penalty, expect the behavior to continue. 

Maybe things are changing.  In the New York Times, Duff Wilson wrote:

In a rare move, the Justice Department on Tuesday announced that it had charged a former vice president and top lawyer for the British drug giant GlaxoSmithKline with making false statements and obstructing a federal investigation into illegal marketing of the antidepressant Wellbutrin for weight loss.

Specifically,

The indictment accuses the Glaxo official, Lauren C. Stevens of Durham, N.C., of lying to the Food and Drug Administration in 2003, by writing letters, as associate general counsel, denying that doctors speaking at company events had promoted Wellbutrin for uses not approved by the agency. Ms. Stevens 'made false statements and withheld documents she recognized as incriminating,' including slides the F.D.A. had sought during its investigation, the indictment stated.

An Associated Press story provided more detail about the allegedly false statements:

The Department of Justice alleges that in 2002, Lauren Stevens of Durham, N.C., signed several letters to the Food and Drug Administration denying that her company had promoted an antidepressant drug for unapproved uses. But Stevens knew that the company had paid numerous physicians to give talks touting unapproved uses of the drug, including weight loss,....

Also,

In one instance, prosecutors say Stevens withheld slides used by physicians promoting the company's drug, even though the FDA had asked specifically for the materials. Stevens claimed that the company's response to the FDA was 'final' and 'complete,' according to the indictment.

Stevens also falsely denied that Glaxo had paid doctors to attend special sessions where medical experts discussed unapproved uses of Wellbutrin, according to the Department of Justice.

'Attendees were not paid, reimbursed or otherwise compensated to attend these events,' Stevens wrote in a 2003 letter to the FDA. But prosecutors say attendees received gifts, entertainment and other compensation in return for attending the events.

During 2001 and 2002, Glaxo paid two expert physicians to speak about 500 times each about Wellbutrin, including how to use the drug to treat obesity.

In addition, a CBS News story suggested that Ms Stevens was made aware of the nature of the information withheld:

In March of 2003, the indictment alleges, Stevens received a memo from other lawyers at GlaxoSmithKline analyzing the pros and cons of turning over the slides to the FDA. One of the cons listed in that memo was that turning over the slides would provide 'incriminating evidence about potential off-label promotion of [the drug] that may be used against [the corporation] in this or in a future investigation.'

An indictment of an individual, particularly a high-ranking corporate executive, seems to have gotten people's attention, e.g., as Duff Wilson wrote in the Times:

The indictment grabbed the attention of pharmaceutical executives who have been bracing for a long-promised government crackdown on company officials — rather than the corporations themselves — in drug-fraud cases that have resulted in billions of dollars in fines and payments.

'This is absolutely precedent-setting — this is really going to set people’s hair on fire,' said Douglas B. Farquhar, a Washington lawyer who recently presided at a panel on law enforcement during a drug industry conference where federal officials warned they were focusing on individuals. 'This is indicative of the F.D.A. and Justice strategy to go after the very top-ranking managing officials at regulated companies.'

My response is, of course, that the threat of this sort of action is absolutely what is needed to deter future bad behavior by health care organizations. As long as health care leaders could act with impunity, the fraud, kickbacks, conspiracy etc were continuing. Worse, given their impunity, why would anyone but an idealistic fool attempt to swim against the tide of rising sleaze in health care?  How could skeptics and critics of the status quo in health care gain any traction?

Now maybe this sort of action may finally lead self-satisfied, unreflective health care executives to think about what they are doing and its ethical and moral aspects. The NY Times article included this statement in defense of Ms Stevens:

Brien T. O’Connor, a lawyer with Ropes & Gray, said in a statement, 'Lauren Stevens is an utterly decent and honorable woman. She is not guilty of obstruction or of making false statements. Everything she did in this case was consistent with ethical lawyering and the advice provided her by a nationally prominent law firm retained by her employer specifically because of its experience in working with F.D.A.'

I actually would guess that Ms Stevens believes she did nothing wrong. I would guess that most of the numerous health care leaders who have been caught up in bad behavior also thought they did nothing wrong. After all, they were all very well paid, lived in nice houses in nice neighborhoods, drove fancy cars (when they did not have a paid car and driver), were respected in their communities, did charitable works, etc. How can fine people who look so respectable do anything wrong? But, of course, the veneer of respectability does not prevent unethical or immoral behavior. Making one's numbers, getting one's bonuses, all from doing the big boss' wishes do not certify one's actions as ethical or moral. Perhaps making corporate health care leaders actually accountable for their actions will lead them to think about whether their actions are really as upstanding as their accoutrements of social status make them feel.

My final comment is that it may be significant that this case involved a lawyer. On one hand, attorneys have been at the forefront of what little movement there is to improve the accountability, integrity, and transparency of health care organizations. On the other hand, the leadership of many health care organizations have lawyered up to defend their actions. Organizational lawyers have been known to sweet-talk, obfuscate or intimidate those who dare to criticize the organizational leaders' actions. Anyone who is a vocal skeptic of the powers that be in health care must know there is a constant risk of some corporate counsel or hired firm threatening a libel, slander, or tortious interference action. Any individual who dares to be skeptical must be worried that the leaders of large health care organizations can use a lot of other peoples' money to pay for lawyers to push such actions, while individual skeptics facing threats of suits for huge amounts of damages are not likely to have enough money of their own to keep fighting. So I hope that the current case will also push attorneys who make a lot of money protecting the status quo in health care to reflect on the ethics and morality of what they are doing.

ADDENDUM (10 November) - Also see comments by Prof Margaret Soltan on the University Diaries blog.

BLOGSCAN: Florida Doctors Endorse Ex- Columbia/ HCA CEO for Governor

Rick Scott was the CEO of for-profit hospital chain Columbia/ HCA.  The company ended up settling civil and criminal charges for $1.7 billion.  Like many other examples in the march of legal settlements about which we have often posted, no individual who authorized, directed, or implemented the relevant bad behavior suffered any sort of negative consequence or paid any penalty.  Rick Scott left the company, but with a golden parachute.  Now he his running for Governor of Florida, using a substantial amount of his own money (but money that probably mostly came from Columbia / HCA). (See post here.)  He may be in the lead.  And the Florida Medical Association has just endorsed him.  In the Health Beat blog, Maggie Mahar is all over this story.  Read it and weep.  Remember another good reason for the people who lead health care organizations to be truly accountable for their actions.

An Attempt to Hold Health Care Leaders Accountable for Their Organizations' Bad Behavior?

We have frequently noted how health care organizations accused of kickbacks, fraud, and other unethical and sometimes illegal behavior involving how they produce or market health care products or services often are allowed to settle the charges only with a fines to the companies, and sometimes with corporate integrity agreements.  Almost never are the people who authorized, directed, or implemented the unethical behavior required to pay any sort of penalty.  We recently commented on a case in which an executive of a medical device company accused of exaggerating the performance of a diagnostic test in development was charged, not with misleading doctors or patients by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but with misleading investors by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  That executive lost her job, and will be barred from leading any public company.

So up to now, a corporate executive responsible for misleading doctors or patients about issues that could affect clinical decisions or outcomes likely would never pay a penalty, but one responsible for misleading  investors about similar issues could lose his or her job and livelihood.

Now, per an article in Fortune, it appear the situation may be changing,

The federal government is fed up with the amount of fraud, especially recurring fraud from the same companies, happening in the pharmaceutical industry. So regulators have decided that when it comes to punishments, it's time to get personal.

From now on, individual executives risk being ejected from their jobs -- and perhaps even barred from the industry -- for fraud their companies commit, even if they did not participate or even know about the crimes.

Furthermore,

The new approach, emerging from the unusually powerful Inspector General's office in the Department of Health and Human Services, reflects frustration with corporate recidivism even in the face of ramped-up fines, penalties and disgorgements.

'We are going to start to use that authority in the appropriate circumstances to get high level executives out of companies, so that the company has a better shot at changing its behavior, so that it does not become a recidivist,' explains Lewis Morris, chief counsel to the Inspector General.

The article noted some cases in which even large fines and corporate integrity agreements seemingly failed to deter future bad behavior by the companies which paid these penalties. For example,

In the government's most recent major settlement -- in which AstraZeneca agreed to pay $520 million -- the fine represented 16.5% of the $8.6 billion income (between 2001-2006) from U.S. sales of Seroquel, a powerful anti-psychotic. AstraZeneca (AZN) turned this narrowly approved drug into a cash cow by marketing it for much wider use, including by the elderly and children, even though they are particularly vulnerable to 'serious and debilitating side effects.'

All the while, AstraZeneca was operating under a corporate integrity agreement (CIA) with the Inspector General, imposed after a 2003 off-label marketing case.

We discussed the AZ settlement here in October, 2009. We asked then, "Does anyone really still believe that integrity agreements, and settlements assessed against huge corporations deter such profitable bad behavior?"

Another example:

Drug company Pfizer (PFE, Fortune 500), which was fined $2.3 billion just last September, is now on its third CIA. Steeper fines and harsh individual penalties should help put more teeth into these agreements and keep companies from flouting them.

We discussed the repeated lack of effect of settlements by Pfizer here in September, 2009. We concluded, "So will even a $2,300,000,000 settlement and yet another corporate integrity agreement make Pfizer or any other health care corporation act more ethically? I doubt it."

The Fortune article quoted Peter Rost, former Pfizer executive turned whistle-blower and ethics advocate (and to whose blog I offer a hat tip for first mentioning the Fortune article), on aspects of corporate culture and corporate incentives that foster repeated unethical behavior by management,

'Usually by the time someone becomes a senior executive they are very aware of the pitfalls in the organization, and they have become masters at not doing something wrong or not getting caught doing something wrong,' explains Peter Rost, a former senior Pfizer executive turned industry gadfly.

Incentive-based compensation systems -- typically 40% to 50% of salespeople's income comes from hitting their numbers -- are one weak point. 'They are going to work real hard to increase those numbers and do whatever it takes, and if they think somebody gave them a wink about doing this or that, they are going to run with it.' says Rost.

Booting senior executives out for any fraud under their watch might end the wink-and-nod system, giving hope to critics.

In my humble opinion, the government's new approach looks like real progress. Giving corporate executives personal impunity was a recipe for increasing unethical, and sometimes criminal behavior. The sorts of marketing fraud they authorized or directed certainly lead to increasing costs, and overuse of unnecessary and sometimes harmful tests and treatments. While there have years of complaints about health care's increasing costs and decreasing quality in health policy circles, it is just amazing that until now, there has been so little action against the bad behavior that was undoubtedly responsible for much of these problems.

So three cheers for making health care organizations' leaders accountable for the bad behavior of their organizations.

After cheering, however, there ought to be some serious inquiry about why they were not held accountable much sooner.  It turns out that there has been legal justification for holding leaders so accountable available for a long time:

All that's required for the government to flex this remarkably broad authority -- embedded in the Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine -- is that the executives were in a position to have stopped the fraud that resulted in a criminal conviction or plea.

Note that the Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine apparently derives from a US Supreme Court case about the selling of misbranded or adulterated drugs into interstate commerce under the US Food and Drug Act, decided in 1943.

However, it looks like in the hyper laissez faire climate of the last 20 or more years, no one wanted to bother to invoke it. After all, the formerly highly regarded leader of the US Federal Reserve believed there was no need for regulators to punish fraud, because the magic of the market would take care of it. US health care has paid a heavy price for such breathtaking naivete (see the PBS Frontline show, "The Warning." )

The Stewards of an Elite University, or a "Politburo" of "Shadow Bankers?"

We have postulated that one of the key reasons US health care has become so dysfunctional is that the leaders of some of the most august health care institutions have strayed from, if not totally abandoned their organizations' fundamental missions.  There are many possible reasons for this phenomenon, but one is that the ultimate stewards of not-for-profit health care organizations, their boards of directors or trustees, have become uninterested in the mission, or impotent to uphold it.  So, we have tried to figure out what has happened to these boards that has lead to this sorry state.

Dartmouth College: the Packing of the Board of Trustees

One example we have come frequently discussed (beginning here) is that of Dartmouth College, despite its name, really a university, and one of the elite American universities which includes a well-regarded medical school.   For a long time, Dartmouth had one of the more accountable and representative systems of governance found in US universities.  Recently, however, this accountability and transparency was challenged by some of the College's own leaders. 

Most boards of trustees are self-elected.  When an old member leaves, the new members elect his or her successor.  Dartmouth alumni, however can elect eight members of the board of trustees. Until recently, eight others were "charter trustees," who were individually chosen by the other charter trustees, and two were ex-officio. Although the College's Association of Alumni traditionally nominated alumni to run for trustee positions, candidates could be nominated by petition, and starting in 2004, four such petition candidates were elected.

As described by FIRE, the Foundation for Integrity and Responsibility in Medicine, this more open process fostered change in how the university was lead, and seemed to foster renewed attention to the institution's mission:

These trustees spoke out when they perceived their alma mater as not living up to its mission, and Dartmouth students benefited. In May 2005, the college repealed its speech code, and it immediately moved from FIRE's 'red-light' rating and became a 'green-light' institution.

As might be expected, the reigning leadership was not pleased.

Some campus officials viewed the propensity of petition candidates to voice their opinions on illiberal policies as detrimental to the school's image. The Wall Street Journal profiled T.J. Rodgers, a petition-nominated trustee, who explained the criticisms leveled at the 'divisive dissidents.'

'If 'divisive' means there are issues and we debate the issues and move forward according to a consensus, then divisive equals democracy, and democracy is good. The alternative, which I fear is what the administration and [Board of Trustees Chairman] Ed Haldeman are after right now, is a politburo-one-party rule.'

In 2007, in apparent response to the "divisiveness" of the petition trustees, the Charter Trustees proposed increasing their own numbers. Chairman Ed Haldeman's rationale for this, as we discussed here, was to ensure that the board "has the broad range of backgrounds, skills, expertise, and fundraising capabilities needed," and that the board members would possess "even more diverse backgrounds."

Charter Trustees or "Shadow Bankers"?

Yet when we examined the backgrounds of the current charter trustees, we found that they exhibited little diversity. Remarkably, three-quarters (6/8) were in leaders of the finance sector. The board chairman, Ed Haldeman, was then the leader of Putnam Funds.  Now, he is the CEO of "Freddie Mac."  In 2007, the significance of this kind of lack of diversity were not clear.  However, it did seem strange that those accused of seeking to form a "politburo" came from the Wall Street, the street that the left once loved to hate.

However, by late 2008, the world economy descended into an unprecedented financial collapse. Many concluded that the global economic collapse was caused by arrogance, greed, and corruption within the financial sector. This suggested that leadership of academia, and academic medicine in particular, by leaders of the finance sector might not, in retrospect, have been a such a good idea. When we reexamined the composition of the now enlarged cohort of Charter Trustees, however, we found nine of 13 "charter" trustees were leaders in finance, now including three in asset management, two in private equity, one in the field formerly known as investment banking, one in venture capital, one in mutual funds, and one in strategic consulting and investment. Of the remaining four, one was the CEO of a large diversified corporation that has a major finance subsidiary. The remaining three were two physicians and a pharmaceutical corporate CEO.

Given the ongoing financial chaos at the time, we again suggested that a board dominated by business leaders in the finance sector might not be a good idea. Last week, a report came out suggesting why we were right.

Charter Trustees as Dartmouth's Own "Shadow Bankers"

"Educational Endowments and the Financial Crisis: Social Costs and Systemic Risks in the Shadow Banking System," published by the Center for Social Philanthropy, Tellus Institute, focused on how prominent educational institutions, including Dartmouth College, came to invest much of their endowments in risky, illiquid "alternative" investments, the sort provided by the "shadow banking system." The report noted that this change lead to greater financial risks, leading to recent losses and consequent sharp cutbacks in spending, programs, and employment at the affected institutions. In particular, however, it focused on leadership and governance problems at the institutions that lead to this state of affairs.

Although the emergence of the high-risk Endowment Model of Investing has taken place against the backdrop of powerful forces of financial globalization and the influence of Modern Portfolio Theory, its consolidation and influence today at colleges and universities depend vitally on college leaders: senior administrators, trustees, and investment managers, especially the increasingly prominent role of chief investment officer, or CIO. The financial crisis has in many ways been a crisis of leadership. The precipitous declines endowments have suffered during the credit crisis need to be understood as the logical outcome of the Endowment Model’s high risk strategies, but behind the model stand those who are ultimately responsible for its execution: whether as professional money managers, investment officers, affiliated investment management companies, outside managers, or investment consultants, or as the fiduciaries sitting on governing boards and investment committees.

At Dartmouth, in particular, the report focused on conflicts of interest among the board of trustees:

When it comes to weakened endowment oversight, the most glaring problem arises from trustees from the finance industry whose firms provide investment management services. One of the most disconcerting cases in this respect is that of Dartmouth College, where the sudden departure of CIO David Russ in 2009 created a leadership vacuum over endowment management. The college’s investment committee chair and trustee Stephen Mandel has played the CIO role on a voluntary, part-time basis since last summer and will continue to do so until he becomes chair of the board of trustees later this year. At the same time, Mandel’s firm, Lone Pine Capital LLC, a well known hedge-fund complex he founded in 1997, has also managed an investment mandate from the college’s endowment valued originally at $10 million. Although the college has a conflict-of interest policy and is required to disclose such 'pecuniary benefit transactions' with the state of New Hampshire, it would seem difficult for fellow trustees to provide proper oversight of investments managed by a fellow trustee serving as the de-facto CIO. Additionally, if Mandel recuses himself from committee or board deliberations related to his firm, then the investment committee must function without its chair.

However, the problem is magnified because Mandel is only one of more than half a dozen Dartmouth trustees whose firms manage multimillion-dollar investments for the endowment, according to the college’s filings with Charitable Trusts Unit of the New Hampshire Department of Justice. Leon Black’s firm Apollo Management has reportedly managed at least $40 million in Dartmouth investments. Russell Carson’s private equity firm[Welsh, Carson, Anderson and Stowe] has reportedly received at least $45 million in commitments of capital from Dartmouth. William Helman, IV’s venture capital firm Greylock Partners, has reportedly received $10 million investment mandates from the college, while R. Bradford Evans’ firm Morgan Stanley has done multiple transactions
with the college, varying from investments in international real estate and hedge funds to bond issuances, all at undisclosed levels. P. Andrew McLane [T A Associates] and Jonathan Newcomb [Leeds Weld and Co] have also had reported interests in college investments at undisclosed levels. For an endowment of its size— Dartmouth’s endowment fell to less than $3 billion in fiscal year 2009—the deep dependence on trustees’ own businesses for endowment management seems disproportionate.

Thus, one half of the membership of Dartmouth's Charter Trustees were also being paid by Dartmouth to manage its endowment investments.  However, as the Tellus Institute report noted,

Leading experts on nonprofit board governance, such as Richard Chait at Harvard University, stress that colleges should simply not do business with the companies of their board members, in order to avoid inevitable distractions and the sense of divided loyalties that arise, to say nothing of appearances of self-dealing and personal enrichment

Another "Missing Link": Board Members Doing Business with the Organizations They are Supposed to Steward

We have frequently discussed the web of conflicts of interest that now permeates health care.  Most of the conflicts we have discussed up to now involve physicians or academicians who have financial ties to pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and device companies.  Health care organizational leaders also do business  with the organizations they lead have not until recently been a topic of discussion, mainly because such conflicts of interest have rarely been disclosed.

It looks like this is going to change.  The US Internal Revenue Service sought disclosure of such conflicts of interest affecting hired executives and boards of trustees of not-for-profit organizations beginning in 2009.  These disclosures, reported on IRS form 990, are just beginning to be made public.  We just posted about members of the board of directors of a large academic health care system who also lead or owned companies that did substantial business with the system.  Now we see that a substantial portion of the board of trustees of Dartmouth lead financial firms that managed a major portion of the College's endowment, perhaps to the overall detriment of the endowment's performance.  No wonder the Charter Trustees got nervous about petition trustees poking about their business.

 As summarized by BoardSource, there are three traditional duties of members of boards of trustees of not-for-profit organizations:

Duty of Care

The duty of care describes the level of competence that is expected of a board member, and is commonly expressed as the duty of "care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances." This means that a board member owes the duty to exercise reasonable care when he or she makes a decision as a steward of the organization.

Duty of Loyalty

The duty of loyalty is a standard of faithfulness; a board member must give undivided allegiance when making decisions affecting the organization. This means that a board member can never use information obtained as a member for personal gain, but must act in the best interests of the organization.

Duty of Obedience

The duty of obedience requires board members to be faithful to the organization's mission. They are not permitted to act in a way that is inconsistent with the central goals of the organization. A basis for this rule lies in the public's trust that the organization will manage donated funds to fulfill the organization's mission.

Letting a board member's firm manage millions of dollars worth of the institution's endowment portfolio seems an obvious violation of the duty of loyalty. (Letting a board member's legal firm handle the institution's legal issues, or having a board member's advertising firm do its marketing, as described in our earlier post, also seem to be obvious violations of this duty.) A board member who sees nothing wrong with doing business with the organization he or she is supposed to steward would likely see nothing wrong in allowing the organization's mission to become a casualty of the means used to protect that business relationship.

I suspect we are soon to see many more examples of hired executives and board members of revered not-for-profit organizations who have been doing business on the side with the organizations of which they are supposed to be leaders or stewards.  These sorts of conflicts of interest may be another "missing link" explaining why the leadership and governance of health care organizations has gone so far astray. 

As disclosure continues, maybe enough outrage will ensue so that improved leadership and governance will become possible. 

$19 Million Means Never Having to Say You Are Sorry?

Johnson and Johnson, the giant diversified health care company, recently shut down a factory that manufactured non-prescription childrens' medication, and recalled its products.  The findings from a US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspection of the plant were striking.  As described by Reuters,

The company recalled 40 widely used children's pain and allergy medications, saying some may have a higher concentration of their active ingredients, while others may be contaminated. J&J has had four recalls in the past year of over-the-counter medicines.

In an FDA report issued on Tuesday, inspectors said they found thick dust, grime and contaminated ingredients at the J&J plant that produces Children's Tylenol and dozens of other products recalled last week.

This infuriated the member of Congress who chairs a sub-committee which oversees the FDA:

Democratic Representative Rosa DeLauro sent a letter to the Food and Drug Administration asking questions about how the agency can respond to recalls and quality control lapses.

'I am concerned that the agency does not possess the authority to take appropriate action to address potentially criminal behavior by a corporation,' DeLauro wrote in the letter to FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg.

Furthermore,

DeLauro, in her letter, said the company's 'disregard' for manufacturing standards was 'both unnerving and unethical.'

'The corporate oversight observed at this facility appears to be symptomatic of reckless behavior that is clearly unacceptable,' she wrote.

The Reuters report then noted:

J&J has called the manufacturing problems unacceptable and vowed to fix them. The company has suspended production at the Pennsylvania plant where the recalled children's products are made.

Moreover, the company CEO took to the blogsphere (via the company's JNJ BTW blog) to give his response (below in its entirety).

To All Who Use Our Products,

We have a responsibility at Johnson & Johnson to provide you with the highest-quality products possible, and we have worked hard to fulfill that responsibility day-by-day for over a century.

The recent recalls of some over-the-counter medicines from our McNeil Consumer Healthcare operating company are a matter of great concern. They are a disappointment to me, and to the employees of the Johnson & Johnson Family of Companies. You can be confident that we will make whatever changes are needed at McNeil to fully restore the quality of its manufacturing.

As reported, McNeil has suspended all manufacturing operations at its facility in Fort Washington, Pa., until we can be sure that they are operating under the standards we demand of ourselves, and which our customers expect of us. McNeil has also retained independent quality experts to assist in this regard and is re-evaluating quality systems and manufacturing processes across the organization.

I have been assured that the chance of a serious medical event from the recalled products is remote. Even so, this does not give us comfort; one of our companies has let you down.

For now, please check your infants’ or children’s forms of TYLENOL®, MOTRIN®, ZYRTEC® or BENADRYL® and discard any medicines that are being recalled. You can check the list of recalled lots, apply for refunds, and get more information about the recall at McNeil’s dedicated website (http://mcneilproductrecall.com), or by calling 888-222-6036.

We will work hard to earn back your confidence.

Sincerely,

Bill Weldon

This seems like a very important case, because it involves a pharmaceutical company apparently violating its most fundamental responsibility, to provide pure, unadulterated medicine to the public.  While the current case did not apparently lead to major health consequences to patients (as did the case of the contaminated heparin), it still suggests very basic flaws with Johnson & Johnson's operations.

Thus, what is striking about the CEO's message is its remote tone.  He characterizes the problems at the factory as a reason for "great concern" and "a disappointment."  Such language seems designed to reduce the CEO's own connection to the problems at the factory.  This is the language one might use to describe someone else's conduct.  (For example, Politician X's vote on the bill "caused me great concern," and "was a disappointment.")

On the other hand, although the CEO wrote about collective responsibility, ("we have a responsibility at Johnson and Johnson,"), he never suggested he had any responsibility or was accountable for what happened. 

Of course, we have frequently seen language like this when health care organizations are accused of practices that violate their fundamental responsibilities, or could threaten health and safety.  Rather than embracing responsibility, often leaders use language that suggests a fear of admitting anything that could create legal liability.

However,  supposedly the rationale for entrusting so much power, and providing so much compensation to CEOs and other top executives, including those of health care organizations, is the tremendous responsibility they undertake.  In fact, the Johnson & Johnson 2010 proxy statement provides this justification for the executives' stratospheric pay:

Pay for Performance —All components of compensation should be tied to the performance of the individual executive officer and his or her specific business unit or function and/or the Company overall.
• Credo Values— The manner in which financial and strategic objectives are achieved is important. While not always quantifiable, the manner in which employees achieve results should also be a key element of the individual performance review process. During the performance review process, the Company’s set of core values—trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fairness, caring and citizenship—as set forth in Our Credo should be used to assess how objectives are achieved.
• Accountability for Short- and Long-Term Performance — Annual performance bonuses and long term incentives should reward an appropriate balance of short- and long-term financial and strategic business results, with an emphasis on managing the business for the long-term.

It then goes on the emphasize the company's Credo:

Importance of Credo Values

For more than 65 years, the Johnson & Johnson Credo has guided the actions of the Company and its executive officers in fulfilling their responsibilities to the Company’s customers, employees, community and shareholders. In assessing the executive officers’ contributions to the Company’s performance, the Committee not only looks to results-oriented measures of performance, but also considers how those results were achieved— whether the decisions and actions leading to the results were consistent with the values embodied in the Credo— and the long-term impact of an executive officer’s decisions. Credo based behavior is not something that can be precisely measured and, thus, there is no formula for how
Credo-based behavior can, or will, impact an executive’s compensation. The Committee and the Chairman/CEO use their judgment and experience to evaluate whether an executive’s actions were aligned with the Company’s Credo values.

Thus, last year Mr Weldon's total compensation was $19,847,026. Such an amount ought to pay for a vast amount of responsibility and accountability. (Also, the total compensation of Ms C A Goggins, the Worldwide Chairman of the Consumer Group, who I presume to the the executive just below the CEO who is responsible for products made by the factory which had to be closed, was $5,345,737.)

So again the rules for the executives of big health care organizations seem to be heads they win, tails we lose.  They are paid enough to turn them into a new aristocracy supposedly because of the tremendous responsibility and accountability they assume.  However, when things go wrong, responsibility and accountability vanish in a haze of concern and disappointment (with other peoples' actions.)

On Health Care Renewal we continue to be concerned with and disappointed about our dysfunctional health care system, and its worsening problems with costs, quality and access as long as it is lead by people who can become rich without any responsibility or accountability for their actions.  The robber barons that arose in the late 19th century lead our country and the world into the great depression.  The new health care robber barons will soon lead us into the great health care depression. 

A "Very Well Paid Boob" on the Harvard Corporation?

The ongoing investigation of the global financial collapse may also shed some indirect light on what has gone wrong with health care.  Consider the recent testimony by two leaders of the nearly failed, then bailed out global financial giant Citigroup, as reported by the New York Times. One of the leaders was Robert Rubin,

Robert E. Rubin, the former Treasury secretary, faced withering questions from the panel, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, for his spare expressions of remorse. Repeatedly playing down his role as chairman of the executive committee of Citigroup’s board, he was met with anger and disbelief.

'You were either pulling the levers or asleep at the switch,' Philip N. Angelides, the committee’s chairman, told him.

Mr. Rubin stopped short of accepting personal responsibility. He grudgingly conceded that a few savvy investors saw the crisis coming, asserting that nearly everyone in the financial services industry had failed to see a dozen powerful forces — from excessive debt levels to trade imbalance — come together in a perfect storm.

'We all bear responsibility for not recognizing this, and I deeply regret that,' Mr. Rubin said.

Mr. Rubin’s stance left several members of the panel angry. Mr. Rubin earned more than $100 million during a decade at Citigroup.

Mr. Angelides, a former California state treasurer and a fellow Democrat, did not buy it. 'You were not a garden-variety board member,' he said. 'I think to most people chairman of the executive committee of the board of directors implies leadership. Certainly $15 million a year guaranteed implies leadership and responsibility.'

Attempts by Mr Rubin (and to some extent, former Citigroup CEO Charles O Prince III) to disavow responsibility met with more derision. For example, yesterday, see a New York Times editorial:

The latest public hearings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, held last week, made headlines for eliciting more apologies from financiers who presided over the market collapse.

You may recall a similar flurry last year, when Lloyd Blankfein, the chairman and chief executive of Goldman Sachs, was widely credited for having apologized for his firm’s role in the financial crisis.

We did not buy it then; Mr. Blankfein never said what he was sorry for or to whom he was apologizing. And we are not buying it now.

Mr. Prince says he 'could not' foresee the impending collapse, when he could have and should have seen it coming. Certainly, others did. Mr. Rubin has said that under his employment agreement, he was not responsible for the bank’s operations. But he was a towering figure at Citi, a source of its credibility and prestige. That implies responsibility, no matter what his contract said. Add all that to the 'I wasn’t the only one' context of both men’s comments, and their regret translates as, 'We feel bad about an accident we were powerless to prevent.'

Except that the financial crisis was not an accident and they were not powerless. The crisis was the result of irresponsibility and misjudgments by many people, including Mr. Prince and Mr. Rubin. Citi, under their leadership, epitomized the financial recklessness that ruined the economy.

A Seattle Times columnist was even more harsh, calling Rubin a "very well paid boob," and:

Rubin was barely contrite and went back to his meme of 'who knew?,' adding the unintended comedic line about how leaders shouldn't be responsibility for the 'granularity' of little things -- such as $40 billion in essentially fraudulent collateralized debt obligations. Rubin was being paid more than $100 million as a senior adviser to Citi while it headed toward collapse and a $45 billion taxpayer rescue. So 'granularity' is in the eye of the beholder.

Commission vice chairman Bill Thomas said, 'Apparently you get to the top without having had to experience anything the people underneath you do. You don't have a comprehension. You're not informed, but you get to make all this money on the upside, but there's no downside.'

Indeed. Rubin and Citigroup epitomize the public policies and the corporate practices that brought the economy to the brink of a new depression.

As Bill Clinton's Treasury Secretary, Rubin championed financial deregulation and the financialization of the economy as manufacturing was hollowed out. Among other things he helped keep derivatives from being regulated and encouraged the creation of 'too big to fail' institutions such as Citi. Rubin led the battle to dismantle Glass-Steagall, so Citi and its giant siblings could gamble in investment banking, while also doing commercial banking and insurance. An alum of Goldman Sachs, Rubin was fine with big compensation for executives, even if their leadership wrecked the bank (Prince walked away with $120 million). Funny how Rubin was offered the lucrative Citi position after he left such 'government service.'

So what does this tell us about health care? As we noted before, while Robert Rubin is no longer on the board of Citigroup, he has been a member of the Harvard Corporation since 2001. The Corporation is ultimately responsible for the US' oldest and most prestigious university, its equally prestigious medical school and teaching hospitals. Yet under Rubin's stewardship, Harvard's endowment has fallen a prodigious amount, and Harvard and its Partners Healthcare hospital system have faced charges of conflicts of interest and various sweetheart deals. Perhaps this is to be expected when the ultimate steward may be a "very well paid boob."

While Rubin's impressive resume and wealth in 2001 may have provided a rationale for his appointment to the Corporation, what would be the rationale for his continuing service?

As we have pointed out, as the world economy was driven to near ruin by "masters of the universe," some of the same also became leaders of academia and academic medicine in their spare time. Maybe this made sense 10 or 20 years ago, but why does it still make sense? On the other hand, now that we understand how bad the leadership of finance really was, it is a little easier to understand why the leadership of health care has become so bad.

What Me Worry? - Leaders Prosper Despite Questions About Their Organizations' Ethics and Performance

There were two examples in the recent news about how the leaders of health care organizations seem to prosper no matter what questions are raised about their organizations' ethics or performance.

WellPoint

It seemed that anger over a rate increase by a subsidiary of the huge insurance company/ managed care organization WellPoint was one reason for the revival of efforts in the US to enact some sort of health care reform legislation.  In our comment on this controversy, we noted that questions about the ethics of WellPoint's actions have appeared again and again.  Wellpoint...

• settled a RICO (racketeer influenced corrupt organization) law-suit in California over its alleged systematic attempts to withhold payments from physicians (see post here).
• subsidiary New York Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield misplaced a computer disc containing confidential information on 75,000 policy-holders (see story here).
• California Anthem Blue Cross subsidiary cancelled individual insurance policies after their owners made large claims (a practices sometimes called rescission).  The company was ordered to pay a million dollar fine in early 2007 for this (see post here).  A state agency charged that some of these cancellations by another WellPoint subsidiary were improper (see post here).  WellPoint was alleged to have pushed physicians to look for patients' medical problems that would allow rescission (see post here).  It turned out that California never collected the 2007 fine noted above, allegedly because the state agency feared that WellPoint had become too powerful to take on (see post here). But in 2008, WellPoint agreed to pay more fines for its rescission practices (see post here).  In 2009, WellPoint executives were defiant about their continued intention to make rescission in hearings before the US congress (see post here).
• California Blue Cross subsidiary allegedly attempted to get physicians to sign contracts whose confidentiality provisions would have prevented them from consulting lawyers about the contract (see post here).
• formerly acclaimed CFO was fired for unclear reasons, and then allegations from numerous women of what now might be called Tiger Woods-like activities surfaced (see post here).
• announced that its investment portfolio was hardly immune from the losses prevalent in late 2008 (see post here).
• was sanctioned by the US government in early 2009 for erroneously denying coverage to senior patients who subscribed to its Medicare drug plans (see post here).
• settled charges that it had used a questionable data-base (builty by Ingenix, a subsidiary of ostensible WellPoint competitor UnitedHealth) to determine fees paid to physicians for out-of-network care (see post here). 
• violated state law more than 700 times over a three-year period by failing to pay medical claims on time and misrepresenting policy provisions to customers, according to the California health insurance commissioner (see post here).

But a few days ago, according to the Indianapolis Star:

Large stock awards helped boost total compensation to top executives at WellPoint by 51 percent to 75 percent last year over 2008.

The big jumps in take-home pay are detailed in the Indianapolis health insurer's annual proxy report to shareholders filed Friday.

Angela Braly, who is chair of the board, president and chief executive, saw her 2009 total compensation rise 51 percent, to $13.1 million. That compares with $8.67 million in 2008 and $14.8 million in 2007.

Braly's salary of $1.14 million barely budged from 2008, but she earned a $6.2 million stock award, almost triple the award she got in 2008.

Total compensation to other top executives:

Wayne DeVeydt, chief financial officer, $7.25 million, up 75 percent from 2008.

Ken Goulet, executive vice president, $4.43 million, up 62 percent.

Dijuana Lewis, executive vice president, $4.46 million, up 64.5 percent.

So whatever top WellPoint executives are paid for, it is not insuring that the company avoids ethical questions about its conduct, or controls health care costs or mdoerates premiums, for that matter. 

Boston Scientific, and Zimmer Holdings

We just commented on the generous compensation given the new and former CEOs of Boston Scientific, despite a series of ethical questions about that company's conduct, culminating in a guilty plea by the company to charges that it concealed information about important and potentially dangerous defects in its products.

A few days ago, I found a reminder, buried in an article in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune about a dispute between Boston Scientific and St Jude Medical, that current Boston Scientific CEO Ray Elliott has a track record of collecting generous compensation despite ethical questions about the companies he has lead.

Elliott is certainly familiar with the potential ethical minefield surrounding the relationships between sales reps and doctors. He was CEO at orthopedic devicemaker Zimmer Holdings Inc., which paid (along with four other companies) $311 million in 2007 to settle a Department of Justice investigation into the consulting fees paid to doctors.

As we discussed back in 2007, Zimmer Holdings Inc was one of four medical device companies which submitted to deferred prosecution agreements in response to charges that the companies implemented criminal conspiracies to violate federal anti-kickback laws. We posted several times about one aspect of this settlement, the mandate that the companies make public the payments (often huge) to orthopedic surgeons, academic institutions, and medical associations. (See posts here, here, here, here, here.) At the time, I did not think to look into what happened to the leadership of these companies thereafter.

According to the 2008 proxy statement by Zimmer Holdings, Ray Elliott conveniently retired in 2007, just before the deferred prosecution agreement was announced. Since he had been President of Zimmer since 1997 and CEO since 2001, according to the 2007 proxy statement, he appeared to have been in the top leadership of the corporation during the time the actions were performed that resulted in the deferred prosecution agreement. Nonetheless, again according to the 2008 statement, for the part of 2007 during which he served as CEO, his total compensation was $7,987,158. For 2006, his total compensation was $11,998,121. In 2007, the present value of his two pension plans were $269,764 and $5,302,050. In 2007, he owned 1,235,859 shares of stock (now worth $72,952,757 at the current price of $59.03 /share), and had the right to acquire 1,169,987 more within 60 days.

And of course, as we posted earlier, Boston Scientific paid him over $30 million for working part of 2009.

So Mr Elliott prospered mightily from his leadership of ethically challenged Zimmer Holdings, and was then further rewarded by ethically challenged Boston Scientific.

Summary

We have commented again and again that while numerous health care organizations have been charged with unethical, and sometimes illegal behavior, the people who oversaw, directed, or implemented the behavior almost never have had to suffer any negative consequences.  Now we see that while some large health care organizations have been subject to penalties for unethical and illegal behavior, the leaders of these organizations have been compensated so well as to make them rich, rich beyond the dreams of most people.  So the problem is not merely that captaining an organization onto the ethical rocks costs one nothing, but that it can make one very rich.

Clearly we see examples of both profoundly perverse incentives and a complete lack of accountability and responsibility affecting the leadership of major health care organizations.  Is it any wonder that these organizations continue to act unethically, and that the costs of the goods and services they provide rise continuously?

If we truly want health care that is accessible, of high quality, at a fair price, and more importantly, if we want health care that is honest and focused on patients, we need to provide health care leaders with clear, rational incentives in these directions, and make them fully accountable for their actions, and the courses of their organizations under their leadership.

Making Health Care More Representative and Accountable - the Example of the Thai National Health Assembly

On Health Care Renewal, we have often shown how the governance of health care organizations may be unaccountable, unrepresentative of relevant constituencies, opaque, and not subject to ethical standards. Conversely, we have repeated the need to make the governance of health care organizations accountable, representative, transparent, and ethical. Meanwhile, our US debate about health care reform seems to be driven by leaders of powerful health care organizations, while common citizens need to scream to be heard.

Maybe we could benefit from a lesson from another country. As reported in the Bulletin of the WHO, Thailand seems to have found a way to get ordinary citizens and members of civil society involved in a civil, organized health care discussion.

For Dr Suwit Wibulpolprasert, chairman of the committee organizing Thailand’s first National Health Assembly (NHA), which took place from 11 to13 December 2008 in Bangkok, opening up the debate on public health is an essential part of developing effective national policy. 'In the past, health policy has tended to be drawn up by politicians and officials,' Wibulpolprasert says. 'But the National Health Assembly is a forum for the public to pool views and initiate health agendas that truly address people’s needs.'

More than 1500 people attended the conference, the first of its kind to take place since the passing into law of the National Health Act of 2007, which also brought the NHA into existence.

A broad cross-section of Thai society was represented, including 178 delegations from government agencies and provincial authorities, the private sector and civil society. In addition, groups including stateless people living near the Myanmar border gave presentations at technical briefings for participants. Dr Kumanan Rasanathan, from WHO’s Department of Ethics, Equity, Trade and Human Rights, described the meeting as 'a very interesting exercise in participatory governance'.

The 12 topics that were up for discussion were distilled from more than 68, including such familiar ones as universal access to medicines and equal access to basic public health services. Also addressed were matters as diverse as agriculture and food prices in the current economic crisis and safe media access for youth and family – an agenda that included a proposal for addressing problems of children addicted to online games and television.

'The broad slate of topics reflects the intention to encourage input from everyone,' says Rasanathan, 'and improve public participation as well as intersectoral collaboration.' In other words, the assembly’s organizers actively encouraged the participation of stakeholders from outside the field of public health – from education, agriculture and industry, to name but a few.

'The Thais have adapted much of the machinery of the World Health Assembly [WHO’s supreme decision-making body] for their own context,' says Rasanathan, who noted that each of the 178 constituent groups had equal speaking rights. Briefing papers were produced and resolutions were passed on each of the agendas. As with WHA resolutions, these resolutions are not binding.

According to Dr Amphon Jindawatthana, secretary-general of the National Health Commission Office, once the resolutions have been adopted they are considered by the National Health Commission, which reworks them for ministerial review and possible inclusion in national policy.

Given the hurdles that still need to be cleared once a resolution is passed at the Assembly, one might be forgiven for dismissing the body as something of a talking shop.

This is a charge that Wibulpolprasert firmly denies. He is convinced that NHA-formulated resolutions will certainly lead to policy, and policy that is closer to the needs of Thailand’s 63 million people.

The 2009 Assembly will be held in December. Details can be found here.

I wonder if we would be having a more productive health care debate in the US if the way had been prepared by a US National Health Assembly? Maybe if the multi-million dollar a year leaders of health care organizations had to listen to the concerns of ordinary people, and some practicing health care professionals, a little common sense might penetrate into the bubble created by their superclass membership.

IRS Changes Form 990 to Make Not-for-Profit Organizations More Transparent and Accountable

In the US, many important health care organizations are not-for-profit organizations. Many US medical schools, and other health educational institutions, along with their parent universities are not-for-profit. (Essentially all the exceptions are supported by local or state government.) The majority of US hospitals and hospital systems, including academic medical centers, are not-for-profit. Some managed care organizations are not-for-profit. Medical and professional societies, health care advocacy groups, health care charities, and a variety of other groups are not-for-profit.

Not-for-profit health care organizations here have hardly been immune from leadership and governance problems. We have discussed numerous instances of ill-informed, conflicted, and even corrupt leadership of these organizations, and underlying problems with their governance, which may be unrepresentative of key constituencies, unaccountable, secretive and opaque, and not subject to clear ethical rules.

There may be some major changes coming, however, affecting leadership and governance of all US not-f0r-profit organizations, including health care organizations. The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has long required that not-for-profits that exceed certain minimums file and make publicly available certain information on a form 990. Relatively recent forms from most US not-for-profits are available online from Guidestar.org. The old forms provided for some minimal transparency. They displayed, for example, a list of the filing not-for-profit organization's trustees, and the salaries and retirement plans given to their five highest-paid employees.

The IRS has revised the forms starting with those to be filed in 2009, which will reflect 2008 data, so as to markedly increase organizational transparency. The actual forms can be found on this IRS web-page, and a discussion of key points can be found here on the GuideStar.org web-site.

For the first time, the forms will include information about certain aspects of leadership and governance.

Leadership Conflicts of Interest

The new form 990 will require each organization to establish the "independence" of the organizations' trustees, directors, officers, and key employees. Independent individuals would be those without any direct or indirect business relationships with the not-for-profit organization; without any relatives with such business relationships; and who were not serving as an officer, director, trustee, key employee, partner, or member of an organization doing business with the not-for-profit organization. The relationships preventing individuals from being independent would have to be documented.

It is likely that perusal of such information on the new form 990 would reveal to some extent the degree the organization's leaders are conflicted. Up to now, it has been very difficult to get information about conflicts affecting the leadership of health care organizations. We have reported numerous cases of seemingly high-level conflicts affecting leaders of not-for-profit health care organizations. It is likely that such conflicts affect the ability and inclination of leaders to uphold their organization's mission, that is, to fulfill their duty of obedience.

Leadership Compensation

The new form 990 will ask for detailed information about the total compensation given to officers, directors, and trustees, key and the five most highly paid employees, and former officers, directors, trustees, key and most highly compensated employees who continued to receive substantial amounts. This will include not only reportable and other compensation, but whether anyone received unusual compensation such as first-class or charter travel, companion travel, tax indemnification for gross-up payments, discretionary spending accounts, housing allowance or residence for personal use, payments for business use of personal residence, health or social club dues or fees, and personal services (e.g., maid, chauffeur, chef). Also, the form inquires about severance packages and supplemental non-qualified retirement plans.

Up to now, little information about the compensation of not-for-profit leaders beyond base salaries, contributions to employee benefit plans and deferred compensation, and expense allowances and the like was available. Clearly, while not reaching the stratospheric levels enjoyed by top leaders of for-profit health care corporations, some leaders of not-for-profit health care organizations have come to be paid enough to make them rich. It is possible that some now regard their positions as first a pathway to wealth, rather than a calling to improve the health of society, or to advance medical education or science. Furthermore, it is possible that some leaders have been receiving additional compensation which has made them even more wealthy, while particular "perks," like staffed houses, chauffeured cars, and first-class travel, has isolated them from the patients, clients, and/or students they are supposed to be serving.

Organizational Policies

The new form 990 will ask whether the organization has a written conflict of interest policy, and if so, how compliance is monitored and enforced, and a written policy to protect whistle blowers.

Summary

In my humble opinion, the IRS' new form 990 could make substantial improvements to the transparency and accountability of not-for-profit health care organizations. Review of form 990's filed starting this year could provide important information about conflicts of interest affecting organizational leaders, whether they have been distracted by new-found wealth, or decoyed by luxurious perks, and whether their organizations have clear policies meant to maintain certain ethical standards.

However, while the IRS will mandate that such information becomes available, it is not clear what it will do about the information so revealed. Additionally, the wealth of information that will be provided could easily bury the few watchdogs, including the Health Care Renewal bloggers, that have been trying to monitor the governance and leadership of health care organizations.

However, the new information provides an important opportunity to other people concerned about these issues. For example, perhaps some health professionals have concerns about how their alma maters are lead and governed. Maybe they will peruse the new information provided, and then try to use it to make their alma maters more accountable. It is at least possible to be optimistic.

What Is to Be Done?

If you are concerned about a particular not-for-profit health care organization, you can prepare for the availability of more information from the revised form 990 in several ways, by searching for already publicly available information. You can peruse older form 990s, which at least provides the names of trustees and officers, and officers' and key employees' salaries.

In addition, the web makes it possible to identify some conflicts of interest affecting current leadership. For example, try first entering each leader's name, surrounded by quotes, into Google, to look for biographical information that could reveal conflicts. Next, try searching on the name plus terms like "board of directors," "board of trustees," "consultant," or "advisory board," which may uncover some additional conflicts. If you find anything of concern, consider making it more public.

Remember, the best way to improve health care leadership is to hold it accountable to an activated public, preferably strongly infused with health care professionals who want to uphold their professionalism.

BLOGSCAN - Accountable Academic Governance Under Threat

On The Torch blog, hosted by FIRE (Foundation for Individual Rights in Education), this post by Kyle Smeallie summarized the travails of "petition candidates" for the boards of trustees of two elite American universities (Dartmouth and Harvard). As we have noted, at most universities, the boards of trustees, the bodies ultimately responsible for upholding the universities' missions, are closed shops. At most universities, the boards appoint new members to replace departing ones, without input from alumni, parents, students, faculty or anyone else who might be considered constituents. Thus, at most universities, even though the boards are ultimately responsible for the stewardship of the institutions, and upholding the institutions' missions, practically, they are accountable to no one. At very few universities, there may be contested elections for a few board seats, and an opportunity for those outside the board, usually alumni, to place candidates on the ballot. However, even at those somewhat more enlightened universities, those candidates face an uphill battle. Thus, while Dartmouth and Harvard have somewhat more transparent, accountable, and representative governance than do most academic institutions, even that is under threat.

Pension Fund Scandals, Payment Agents, "Chooch" and the Anechoic Effect

As we get closer to graduation season for most institutions of higher education, another story about the leadership and governance of higher education, involving an institution housing a prominent medical school, has come into view, albeit indirectly. Let me try to explain this complex story, which on its surface has something to do with the ongoing financial crisis, but nothing to to with academia, by quoting, as usual, from media coverage.

We start with an article from the New York Times last week:

The man leading the Obama administration’s efforts to restructure the auto industry has been described in Securities and Exchange Commission documents as having arranged for his investment firm to pay more than $1 million to obtain New York State pension business.

Although he is not named in the documents, a person with knowledge of the inquiry said the investment executive is Steven Rattner, co-founder of the Quadrangle Group, the prominent private equity firm.

The S.E.C. complaint, filed as part of an expansive state and federal investigation into corruption at the state pension fund, details the efforts of Quadrangle to gain business from the pension fund beginning in 2004.

The person who received most of the $1 million-plus payment has been indicted, accused of selling access to the fund.

Here are the details of allegations of how Mr Rattner interacted with intermediaries to get NY state pension fund investments into his company.

Investigators are scrutinizing the fees paid by investment firms to intermediaries who arranged deals with the $122 billion pension fund. While such payments are legal, they often raise questions about conflicts of interest and would be illegal if used to bribe public officials.

In a 123-count indictment issued last month, two aides to Mr. Hevesi were accused of selling access to the fund. The aides, Hank Morris, who was Mr. Hevesi’s top political consultant, and David Loglisci, the fund’s chief investment officer, have denied any wrongdoing.

The S.E.C. complaint, which was released Wednesday, describes steps undertaken by the Quadrangle executive to win $100 million worth of business from the pension fund in 2005. That amount accounted for nearly 5 percent of a Quadrangle private equity fund and helped the company raise money from other investment funds.

In October 2004, the executive met with Mr. Loglisci to seek the pension fund investment and Mr. Loglisci 'reacted favorably' and 'began taking the necessary steps to secure approval' for the investment, the complaint said.

Two months later, in December, the same executive met with Mr. Morris, who, according to prosecutors, was working in tandem with Mr. Loglisci to generate millions of dollars in fees from the investment firms, and within weeks had agreed to a deal to pay an obscure securities firm that employed Mr. Morris 1.1 percent of any money that the retirement fund invested with Quadrangle, as a placement agent fee. That worked out to $1.1 million, of which Mr. Morris received 95 percent.

The timing of the meeting with Mr. Morris was significant, the complaint indicated, because the Quadrangle executive had already met with Mr. Loglisci and would presumably not need a placement agent. In addition, Quadrangle had previously retained a separate placement agent.

The executive also met with Mr. Loglisci about a low-budget movie Mr. Loglisci was producing, 'Chooch.' Soon afterward, GT Brands Holdings, a company owned by one of Quadrangle’s private equity funds, made a deal to acquire the DVD distribution rights to 'Chooch,' an agreement that made the film’s producers nearly $90,000.

The Quadrangle executive called Mr. Morris after the distribution deal was closed, and told him of the deal’s 'connection to Loglisci.' Three weeks later, Mr. Loglisci 'personally informed the Quadrangle executive that the retirement fund would be making a $100 million investment' in Quadrangle, the complaint said.

Later, the Washington Post published an article which alleges possible conflicts of interest affecting Mr Rattner in his current position as "automobile czar,"

The questions around Quadrangle and Rattner follow others that came to light soon after he emerged as a candidate to lead the Obama administration's efforts to prop up Chrysler and General Motors.

Quadrangle was, at least indirectly, previously involved in a deal involving Chrysler's majority owner, Cerberus Capital Management, a private equity firm.

That connection has led some Chrysler investors to doubt whether Rattner can decide without bias how the government should aid Chrysler.

In the summer of 2007, Quadrangle purchased Dennis Publishing, the owner of magazines including Maxim and Blender. The estimated price was $250 million.

Quadrangle's new magazine company was renamed Alpha Media and it took a loan of $125 million, much of it coming from Cerberus.

A year after Quadrangle's purchase, the publishing company's profits began to plummet.

The company announced last month that it would cease publication of its Blender magazine. Quadrangle has written the Alpha Media investment down to zero on its books, and Cerberus, the company's major creditor, is now effectively in control of Alpha, a person familiar with the matter said.

This week, a NY Times article revealed that Mr Rattner and Quadrangle are facing a wider investigation, and may be a target of investor lawsuits:

Two months after Steven Rattner left Wall Street for Washington, his private investment company is facing a widening investigation into corruption in public pension funds — and fighting for its future.

As state and federal authorities examine Mr. Rattner’s dealings with the New York State retirement fund, questions are emerging about his efforts to gain business from several other public funds, including ones in New Mexico and New York City. His private investment firm, the Quadrangle Group, is moving to calm anxious pension managers, who have entrusted the firm with hundreds of millions of dollars.

Mr. Rattner, who is leading the Obama administration’s efforts to revamp the auto industry, has left his small but prominent firm in a bind. Because he was integral to Quadrangle, investors can try to withhold additional money that they have pledged to the firm now that he has left.

No charges have been filed against Mr. Rattner, who did not respond to e-mail messages on Tuesday, or against Quadrangle, whose executives declined to comment.

While Quadrangle’s funds have not suffered as much as some other private equity funds, its investors have suffered losses in other parts of their portfolios. Some of them might try to capitalize on the inquiry to avoid making good on their pledges.

Another crucial question, however, is whether money from one Quadrangle fund was used to lure investors to a second fund. That possibility that might expose Quadrangle to investor lawsuits.

Furthermore, a Washington Post article raised the question of a failure of honest disclosure:

Government officials are expanding their investigation of Quadrangle, the private-equity firm founded by the Obama administration's lead auto negotiator, as new details emerge about an alleged kickback scheme involving the New York state pension fund.

On Wednesday, the New York City Comptroller William C. Thompson Jr. said he is working with the state's attorney general, Andrew M. Cuomo, to determine whether the city's pension funds were 'intentionally misled or deceived' by Quadrangle's failure to disclose the use of a middleman who has since been indicted, Hank Morris.

New York City's comptroller on Wednesday said Quadrangle never disclosed that it had paid Morris fees in connection with the city pension funds' investment in Quadrangle. The city invested $85 million in 2005 and $40 million in 2006.

The city has a rule that use of placement agents must be disclosed, but that rule was implemented in 2008 and does not apply to the Quadrangle investments.

But as part of the due diligence for receiving the investment, Quadrangle said in writing at the time that it used only two placement agents, Monument Group and London-based Helix Associates, the comptroller's office said.

'We take any ethical lapses by our managers seriously and will consider any remedies available to investors,' Thompson, the city's comptroller, said in a statement.

In response to all this, New York state government officials decided to ban middle-men from influence over pension fund investment decisions, according to the Wall Street Journal:

New York state said its public pension fund, one of the nation's largest, would ban the use of middlemen to help private-equity funds and other investors secure its business.

The move marked a pivotal development in a burgeoning controversy that has grown from a local corruption probe to a broader examination of the tactics that investment firms used to win lucrative business from vast public pension pools.

In most states, charging placement fees is legal if they are disclosed as required. But potential conflicts of interest are rife, especially for officials with a legal obligation to make informed, well-intended decisions about how pension-fund money is spent. Lawyers say a gray area emerges when finder's fees are paid to individuals or firms that do little more than trade on their access to public-pension-fund executives.

Such alleged behavior is at the heart of the scandal unfolding in New York. The state attorney general and the SEC have accused a former top fund official and a political adviser of giving investment funds access to billions of dollars of state pension money, in exchange for kickbacks and other payments for personal and political gain. One such middleman already has pleaded guilty to securities-fraud charges.

Some officials across the country have expressed concern about so-called pay-to-play practices -- that is, paying to influence people who direct the investments of public-employee retirement funds. Pay-to-play can range from illegal kickbacks, which in some instances have led to jail time, to legal activities such as campaign contributions to elected officials on the boards of pension funds. Pension funds are especially vulnerable to such accusations because their boards are often populated by elected officials or people with limited financial experience who need to rely heavily on outside advisers.

New York state's comptroller, Thomas DiNapoli, said that in light of the allegations contained in the case brought by the state's attorney general and the SEC, 'the best way to restore the pension fund's reputation is to say we won't be involved with any transactions that involved placement agents.'

Meanwhile, several commentators raised questions about Mr Rattner's suitability to be "automobile czar."

David Rothkopf, the author of Superclass, dubbed Mr Rattner the "kickback czar" on the Foreign Policy blog,

Are you joking? The Obama Administration somehow thought that it was okay to give a pass to Steve Rattner? They thought it was okay to appoint a guy to a key job after he apparently acknowledged to them that he was under investigation for providing a million dollar payment to pension consultant in exchange for receiving an assignment to manage a big chunk of pension fund money for New York State?

They thought it was okay in the middle of a justified surge of global disgust with Wall Street to embrace a big time Wall Street player who is smart enough to be arguing the legal technicalities of the transaction but not smart enough to recognize that it might just seem to be sleazy, dubious and a gross disservice to the people who were depending on the State to use appropriate methods and metrics to find stewards for their retirement money?

They even thought it was okay when part of the deal involved payments to support a movie called 'Chooch.' (What’s worse than bad ethics and bad taste all wrapped up into one sordid exchange? The New York Post called 'Chooch' which scored an amazing 00 rating from Rotten Tomatoes “the kind of vanity project that gives amateurs a bad name.”) What's more they did all this while giving Rattner the job of auto czar for which he had no material auto industry experience? I thought the way high ethical standards worked was that you didn't just bar people convicted of crimes, you tried to weed out people who had done things that were wrong or contrary to the public interest.

On BlackStarNews, Edward Manfredonia wrote:

I believed Rattner’s efforts to take the Times private should have disqualified him from an appointment with the Obama Administration; especially the key post of trying to stabilize the collapsing auto industry.

The White House still insists that the Administration fully supports Rattner; that reminds me of Bush proclaiming backing for Don Rumsfeld when it was clear he should have been shown the door as defense secretary.

Here's why Rattner deserves the boot.

An even more egregious form of activity that what I previously covered has become public. Rattner, who has extensive ties to Bill and Hillary Clinton, has been identified in several published news reports as the Quadrangle Fund executive who paid $1.1 million to receive more than $100 million from New York State’s multi-billion dollar pension fund to manage. The manner in which the payments were made leaves no doubt that they were meant for 'pay to play', which is illegal in my opinion.

Not surprisingly, a NY Times editorial was milder, but did allow,

Mr. Rattner showed some bad judgment in the 'Chooch' deal, and the public has a right to expect more of him in his new, highly sensitive position.

It's an interesting story, with implications in many areas, and it has hardly played out. Anyone reading this far is probably wondering, however, what this has to do with leadership, governance, and ethics in health care. None of the articles quoted above mentioned anything related to health care, or academics for that matter.

Here is where I pull the rabbit out of the hat.

Steven Rattner, in fact, has an important leadership position relevant to academics, and to academic health care. He is a member of Brown University's Board of Fellows, the "upper house" in the university's bicameral board of trustees, called the Brown Corporation. Brown University includes the Alpert Medical School, and the Division of Biology and Medicine. (Full disclosure: I am an alumnus of the College at Brown, and of the Medical School. I am a former full-time Brown faculty member, and currently a voluntary Clinical Associate Professor.)

And thus the issue here is really about the anechoic effect. Even though this convoluted case raises issues about Mr Rattner's role at Brown analogous to the issues it raises about his role as "automobile czar," there has been to date not even any media mention of his role at Brown, much less discussion of its implications for the university, academic leadership and governance, etc.

To survey the local coverage, the Providence Journal has not published any relevant news stories so far. It did print an op-ed questioning Mr Rattner's suitability for the "automobile czar" position, which had to do with the lack of sympathy an "investment banker" might have for the United Auto Workers. The Boston Globe ran a story from the Washington Post about the case, but one that had nothing on the local, or the academic angle. The Brown Daily Herald published a two news stories (here and here) about Mr Rattner's appointment as "automobile czar," which did note he is a "corporation member," but has not covered the current controversy. I am aware of no recent open discussion, or any discussion at all of Mr Rattner as a member of the Board of Fellows, in light of the recent unpleasantness.

Thus, our local angle on the New York pension/ placement agents/ Quadrangle/ "Chooch" affair mainly demonstrates how at many academic institutions, it is simply not done to bring up issues that question leadership and governance, especially at the highest levels.

Parenthetically, we have posted many times, most recently here, about the leadership and governance of Dartmouth College. Some might have interpreted these posts as hostile to that institution. They were anything but. In fact, it has only been possible to discuss leadership and governance at Dartmouth so thoroughly because that institution is much more open about its leadership and governance than is the typical US academic institution. Half of the he Dartmouth Board of Trustees, as we noted, used to be elected by vote of the alumni. The alumni could nominate their own candidates for the Board, through a petition process. The successful attempt to decrease the overall proportion of elected Trustees sparked a tremendous amount of open discussion and debate. Issues of leadership and governance at Dartmouth seem to be frequently discussed in local publications, on blogs, and sometimes even in the national media. I suspect that a governance system at Dartmouth marked by more than average representativeness and accountability has lead to much more vigorous debate and discussion of academic governance and leadership than occurs at more typical universities. (Note that even after the "board packing," Dartmouth still has a larger proportion of alumni-elected trustees than does the typical university, and it is still possible for alumni to put people on the ballot via petition.)

Brown University, on the other hand, is lead by a Corporation most of whose members are appointed by the Corporation itself. While a minority (14 of 42) of the Board of Trustees (the lower house) of the Corporation are elected by alumni, to my knowledge, all the election candidates are hand-picked by the Brown Alumni Association, and there is no provision for petition candidates. Although a few fiesty students occasionally call for more light to shine on the Brown Corporation, (e.g., see here), for the most part, questioning the leadership and governance of the university is simply not done. Thus, Brown seems to be typical of most major US academic organizations.

However, more transparent, accountable, governance, clearly guided by ethical principles and the organization's mission might allow US academia, and academic medicine to address some of the problems that we too often have opportunities to discuss on Health Care Renewal.