VCU President Rao's Previous Code of Silence

We recently posted about the code of silence imposed by Virginia Commonwealth University President Stephen Rao on his staff.  It turns out now that this was not his first exercise in imposing a code of silence. Before he was at Virginia Commonwealth University, Rao was President of Central Michigan University.  Central Michigan Life just reported:

While serving as CMU president, Rao required all office employees to sign a similar confidentiality agreement stating all names, places, dates or incidents that happened in his office were not to be shared with anyone or discussed outside the office.

'I understand that the information and all files, letters, projects, telephone calls and anything relating to the work performed in the President’s Office and in my capacity as an employee is highly confidential,' stated the agreement, which was obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request. 'I understand that it may not be discussed with anyone outside this office who does not have a need to know, which includes any other CMU employee, as well as my family members, friends, etc.'

The CMU confidentiality agreement extended past any employee’s tenure at CMU, stating that the contract must not be broken past the term of employment. If an employee were to break the confidentiality agreement past employment, possible consequences included personal liability and potential lawsuits.

Note that just as was the case in Virginia, this agreement placed employees at risk not only of losing their jobs, but of being sued were they to violate the agreement.

By the way, while Central Michigan University does not include a medical school and academic medical center, as does VCU, it does have, and therefore the previous agreement affected the operations of multiple health related programs (see here) including allied health, health administration, physical therapy, and psychology.

As we wrote previously, such a code of silence subverts the university's central mission, and directly opposes the transparency I believe is necessary for good governance in health care.  The discovery of this previous confidentiality agreement at CMU suggests that such agreements may not be rare in health care. 

We have long discussed the anechoic effect in health care, how certain topics and issues are just not to be discussed, especially those that might embarrass or oppose the personal interests of health care leaders.  We have postulated that the effect operates through fear of offending supervisors, colleagues, or those who provide one's pay.  It may be, however, that the anechoic effect has been codified through confidentiality clauses.  As noted above, such codification can mean whistle-blowers may risk lawsuits as well as job loss and ostracism.

If there are other codes of silence operative in health care, I hope that sunlight soon shines upon them. 

That sunlight may cause such codes to shrivel is suggested by President Rao's rescinding of the code at VCU soon after it was made public, as reported by the Richmond Times-Dispatch:

With the board of visitors meeting yesterday to evaluate his performance, Virginia Commonwealth University President Michael Rao rescinded the confidentiality agreements he required employees working in his office to sign.

Rao sent employees a letter Wednesday that said the confidentiality agreements were intended "to protect the privacy of my family, particularly my children, in my home."

'The confidentiality agreements have been the subject of recent scrutiny and criticism and, unfortunately, have been misinterpreted in terms of what I sought to be accomplished by these agreements,' he wrote. 'I sincerely regret any undue burden or ill will that these agreements may have caused. Therefore, I have decided to withdraw all such confidentiality agreements.'

Such codes ought to be perceived as unethical, and perhaps should be made illegal.  Meanwhile, though, the anechoic effect continues.

A Confidentiality Clause or an Oath of Fealty?

The advancement of modern scientific medicine depends on the search for and dissemination of truth. Academic medicine, like the rest of academia, ought to be based on openness, transparency, and academic freedom. The 1940 American Association of University Professors (AAUP) Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure opened with:

The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.

Yet we have written about dark clouds of secrecy spreading over medicine and health care. The increasingly powerful leaders of health care increasingly use opacity and secrecy to keep what they are doing out of the public eye. We have frequently discussed the anechoic effect, how it is just not done to discuss certain topics, particularly those related to the adverse effects of bad (ill-informed, incompetent, self-interested, conflicted, or corrupt) leadership and bad (opaque, unaccountable, mission-hostile, unethical) governance of health care organizations.  People may feel it is unseemly to speak badly of renowned institutions such as hospitals and universities.  People with conflicts of interest may not be inclined to criticize those who pay them.  Now people employed by contemporary health care organizations may have to pledge theri silence to keep their jobs.

The latest story in this regard comes from Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU), which includes VCU Health Systems, and MCV Hospital and Physicians.  (Full disclosure: I was a VCU full-time faculty member from 1987-1994, and still am on the adjunct faculty.)  In 2008, the VCU President resigned after the university's secret research contract with a tobacco company, and the President's own position on the board of directors of another tobacco company were revealed (see blog post here and others here).

Michael Rao, the President since 2008, is now under outside review after it was revealed that he required his staff to sign a secrecy pledge.  The story appeared in the Richmond Times-Dispatch:

Virginia Commonwealth University President Michael Rao asks employees who work in his office to sign an unusual confidentiality agreement that bars them from talking about what they observe about him or his family.

The prohibition goes beyond the standard agreement that university employees sign acknowledging that they can't disclose personal or proprietary information.

The agreement, a copy of which was obtained by the Richmond Times-Dispatch, covers interactions at Rao's office and at his residence. It bars disclosure not just to the news media, family or friends, but also to colleagues, 'clergy and attorneys, or to any other person not otherwise identified.'

'I agree that any such disclosure in violation of this nondisclosure agreement could result in irreparable damage and harm to VCU, President Rao, and/or his family'" the agreement states. 'Any such violation or anticipated violation' would entitle Rao to seek 'injunctive relief' in Richmond or Henrico County circuit courts.

VCU spokeswoman Pam Lepley said she could not comment immediately yesterday.

Several current or former employees of the president's office confirmed that they had been asked to sign the agreement, including Kimberley Busch, Rao's former scheduler.

She described it as a 'what happens in the president's office stays in the president's office' agreement.

The newly uncovered confidentiality clause provoked strong criticism:

Raymond D. Cotton, a Washington attorney who specializes in higher-education governance, said such a confidentiality agreement is highly unusual and goes against the culture of openness and transparency in higher education.

'There is this concept of academic freedom that is broader than the First Amendment,' he said.

In fact, since Virginia Commonwealth University is a state-supported institution, the confidentiality clause may be unconstitutional, as reported by WTVR:

Kent Willis with the Virginia American Civil Liberties Union said the agreement doesn't pass constitutional muster.

'A public employee, no matter where they are in the government, has a right to speak out on matters of public concern,' Willis said. 'That's a U.S. Supreme Court case, it's guaranteed to every public employee by the First Amendment to the Constitution.'

Willis said there are numerous legal issues raised by the contract. But, he said, the bottom line problem with the contract 'is the attitude. This is a contract that says 'I'm not transparent. I don't want you to know what is going on. I'm running a closed shop.''

Times-Dispatch columnist Michael Paul Williams wrote:

VCU, we have a problem. This confidentiality agreement does not inspire confidence. The lack of transparency only gives the appearance that someone's hiding something.

He also further quoted Kent Willis:

Rao's contract 'fails to address this whistle-blower right and could create conflicts for employees, who are silenced by the employment contract,' yet have a constitutional right to speak out on some matters, Willis said.

And as Willis points out, even if a person's constitutional right trumps the contract, how many employees are willing to take that risk?

'Particularly disturbing is the prohibition against talking to an attorney,' he said. 'If an employee believes something illegal is going on at work, an attorney is precisely the person he or she should be talking with.'

We just posted about how a pharmaceutical company included a confidentiality clause in a consulting contract, suggesting the deliberate creation of a conflict of interest in order to prevent criticism of the company's products or practices. 

However, in several ways, the present example is more insidious.  First, it involves a university, whose mission is to discover and disseminate the truth.  Thus, as noted above, the confidentiality agreement subverts the university's core mission.  Second, it was required of full-time employees who wanted to keep  their jobs, making choose between secrecy and unemployment.  Third, it was particularly harsh, addressing incipient as well as actual disclosure, and including injunctive relief as well as the threat of  termination.  Fourth, it protected not just the organization and its products, but personally protected the organization's leader and his family.  It was not just a contract, but an oath of fealty, as if the CEO were nobility, or even royalty.

The good news is that this confidentiality agreement now sits in the glare of sunlight.  One does wonder, however, how many other such agreements are already in force so that the would be nobility who now run too much of health care to avoid any embarassing revelations about what their leadership really is about.

We are a long way from the transparency that true health care reform requires. 

RUC It Up - How the US Government Fixes Physicians' Payments Becomes Less Anechoic

We have frequently posted, first here in 2007, and most recently here and here, about the little-known group that controls how the US Medicare system pays physicians, the RBRVS Update Committee, or RUC. 

Since 1991, Medicare as set physicians' payments using the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS), ostensibly based on a rational formula to tie physicians' pay to the time and effort the expend, and the resources they consume on particular patient care activities.  Although the RBRVS was meant to level the payment playing field for cognitive services, including primary care, vs procedures, over time it has had the opposite effect, as explained by Bodenheimer et al in a 1997 article in the Annals of Internal Medicine.(1)  A system that pays a lot for procedures, but much less for diagnosing illnesses, forecasting prognoses, deciding on treatment, understanding patients' values and preferences, when procedures and devices are not involved, is likely to be very expensive, but not necessarily very good for patients. 

As we wrote before, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments. However, the identities of RUC members are opaque, and the proceedings of the group are secret.


To expand on the penultimate point, the current page on the AMA web-site that describes the RUC only lists its members in terms of their specialties and organizational affiliation. Their names do not appear. A response to a previous post by me on the subject by the then Chair and Chair-Elect of the RUC suggested that the RUC membership is not quite secret. They stated that "a list of the individual members of the RUC is published in the AMA publication, Medicare RBRVS 2009: The Physicians Guide." This publication is available from the AMA here for a mere $71.95. However, the book is not on the web, or in my local or university library, and I have no other way to easily access it. Thus, the RUC membership as at best relatively opaque.

To expand on the ultimate point, as Goodson(2) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."

The fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about. We have posted (here, here, here, and here) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC. Up until now in 2010, after the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seems to remain the great unmentionable. Even the leading US medical journal seems reluctant to even print its name.

That has just changed.  A combined effort by the Wall Street Journal, the Center for Public Integrity, and Kaiser yielded two major articles about the RUC, here in the WSJ (also with two more spin-off articles), and here from the Center for Public Integrity (also reprinted by Kaiser Health News.)  The articles cover the main points about the RUC: its de facto control over how physicians are paid, its "secretive" nature (quoting the WSJ article), how it appears to favor procedures over cognitive physician services, etc.

So the RUC has suddenly become less anechoic.

However, despite the best efforts of some very good investigative reporters, there still are important unanswered questions, questions we have raised before:

• How did the government come to fix the payments physicians receive? Government price-fixing has not been popular in the US, yet this has caused no outcry.
• Why is the process by which they are fixed allowed to be so opaque and unaccountable? Why are there no public hearings on the updates, and why is there no input from practicing physicians or organizations other than those related to the RUC?
• How did the RUC become de facto in charge of this process?
• Why does the AMA keep the membership on the RUC so opaque, and give no input into the RUC process to its general membership?
• Why is the RUC membership so dominated by procedural specialists? Why were primary care physicians, who made up at least a sizable minority of physicians when the update process was started, not represented according to their numbers?
• Why has there been so little discussion of the RUC and its responsibility for an extremely expensive health care system dominated by high-technology, expensive, risky and invasive procedures?

Without discussing how the incentives for physicians became so unbalanced, do we really expect we can fix them?  If we do not fix them, do we really think we can "bend the cost curve?"  If we do not control our costs, do we really think that we will be able to make good health care accessible for all?  At least now I can say that the issue may really be in play for health care professionals, health care policy experts, and the public at large.
See also comments on other blogs: DBs Medical Rants, GoozNews, and Managed Care Matters.

ADDENDUM - Additionally, see comments on the Retired Doc's Thoughts blog, and the Running a Hospital blog.

References
1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link here.)

2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. (Link here.)

"Proprietary Information," Confidentiality Motions, and the Anechoic Effect; the Case of the Contaminated Heparin

The case of the deadly contaminated heparin sold by Baxter International has received much less attention than seems warranted given its human costs (81 lives).  How the heparin was contaminated, and how the contaminated heparin ended up being sold as a US Food and Drug Administration approved American product are still unknown.  Our most recent post, here, noted that an investigation into the contamination of the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API - actually the heparin itself) in China failed to produce any results, apparently because the Chinese government did not see fit to pursue it.  (Note that a brief summary of the whole case is at the end of this post.)
Now a new story in the Wall Street Journal by Alicia Mundy explains even more about why we do not know more about the contaminated heparin:

Baxter International Inc. faces a new challenge in federal court in its bid to block disclosure of documents about the 2008 contaminated-heparin crisis.

Baxter and Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC are fighting a civil mass tort lawsuit alleging deaths and injuries from imported Chinese heparin in 2007 and 2008. A company that isn't party to that lawsuit says some of the information Baxter and SPL want to keep confidential is important to public health and drug safety, and could reveal information about the sources of toxic heparin in the Chinese supply chain.

The two companies want to keep under seal portions of depositions taken in the case, including those related to Momenta Pharmaceuticals Inc., which helped the U.S. government investigate the contamination. Baxter and SPL say they will be hurt if forced to disclose proprietary information.

They have denied that they were negligent in the deaths linked to the blood-thinning drug, widely used in cardiovascular and other conditions.

So,

On Aug. 3, federal Judge James Carr in Toledo, Ohio, ruled in favor of the confidentiality motion by Baxter and SPL.

On the other hand, there are arguments, admittedly by parties with relevant financial interests, for making more information public:

Last Friday, another company entered the fray, contending that the information in the depositions shouldn't be sealed. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc. said public health could benefit if the depositions shed light on circumstances in China.

Amphastar, which has been competing with Momenta for approval to make a newer and more expensive form of heparin, said the information is also important to a congressional investigation into the Food and Drug Administration's handling of the heparin crisis. Republican leaders of a House committee say the FDA failed to trace the contamination in the Chinese heparin supply chain.

On July 23, the FDA granted approval to Momenta to make the special heparin called enoxaparin, while Amphastar's application remains on hold.

Amphastar said in its court filing that the 'serious safety concerns' involving heparin are relevant to enoxaparin because heparin is the starting material of enoxaparin's active ingredient. Most U.S. heparin supplies come from China.

Of course, the companies who want to keep as much about the case secret as they can are not talking about it:

Lawyers for Baxter and SPL declined to comment on their efforts to restrict information related to Momenta. They referred inquiries to Baxter, whose spokeswoman declined to comment.

So here is more about what we do not know about the deadly contaminated heparin from China. One reason that this case has remained so anechoic is that the companies that sold and processed the contaminated heparin, and are now defendants in lawsuits have used that situation as a rationale for keeping "proprietary" information secret.  There clearly may be reasons that Baxter International, the company that sold the heparin under their (formerly?) prestigious US label  wants to keep secret the details about what efforts it did or did not make to assure that the heparin it sold was pure and unadulterated. There clearly also may be reasons that Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC, the US based company that sold the heparin API to Baxter wants to keep secret the details about what efforts it did or did not make to assure that the heparin API was pure and unadulterated. 

The ability of participants in lawsuits to keep "proprietary" information secret clearly adds to the anechoic effect.  Ironically, it may be that civil legal action, which is sometimes the only way to impose negative consequences on health care organizations that have misbehaved, may have the adverse effect of further hiding information about the events in question. 

However, to promote the safety of individual patients and the health of public, and to prevent another deadly case of drug contamination, understanding details about what happened is absolutely vital. The private pecuniary interests of Baxter International and Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC seem to be directly opposite to those of patients, physicians, and the public at large in this case. It is therefore disquieting to learn that the companies' wishes to keep information they declare is "proprietary" seem to have trumped individual patient safety and public health concerns. (Note that these concerns go beyond the commercial concerns of Amphastar Pharmaceutical, although in this case the pecuniary interests of that company do not seem to be opposed to patient safety and the public health.)

If we really want a health care system that improves the health of individuals and the public, we need it to put health and safety concerns ahead of the incomes of health care corporations.  That such a statement seems not a platitude, but revolutionary is a mark of how our health care system has been turned on its head.

Case Summary


In summary, Baxter International imported the "active pharmaceutical ingredient" (API) of heparin, that is, in plainer language, the drug itself, from China. That API was then sold, with some minor processing, as a Baxter International product with a Baxter International label. The drug came from a sketchy supply chain that Baxter did not directly supervise, apparently originating in small "workshops" operating under primitive and unsanitary conditions without any meaningful inspection or supervision by the company, the Chinese government, or the FDA. The heparin proved to have been adulterated with over-sulfated chondroitin sulfate (OSCS), and many patients who received got seriously ill or died. While there have been investigations of how the adulteration adversely affected patients, to date, there have been no publicly reported investigations of how the OSCS got into the heparin, and who should have been responsible for overseeing the purity and safety of the product. Despite the facts that clearly patients died from receiving this adulterated drug, no individual has yet suffered any negative consequence for what amounted to poisoning of patients with a brand-name but adulterated pharmaceutical product.


(For a more detailed summary of the case, look here.)

2 Legal Settlements + 1 Corporate Integrity Agreement = $130 Million Retirement Package?

Omnicare's Trail of Legal Settlements

Last year, we discussed a $98 million settlement made by Omnicare, US based corporation that manages pharmacy-benefits, of allegations that it received kickbacks from generic drug manufacturers for buying and recommending their drugs.  Omnicare had previously submitted to a corporate integrity agreement in 2006, and paid $102 million to settle allegations it defrauded Medicaid.  At the time, we noted that this was yet another of the many cases in which the organization alleged to be involved in wrong-doing paid a fine, but no one who authorized, directed, or implemented the bad behavior was subject to any negative consequences.

So last week, Cincinnati.com ran a story on the retirement of the CEO who presided over Omnicare during the time of the alleged misconduct. 

Before reading further, would anyone care to guess whether the company's previous bad behavior would negatively impact his fortunes?

Contrasted with the Size of the CEO's Retirement Package

No exactamente:

As Omnicare Inc.'s new leadership begins to reshape its corporate culture - one that had included generous pay for senior executives - the Fortune 500 firm's exiting CEO stands to collect one of the largest payouts landed by a U.S. corporate executive in recent history.

Former president and CEO Joel Gemunder, who surprised analysts and investors when he retired on July 31, is in line to receive more than $130 million in severance, pension and departing payouts.

At 71, Gemunder had led Omnicare Inc., the nation's largest provider of pharmaceuticals for the elderly, for nearly 30 years.

On his retirement, Gemunder was up for a lump sum pension payment of more than $91 million. That's in addition to a monthly pension payment of $1,719 and roughly $5.38 million from a deferred compensation plan.

Gemunder also will receive $16.2 million in cash severance payable through next July. His 2.7 million in stock options and more than 705,100 shares of restricted common stock also became fully vested on his retirement. Collectively, the shares were worth more than $21.7 million, according to the company's most recent proxy.

To recapitulate so far: the company had to make two settlements of charges of kickbacks and fraud, totalling about $200 million, and accept a corporate integrity agreement. The CEO on whose watch this occurred left the company with a $130 million retirement package.

Can we spell "impunity?"

Protest from the Main-Stream Media

But this case was different from many of the legal settlements that we have chronicled in the past. In those previous cases, we noted how corporate bad behavior cost the organization as a whole, and hence collectively cost the stock-owners, the employees, and the customers/ clients/ patients involved, but not the leaders who authorized and directed the bad behavior, nor the particular people who implemented it. Hardly anyone else, however, took notice.

However, after Mr Gemunder's obese retirement package was made public, there was actually outrage in the opinion section of the Wall Street Journal:

Health-care costs, the national debt and taxes are all going up, and Joel Gemunder is one reason why.

Until Mr. Gemunder's abrupt retirement was announced on Monday, he was CEO of Covington, Ky.-based Omnicare, the nation's largest dispenser of pharmaceuticals to nursing homes.

Omnicare gets most of its revenue from Medicare, Medicaid and other companies sucking on these same government feeding tubes. Omnicare also lives up to its name, serving 1.4 million beds in 47 states.

Mr. Gemunder, 71, had been in charge since 1981, but now he's split with one of the largest lump-sum pension payouts in history, The Wall Street Journal reported. He's getting a $91 million pension payout, plus severance, vesting of restricted stock and other goodies that bring his final payday to at least $130 million. And that's on top of the $14 million he bagged last year.

As CEO, Mr. Gemunder touted 'cost reduction initiatives,' including salary cuts for employees, but these initiatives didn't apply to himself.

And what did the shareholders get for their money? Omnicare shares took a tumble last week after the company reported a shocking drop in the number of prescriptions it fills.

Omnicare stock peaked in March 2006 at more than $61, but now trades under $23. That's a drop of more than 60% -- versus a roughly 11% decline in the S&P 500 during the same period.

And what did the taxpayers and customers get? Omnicare has long been plagued by huge litigation costs amid allegations of kickback and billing schemes.

It's nice to have company. And it's very nice that the issue of the impunity enjoyed by leaders of top health care organizations has made it into the main-stream media. Now it is time to do something about it.

Summary

Let me say it again:  The Omnicare settlement coupled with its CEO's outlandish retirement package fit right into the parade of legal settlements we have discussed. As we have said again and again, the usual sorts of legal settlements we have described do not seem to be an effective way to deter future unethical behavior by health care organizations. Even large fines can be regarded just as a cost of doing business. Furthermore, the fine's impact may be diffused over the whole company, and ultimately comes out of the pockets of stockholders, employees, and customers alike. It provides no negative incentives for those who authorized, directed, or implemented the behavior in question. My refrain has been: we will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

Postscript: A Conflicted Board Member?

The Cincinati.com story described the bizarre process used to set the size of the Omnicare CEO's retirement package.

Just ahead of Gemunder on the big pension list is Thomas M. Ryan, president and CEO of CVS Caremark Corp. with $94.4 million at the end of 2009.

CVS posts annual sales in excess of $98 billion compared to Omnicare's $6.17 billion. Annual profit at CVS is $3.6 billion compared to $ 211 million at Omnicare.

Despite the sizable differences, CVS is among 40 companies whose CEOs pay is considered when Omnicare's executive compensation committee determines pay for its top executives, according to the firm's April proxy. The company's compensation committee, which declined comment for this story, is made up of three long-time directors Andrea R. Lindell, board chair John T. Crotty and Steven J. Heyer.

Other companies considered include New York-based Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. with $17.8 billion in sales; Dublin, Ohio-based Cardinal Health, Inc. with $99 billion in sales and New Jersey-based Medco Health Solutions, Inc. with $72 billion in sales.

'These companies are enormously bigger than you would expect for a comparative group' for Omnicare, Crystal said. 'It's the equivalent of the local ball team that's not in the major leagues using their comparative group as the New York Yankees.'

Note that one member of the compensation committee that used this absurd standard to set the CEO's compensation was one Andrea R Lindell. The above story did not identify her further, but as we noted last year, she "is also Dean of the College of Nursing at the University of Cincinnati. One would think that someone who thus boasts 'the success of our students, faculty, staff and alumni who work together to promote excellence in education, research, service and practice' needs to keep a closer eye on the ethical aspects of her company's management. But as the New York Times just noted on the front-page of last Sunday's business section, as another blow to the anechoic effect, "Academics may be trained to ask tough questions in their own fields, but when confronted with tricky business issues far above their level of expertise they 'often become as meek as church mice'...." and hence are just the sort of directors that self-interested CEOs intent on lining their own pockets love. 

So this case becomes another reason to take seriously the increasingly frequent conflicts of interest generated when top leaders of non-profit health care organizations sit on boards of for-profit health care corporations.  These conflicts may not only distract the leaders from the mission of the non-profit organizations, but also distract them from their fiduciary duties to the stock-holders of the for-profit corporations. 

Stifling Whistle-Blowers: Old and New Approaches

We have frequently discussed the anechoic effect, how it is just not done to discuss certain topics, particularly those related to the adverse effects of bad (ill-informed, incompetent, self-interested, conflicted, or corrupt) leadership and bad (opaque, unaccountable, mission-hostile, unethical) governance of health care organizations.  We have discussed many possible causes of the anechoic effect, but one particularly obvious cause is the silencing of dissenters and whistle-blowers.

Three recent stories illustrate old and new tactics to reinforce the anechoic effect.

A Classic Case - ValleyCare Medical System Nurse Fired

From the San Francisco Chronicle,

An Alameda County jury awarded more than $344,000 in damages this week against ValleyCare Medical System for refusing to rehire a Castro Valley operating nurse who claimed the hospital was retaliating against her for complaints she made about patient safety issues, including concerns about surgical equipment left inside patients.

Kristeen Klaas, a 15-year veteran at ValleyCare and a registered nurse for more than 30 years, sued the hospital system, which has services in Pleasanton and Livermore, after she quit in distress in May 2008 and hospital managers failed to respond to her request to be rehired days later.

The 54-year-old Klaas, who now works at Alta Bates Summit Medical Center in Oakland and San Leandro Hospital, had brought numerous safety complaints about the Pleasanton hospital to the attention of ValleyCare's management over the two years prior to her resignation.

Klaas complained about a fellow nurse who brought a dog into the operating team's break room and jumped rope with an electrical cord in the operating room, as well as a surgical technician who brought a rifle into the operating room office to sell. She also complained that a tip of a surgical instrument went missing during a surgery and was never found, and that an instrument was left in a patient because the hospital did not have a formal policy of counting instruments after surgery.

She also accused a supervisor of forging her signature on a performance evaluation after she refused to sign an evaluation that was backdated to comply with state regulations.

Here is the tactic allegedly used to silence the whistle-blowing nurse:

On her last day on the job, Klaas got permission from her supervising nurse to leave work because she was in distress after a colleague, the subject of three of her complaints, screamed at her.

'She realized, for the patient's safety, she couldn't continue to go forward that day in the operating room because she was so upset,' he said.

But then a supervisor called her at home and accused her of leaving without permission, prompting Klaas to resign, he said.

This is the classic, rather blunt way to do it: just make the would-be truth-teller's job experience so miserable that she quits.

Now we will present two examples of a more subtle approach, one directly from health care, one at least from a sphere with major health care implications.

A New Approach: A Contract Preventing Communication "Inimical" to a Pharmaceutical Company's Business

This case was documented by a personal narrative by Marc Lipsitch, a Professor of Epidemiology and the Harvard School of Public Health, published in the Chronicle of Higher Education,

I received a request from a large pharmaceutical company to assist in the design of a clinical trial, and the proposed terms seemed to require that I sign away my right to criticize the product. One provision would prohibit me from entering into 'any agreement or relationship to render services as ... adviser or consultant to, any other individual, firm, or corporation that would be inimical to or in conflict with' the aspects of the company's business covered by the agreement. Another would forbid me to engage, in any capacity, directly or indirectly, in "any business," with or without compensation, relating to the class of products under discussion—not just for the term of the contract, but for the year after as well. Those provisions could restrain me from providing candid advice to a regulator, a government official, or the editor of a peer-reviewed journal about the class of products on which I was consulting, even if the advice were based on publicly available information. I objected to those terms, as did a colleague who was offered the same arrangement.

Prof Lipsitch also noted that government research funding agencies and universities may not provide any protections to their faculty against such agreements. He also noted that the contract he was asked to sign was not one of a kind:

Discussions with my colleagues suggest that the problem is not limited to one pharmaceutical company ....

We and many others have frequently discussed the conflicts of interest that may be generated by physicians or health care academics having financial relationships with industry. The Institute of Medicine's definition of conflict of interest (in a health care context) found in its report, Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education, and Practice, is:

Conflicts of interest are defined as circumstances that create a risk that professional judgments or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest. Primary interests include promoting and protecting the integrity of research, the quality of medical education, and the welfare of patients. Secondary interests include not only financial interests....

Thus the concern is that a faculty member,for example, who is paid to consult for a drug company might tend to favor the company, its products, or policies to its advantage in his or her clinical teaching, scholarly talks and writing, or public policy opinions. That might happen even if the consulting work is technical or scientific and not directly related to the particular topic about which communication might be influenced.

However, the situation described by Prof Lipsitch is much worse. Were he to have signed the contract, he would have been constrained by this legal agreement from writing or saying anything "inimical to or in conflict with" the company's business.

Last week, a similar, but more wide-spread example surfaced (pardon the pun) in a domain that is at least related to health care.

Another Version of the New Approach: the BP Consulting Contracts Making Any Communication Between the Company and the Consultant Confidential

Originally reported by the BBC,

The head of the American Association of Professors has accused BP of trying to 'buy' the best scientists and academics to help its defence against litigation after the Gulf of Mexico oil spill.

'This is really one huge corporation trying to buy faculty silence in a comprehensive way,' said Cary Nelson.

The BBC has obtained a copy of a contract offered to scientists by BP. It says that scientists cannot publish the research they do for BP or speak about the data for at least three years, or until the government gives the final approval to the company's restoration plan for the whole of the Gulf.

It also states scientists may perform research for other agencies as long as it does not conflict with the work they are doing for BP.

And it adds that scientists must take instructions from lawyers offering the contracts and other in-house counsel at BP.

Here are some examples of the wording of the contract as obtained by the BBC about confidentiality.

Confidentiality. All communications (including non-public information disclosed in such communications) between you (and your agents), BP Attorneys and/or other BP representatives in the course of your performance of the BP NRDA Services are deemed to be incidental to the rendering of legal services and are to be privileged and confidential. You shall maintain a strict confidentiality of such non-public communications and information unless or until a person from whom you are authorized to take instructions informs you in writing that this restriction is no longer applicable to any particular non-public communications and information. In the event you are required to disclose such privileged and confidential non-public communication and information by an order entered by a court or by similar judicial process, or by a judicial or administrative subpoena, you shall notify a person from whom you are authorized to take instructions as soon as practicable, and you are required to cooperate with BP if BP decides to seek relief from such required disclosure, including commencement of a legal or administrative proceeding to prevent or limit disclosure of such privileged or confidential information.

Here is the description of those from whom the signer of the contract must take orders.

Instructions. You agree to take your instructions only from me, from other lawyers in my firm, from Brian Israel or other lawyers in the Arnold & Porter law firm, and from Donna Ward or other in-house counsel at BP (collectively 'BP Attorneys').

Note that the contract defines privileged, confidential information as any communication between BP and its representatives and the contract signer. Thus, to make something confidential, all BP would have to do is mention it in a communication. It appears that this would allow BP to render off-limits any topic it chose. Also, since by the same mechanism, it appears that the contract itself, once signed, would also become privileged and confidential.

Summary

I submit that ideally medicine and health care ought to be a very transparent calling.  Physicians are obliged to keep confidential the information disclosed to them by patients, enabling the patients to trust physicians sufficiently to provide them the accurate information needed for optimal care.  However, it is hard to think of much other information or communication in health care that ought to be kept secret, (other than the processes used by commercial firms to manufacture drugs or devices.) 

Yet as health care becomes more of a business and less of a calling, businesspeople's proclivity to keep as much as possible secret to avoid giving any advantage to a competitor has become more influential.  Furthermore, those leading big organizations have realized that it is easier to maintain their power if they can keep their mistakes, if not misconduct secret.  So businesspeople's proclivity to mount overwhelming legal defenses of their interests may lead to persuading or fooling people who might be inclined to delve into such mistakes and misconduct to sign contracts to keep them silent through confidentiality clauses, requirements to protect privileged or proprietary information, non-disparagement clauses and the like.  The result will be better coddled self-interests, but more opacity that is inimical to good patient care, teaching, research, and public policy discussion.

To truly reform health care, we need more transparency.  To produce more transparency, we need constraints on contracts that inhibit needed clinical, teaching, research and public policy communication.

Meanwhile, as my father, who was an attorney, done told me: "don't sign a contract you don't understand, and don't sign a contract giving away any right you need to keep." 

Not Your Average Joe's Health Plan

A Denver Post article offered a brief glimpse into the health benefits of corporate leaders, on the unusual occasion of a former CEO now in legal fight for the health benefits in the style to which he had become accustomed:

Poor Joe. He's not getting the health-care benefits he was promised.

His former employer merged with another company, and then another, and then another. And, you know how it goes after a slew of mergers. Suddenly the new, conglomerated monster just doesn't care about retirees any more.

Joe isn't going to sit back and take it like an average Joe. He's suing his former employer in U.S. District Court in Manhattan for breach of contract, breach of faith, breach of fiduciary duty and even promissory estoppel.

The Joe in question was really:

Lord & Taylor's CEO.

Joseph E. Brooks of Greenwich, Conn., lorded over a fourfold increase in sales at Lord & Taylor, expanding to 46 from 19 locations.

His career and Lord and Taylor's course after that were checkered, perhaps contributing to the current dispute:

But that was a long time ago. And Macy's Inc., the current parent company, is resisting some of his medical claims.

Brooks didn't get a deal like this from Filene's, where he served as president before joining Lord & Taylor. Or Ann Taylor, where he went on to generate shareholder lawsuits and shopper hate mail after demanding lower prices from suppliers and higher prices from customers, destroying both quality and value at the same time.

Brooks also made his son president of Ann Taylor, sparking cries of nepotism. And then his son got snagged trying to slip by U.S. Customs without paying duties on pricey watches and was forced to resign. The senior Brooks subsequently resigned as well. A 1992 Newsday article called him 'as egotistical and extravagant as he was brilliant.'

What Health Care Benefits Do CEOs Get?

What had Brooks been promised as CEO of Lord and Taylor?

In 1983, Lord & Taylor's corporate parent told Brooks it sought to provide 'great comfort to executives knowing that their medical costs are fully reimbursed by the Corporation.' The company told Joe it was a lifetime guarantee.

CEOs should never, ever, have to worry about health care.

Here are some details about his benefits:

And for nearly 27 years, substantially all medical costs have been fully covered, even premiums.

We're not just talking doctors' visits, hospitals, medications and tests. We're talking all travel and ancillary expenses associated with care, too.

We're talking first-class transportation, accommodations and meals while being treated at the Mayo Clinic and the Duke Diet and Fitness Center. We're talking expenses for a companion or personal aide, too.

We're also talking 'cosmetic services (surgery, medications, injections, creams and the like)' dental care, gym memberships, personal trainers, vitamins, massages — all paid by Joe's former employer for the rest of Joe's life.

Oh, and if any of these benefits have tax consequences, we're talking gross-up payments to cover that, too.

Why should we be concerned about the extravagant health plans given to top corporate executives? 

The Implications

We noted in 2009 that the Goldman Sachs 2009 proxy statement indicated that top executives of that now controversial company received health plans worth about $40,000 each. 

My concern then were not how much the costs of the plans contribute to top corporate leaders' compensation packages. Such packages are generally already so outrageously huge that providing $40,000 rather than $13,000 worth of health insurance is a trivial increase. My concern was not that plan recipients' demands for health care will collectively increase health care costs, because they likely include only a tiny portion of the population.


My main concern, instead, was how much these plans further insulate already cocooned top executives from the vicissitudes of daily life, particularly related to coping with our current dysfunctional health care system. What benefits executive health care plans provided were not clear from the 2009 story about Goldman Sachs.  However, this year's case of Joe Brooks does suggest that the plans paid for every expense that could be conceivably health related. 

As I worried then, it now does appear that such plans could completely insulate executives from having to deal with the managed care/ health insurance bureaucracy which frustrates patients seeking particular services, but not necessarily the most expensive, or least beneficial services. Furthermore, such plans may completely insulate executives from the various other vicissitudes of managing our currently dysfunctional health care system.  (By the way, that is why it seemed amazing that the CEO of Pfizer had to put up with some of the common vicissitudes when he went to a hospital for an elective procedure, an experience he publicly talked about with an almost charming naivete, given that he runs such a powerful health care organization which has been so influential in shaping our US "health care reform," see post here.)

Such executives isolated from the real world of health care might thus not have gut level appreciation of how dysfunctional the health care system has become for even insured patients. Since top executives often are disproportionately influential members of the "superclass," their disconnection from the realities of dysfunctional health care is likely to translate into little real support by the powers that be for meaningful health care reform. There support may be further retarded by the influence of their fellow superclass members whose personal fortunes depend on the status quo in health care.

Real improvement of health care may depend on finding leaders who have better understanding of the plight of real people.
 
Two Postscripts
 
Note: the Goldman Sachs 2010 proxy indicates that the executive health plans given to the five most highly paid executives cost up to $56,927.  
 
Also note that despite the effect that executive health plans may have on the thinking of those with the most power to influence health care policy, the plans have been of little interest to health care services and policy researchers.  I have not been able to find a single article in these literatures on the subject.  This appears to be yet another version of the anechoic effect, that certain inconvenient truths (to borrow from former US Vice President Al Gore) are not subjects of polite discussion of health care, lest the results excessively disturb the powers that be.

Wellcare Settles Again, but Wait, There is More...

We posted several times, most recently in 2009 (here and here), about misbehavior by the health insurance company/ managed care organization Wellcare.  That year, the company settled criminal charges that it defrauded the Florida state Medicaid program by paying a fine and accepting a deferred prosecution agreement.  Previously, the state of Connecticut had canceled its arrangement with Wellcare to run a Medicaid program in that state after the company refused to provide the state with requested data.  Then the company signed a consent order with the Florida Elections Commission in which it admitted making "questionable" political contributions.

Then this year, it was announced that the company would settle additional civil charges, as per the St. Petersburg (FL) Times,

Tampa-based WellCare Health Plans Inc. has agreed to pay $137.5 million to the U.S. Department of Justice and other federal agencies to settle civil lawsuits accusing the company of overcharging for its Medicaid and Medicare programs.

Also,

Under the tentative deal, which must be approved in court, WellCare would have three years to make payments to the Justice Department's civil division, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Florida and the U.S. Attorney's Office for Connecticut.

WellCare said the payments will include the approximately $23 million owed to the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration for overpayments received by the company in 2005.

The civil settlement is separate from a deal struck last year on the criminal front. In that case, WellCare agreed to pay $80 million to settle a charge of conspiracy to defraud the Florida Medicaid program and the Florida Healthy Kids Corp.

It also previously agreed to a $10 million civil penalty settling an informal inquiry by the Securities and Exchange Commission that regulatory filings reflected more than $40 million in profits that WellCare failed to return to the Florida agencies from 2003 to 2007.

WellCare, which is Florida's largest Medicaid plan operator, has acknowledged that it overcharged Florida and Illinois health programs by about $46.5 million.

But wait, there is more. No sooner than this settlement been announced than it was challenged. While considering the settlement, the judge involved unsealed a set of complaints by whistle-blowers about Wellcare. First, as reported by the Miami Herald,

The complaint, filed by former WellCare financial analyst Sean J. Hellein, portrays a company so ethically challenged that it rewarded employees who dumped hundreds of sick newborns and terminally ill patients from the membership rolls, thereby pumping up profits by millions of dollars.

It describes a company that embraced fraudulent accounting as a business model, eventually stealing between $400 million and $600 million from Medicare and Medicaid programs in several states, perhaps most of it from Florida.

See these specifics:

Hellein, who wore a wire for more than a year to gather evidence for federal agents, says in the complaint that:

- WellCare moved money between accounts to make it appear that patients' treatment cost much more than it actually did. In some cases, the company made payments years in advance to jack up the apparent cost of care to fool states into increasing Medicaid premiums. It worked, he said.

- When states made overpayment errors, WellCare didn't pay the money back, as its contract requires. Florida Medicaid made a series of overpayment blunders that fattened WellCare's bottom line by many millions; those who made the errors included both state officials and contractors.

- Sometimes hospitals and physician groups helped WellCare hide its true spending from Medicaid programs by accepting payments through one account for expenses incurred by another. Sometimes they allowed WellCare to pay for future years' expenses to make it appear spending for the current year was higher than it actually was.

Hellein named two hospital systems - one in Illinois and one in Florida - that he said participated in the sham arrangement, but he said it was common.

WellCare pushed expenses into certain programs - behavioral health programs in Florida and Illinois and the Healthy Kids program in Florida, a program for uninsured children of families with modest incomes - because they required repayment if the cost of treatment fell below a certain threshold.

Florida public officials were repeatedly duped by WellCare. The director of the Florida Medicaid program from 2004 to 2007, while much of the alleged fraud was going on, was Tom Arnold. He currently is Secretary of the Agency for Health Care Administration.

Another agency that fell for WellCare's line was the Office of Insurance Regulation, where an actuary found nothing wrong with a WellCare subsidiary in the Cayman Islands acting as the company's reinsurer.

The reinsurance arrangement enabled WellCare to bank $5 for each insured while making it appear that the cost was just 11 cents, the complaint says.

After Wall Street analysts raised questions about the legality of the reinsurance arrangement in 2007, some thought it might be reviewed by Chief Financial Officer Alex Sink. But nothing ever came of it.

WellCare conducted a study to figure out which Medicaid recipients were profitable and which were not so that it could engage in "cherry-picking," a term for enrolling only the profitable members. The study found that disenrolling a baby born with health problems saved the company an average of $20,000; each terminally ill patient saved $11,500.

Those who were persuaded to resign from WellCare went into the general Medicaid or Medicare fee-for-service programs.

WellCare also restructured its benefit package to discourage the least-profitable Medicaid recipients from enrolling and encouraging those who were more profitable to sign up.

Low-income mothers and children yielded a net of only about 10 percent, while the physically and mentally disabled paid for by Medicare yielded a net of 30 percent, the complaint says.

The complaint names about 20 employees of WellCare who knew about the fraudulent activities. Only one, Gregory West, has been charged. He pleaded guilty in December 2007 but sentencing has been postponed several times.

No charges have been brought against three former executives of the company named in the complaint as orchestrating the fraud: President, CEO and Chairman Todd Farha, CFO Paul Behrens and General Counsel Thaddeus Bereday.

They all resigned in January of 2008, three months after the FBI and other law-enforcement agents raided the Tampa campus of WellCare and carted off computers and files.

The the St. Petersburg Times reported about two more complaints that were unsealed:

Clark J. Bolton, a former supervisor of special investigations at WellCare, said the insurer encouraged overbilling and refused to audit claims for fraud in order to curry favor with doctors and hospitals and build market share. The result was millions in excessive and illegal expenses passed through to federal Medicare and state Medicaid programs, Bolton said.

Eugene Gonzalez, a referral coordinator for seven years, claimed WellCare met government customer service standards only because it had employees create backdated documents and make bogus calls to the company's phone lines. Failure to meet these standards would have resulted in the loss of billions of dollars worth of Medicare and Medicaid contracts.

As we have before, we see a striking contrast between the scope of the allegations and the response by the government agencies that are supposed to regulate insurers, insure that public money is spent wisely, and investigate and seek punishment for illegal activities. As the latter St. Petersburg Times article noted,

U.S. Rep. Kathy Castor criticized the proposed settlement as wholly inadequate in a letter this week to Attorney General Eric Holder. 'Where is the penalty and punishment for such egregious actions?' she wrote. 'It appears that companies such as these simply build such payments into the 'cost of doing business.' We cannot allow this to continue.'

This notion should be familiar to readers of Health Care Renewal. The Wellcare case fits right into the parade of legal settlements we have discussed. As we have said again and again, the usual sorts of legal settlements we have described do not seem to be an effective way to deter future unethical behavior by health care organizations. Even large fines can be regarded just as a cost of doing business. Furthermore, the fine's impact may be diffused over the whole company, and ultimately comes out of the pockets of stockholders, employees, and customers alike. It provides no negative incentives for those who authorized, directed, or implemented the behavior in question. My refrain has been: we will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

Also note that the case of Wellcare remains relatively anechoic. Despite the severity of allegations, and the national scope of the company, the case has only been mentioned in news stories, mainly in Florida where the company has its headquarters, and in a few health care trade publications. It, like many of the cases we discuss on Health Care Renewal, has not been mentioned in the medical/ health care research/ health care policy literature.

If we cannot even speak about the sort of very bad management that afflicted Wellcare as a cause of many of the ills of our health care system, how do we really expect to constructively reform that system?

A Source of the Anechoic Effect Discovered: the Public Relations Person in the Room

A series of posts in journalism blogs last month revealed a mechanism used by health care organizational leaders to shape discussion of the issues that affect their interests, but one that is probably unfamiliar to most health care professionals and the public at large.  Let me provide the key quotes in chronological order.

First, from the Covering Health blog of the Association for Health Care Journalism (10 June, 2010):

Have you recently tried to get information from the federal government or arrange an interview with a federal official?

AHCJ’s Right-to-Know Committee is calling on journalists to report their experiences, as part of a continuing effort to pry open the doors of the federal government. We’re looking for recent anecdotes about journalists’ experiences with public information officers, especially at the Department of Health and Human Services and any of the agencies that are part of it (e.g., CDC, FDA, CMS etc.).

Please write to Felice J. Freyer, Right-to-Know Committee chair, at felice.freyer@cox.net, about problems you have encountered, including mandates to clear interviews with the press office, slow responses, refused interviews, burdensome requirements (such as written questions and answers only), extreme time limitations on interviews, PIOs listening in on your conversations, or anything else that made it hard for you to get the information and quotes that you needed in time.

The implication here, of course, is that the committee was concerned that journalists attempting to interview employees and officials of US government health agencies may encounter a variety of problems, including public information officers "listening in on your conversation."

Of course, just because the committee was concerned about a possible problem does not mean the problem exists, or is if it exists, is important.

However, a week later this post appeared in the Covering Health blog (17 June, 2010):

MedPage Today, an online breaking-news service for physicians, today instituted a rule requiring reporters to inform readers whenever a press officer has listened in on an interview.

'If a source’s comments are monitored by a press officer, then the person may not have been speaking freely,' said Peggy Peck, vice president and executive editor. 'That’s information readers should have.'

Peck instructed her staff to use phrases like 'said in a telephone interview that was monitored by a public information officer' whenever using quotes from such an interview.

Peck emphasized that a reporter’s goal should be to avoid having a press officer listening to calls or attending face-to-face interviews. 'But if that is the only way a researcher will talk, we need to let our readers know that,' said Peck’s memo to eight reporters.

Peck is a member of AHCJ’s Right-to-Know Committee, and the rule sprang from the committee’s work to end interference by public information officers in newsgathering, especially in the federal government.

'I applaud MedPage Today for taking this step and encourage reporters and editors everywhere to follow suit,' said Felice J. Freyer, chair of the Right-to-Know Committee and a member of AHCJ’s Board of Directors.

'Reporters have come to accept the presence of public relations people at interviews, but it’s really not acceptable. We all know that such eavesdropping hinders the free flow of information – and we need to let our readers know that this is happening.'

Now this is much more clear. Apparently some, maybe most of the information obtained by journalists from interviews of officials and employees of government health care agencies was monitored by public relations people, presumably to keep the interviewees "on message," and remind them not to say anything that did not fit the party line.  Furthermore, such monitoring was not often disclosed by the reports when they wrote about the interview. 

In addition, Paul Raeburn posted this on the Knight Science Journalism Tracker blog:

I’ve long been troubled by the insistence of some 'public' information officers (they are paid to work for their institutions, not the public, although the interests of the two can sometimes coincide) to listen in or sit in on interviews. Even if they don’t say a word, their presence inevitably changes the interview.

Imagine telling colleagues about the last story you wrote, and what you had to do to get it. Now imagine the same conversation with your colleagues while your editor–on whom your livelihood depends–listens in. I don’t imagine myself dissembling in either set of circumstances, but I can certainly imagine myself telling the story a little differently in each case.

The point is not that information officers are always trying to limit or shape the interview, although that clearly happens. The point is not to challenge the integrity of information officers, although, like reporters, some are better at what they do than are others. The point is that the presence of an institutional representative changes the interview. And we owe it to out readers to conduct interviews without that presence whenever possible.

Mr Raeburn seemed to make an effort to be exquisitely polite, but still managed to affirm that the public relations person in the room is a real and important phenomenon in reporting about health care.
This reinforces the notion that monitoring of interviews with journalists by public relations people is common practice, but one heretofore not discussed publicly.  It seems obvious that the point of this practice was to keep the interviewee on message, and to restrain any discussion that might not fit with the public relations persons' bosses interests.

If we did not know about the practice of keeping a public relations person in the room for interviews with people working for the government, it seems likely that we also did not know about similar practices affecting interviews with people in other kinds of health care organizations, e.g., for-profit corporations, and not-for-profit organizations.

We have frequently discussed the "anechoic effect," how important cases, stories, and data about the negative effects of concentration and abuse of power in health care, and about ill-informed, incompetent, self-interested, conflicted, or even corrupt leadership of health care organizations, and the unaccountable, unrepresentative, opaque, and often unethical governance that enables it are often just not discussed, and when discussed, produce few echoes.  Now we see another mechanism that maintains this effect.  Large health care organizations deploy substantial money and personnel to market their products and massage their messages.  These people apparently use a variety of tactics to control the flow of information to journalists.  While journalists seem to be provide much more information about the problems in health care we discuss on Health Care Renewal than professional and academic publications and meetings, we now see one more mechanism that has impeded them from doing so openly and fully.

In my humble opinion, disclosing that interviews were monitored by public relations personnel is one small, but important step in beginning free enquiry into what has gone wrong with health care.  Bravo to the people who have stood up for it. 

RUC Off - the New England Journal Once Again Fails to Mention the Unmentionable

Last week, the influential New England Journal of Medicine published an article by Bruce Vladek entitled "Fixing Medicare's Physician Payment System."(1)  Although only identified as working for Nexara, a health consulting business, Mr Vladek was a former administrator of what was then called the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the part of the department that then ran the US Medicare program.  Vladek thus can reasonably be viewed as an expert on Medicare. 

Vladek identified two main problems with the current way physicians are paid by Medicare.  First,

Medicare is captive to an arbitrary, if elegantly conceived, formula for total payments to physicians — the sustainable growth rate (SGR). In the alternate reality of the Congressional budget process, the SGR will reduce Medicare's physician payments, which already trail those from private insurers, as far into the future as the eye can see.

Second,

there is widespread consensus that the relative fees in the current system are a significant cause of the growing imbalance in supply and utilization between primary care and specialty services in the U.S. health care system. That imbalance, in turn, is widely perceived as a major cause of both excessive costs and inadequate quality of care. This is not just a Medicare problem: the Medicare Resource-Based Relative Value Scale is used by most private insurers to set relative prices for physicians.

Vladek expanded on the second point as follows

the basic mechanics of the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, which was supposed to change physician payment to increase rewards for primary care services at the expense of procedural and interventional services, appears to have gone totally off track. For various reasons, the fee schedule, which originally did increase the prices of evaluation and management services relative to those of surgery or invasive procedures, turned in the other direction through the process of annual updating of relative value units. Surgeons, radiologists, and some medical specialists are now paid two to three times as much per hour as providers of cognitive services, which is about where we began 20 years ago; this was the situation that the fee schedule was supposed to fix.

The question of the relative virtues of primary versus specialty care can be debated ad nauseam, but in other wealthy countries that serve their populations at least as well as we do, the ratio of primary care physicians to specialists is much higher than in the United States, and the gap in compensation is much smaller or the poles even reversed. Young physicians, burdened by increasing educational debts, may well choose a career path on the basis of a major difference in compensation, especially when the better-compensated positions require less ongoing responsibility for patients and offer better working hours.

This is about all that Vladek wrote about how the imbalance between how Medicare pays for primary care and other "cognitive services," and for procedures came about. Vladek, and many others have argued that this imbalance has lead to strong financial incentives that have been slowly destroying primary care, and strong incentives that have lead to the use of too many procedures, both strong drivers of rising costs in the most expensive health care system in the world.

Vladek noted vaguely that "through various reasons," the incentives were imbalanced by "the process of annual updating of relative value units."

However, as we have discussed in several blog posts, a lot more is known about how this process got "totally off track."

In fact, in 2007, an article by Bodenheimer et al in the Annals of Internal Medicine explained the problems in considerably more detail.(2)  As we wrote then, Its main points included

• Proceduralists are often able to learn how to do their procedures more quickly, and thus increase the volume of procedures done, while office and hospital visits can only be sped up so much.
• The process used to update the RBRVS system is biased towards procedures for three main reasons: 1. "specialty society influence in proposing RVU [relative value unit] increases," 2. the specialist-heavy RUC [Relative Value Scale Update Committee] membership," and 3. "the desire of RUC specialists to avoid increases in evaluation and management [that is, cognitive, or non-procedural] RVUs."
• Medicare now uses a formula to limit increases in overall spending. The use of this formula leads to across the board cuts in all reimbursements. Since cognitive services reimbursements were never high to begin with, and have rarely been individually increased, these cuts tend to have disproportionate decreases.
• Private insurers and managed care organizations tend to follow Medicare's lead in their reimbursement procedures, but tend to tilt the playing field even more in favor of procedures versus cognitive services. Several studies showed that such payers paid more for procedures than did Medicare, but about the same for office and hospital visits.

The role of the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) is complex and in many ways mysterious.  As we wrote before, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments. However, the identities of RUC members are opaque, and the proceedings of the group are secret.

To expand on the penultimate point, the current page on the AMA web-site that describes the RUC only lists its members in terms of their specialties and organizational affiliation.  Their names do not appear.  A response to a previous post by me on the subject by the then Chair and Chair-Elect of the RUC suggested that the RUC membership is not quite secret. They stated that "a list of the individual members of the RUC is published in the AMA publication, Medicare RBRVS 2009: The Physicians Guide." This publication is available from the AMA here for a mere $71.95. However, the book is not on the web, or in my local or university library, and I have no other way to easily access it.  Thus, the RUC membership as at best relatively opaque.

To expand on the ultimate point, as Goodson(3) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."

The fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about.  We have posted (here, here, and here) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC.  In 2010, post the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seems to remain the great unmentionable.  Even the leading US medical journal seems reluctant to even print its name. 

Thus, as we noted before, however, the mysteries about it remain:

• How did the government come to fix the payments physicians receive? Government price-fixing has not been popular in the US, yet this has caused no outcry.
• Why is the process by which they are fixed allowed to be so opaque and unaccountable? Why are there no public hearings on the updates, and why is there no input from practicing physicians or organizations other than those related to the RUC?
• How did the RUC become de facto in charge of this process?
• Why does the AMA keep the membership on the RUC so opaque, and give no input into the RUC process to its general membership?
• Why is the RUC membership so dominated by procedural specialists? Why were primary care physicians, who made up at least a sizable minority of physicians when the update process was started, not represented according to their numbers?
• Why has there been so little discussion of the RUC and its responsibility for an extremely expensive health care system dominated by high-technology, expensive, risky and invasive procedures?

Without discussing how the incentives for physicians became so unbalanced, do we really expect we can fix them?  In this case, the persistence of the anechoic effect seems to be doing real damage to the discussion of the critical issues we in the US face today.
References


1. Vladek B. Fixing Medicare's physician payment system. N Engl J Med 2010; 362:1955-1957. (Link here.)
2. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link here.)
3. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310.  (Link here.)

More Questions, No Answers About the Case of the Deadly Heparin - Some Congressmen Weigh In

In 2008, we started posting on how the "active pharmaceutical ingredient" of heparin made in China under apparently primitive conditions, contaminated accidentally or deliberately, was sold in the US bearing the label of a large American pharmaceutical company. Ultimately, many patients were sickened, or died. A summary of our posts on the topic, in smaller type, is below.

- We have posted several times, recently here and here, about the tragic case of suddenly allergenic heparin. Although heparin, an intravenous biologic anti-coagulant, has been in use for over 70 years, serious allergic reactions to it had heretofore been rare. Starting late last year, hundreds of such reactions, and now 21 deaths were reported in the US after intravenous heparin infusions.All the heparin related to these events in the US was made by Baxter International.

- We then learned that although the heparin carried the Baxter label, it was not really made by Baxter. The company had outsourced production of the active ingredient to a long, and ultimately mysterious supply chain. Baxter got the active ingredient from a US company, Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC, which in turn obtained it from a factory in China operated by Changzhou SPL, which in turn was owned by Scientific Protein Laboratories and by Changzhou Techpool Pharmaceutical Co. Changzhou SPL, in turn, got it from several consolidators or wholesalers, who in turn got it from numerous small, unidentified "workshops," which seemed to produce the product in often primitive and unsanitary conditions. None of the stops in the Chinese supply chain had apparently been inspected by the US Food and Drug Administration nor its Chinese counterpart.

- Most recently, we found out that the Baxter International labelled heparin was contaminated with over-sulfated chondroitin sulfate, a substance not found in nature, but which mimics heparin according to the simple laboratory tests used in the Chinese facilities to check incoming heparin. (See post here.) Further testing revealed that the contamination seemed to have taken place in China prior to the provision of the heparin to Changzhou SPL. (See post here.) It is not clear whether Baxter International or Scientific Protein Laboratories had inspected most of the steps in the supply chain, or even knew what went on there.

- The Baxter and Scientific Protein Laboratories CEOs did not seem aware of where they got the heparin on which the Baxter International label was eventually affixed. But one report in the New York Times alleged that Scientific Protein Laboratories would not pay enough for heparin to satisfy any sources other than the small "workshops."

- Leaders of all organizations involved, Baxter International, Scientific Protein Laboratories, Changzhou SPL, the Chinese government, and the US Food and Drug Administration, and the US Congress assigned blame to each other, but none took individual or organizational responsibility. (See post here.)

- Researchers (who turned out to have financial ties to a company which is developing an anti-coagulant drug that could compete with the heparin made by Baxter International) investigated the biological mechanisms by which the contamination of the heparin lead to adverse effects, but no one investigated further how the contamination occurred, or who was responsible.  (See post here.)

- Hundreds of lawsuits against Baxter have now been filed, so far without resolution.  (See post here.)

- A recent government report which attracted little attention warned of the dangers of pharmaceutical ingredients made in China and subject to virtually no oversight. (See post here.)

Last week, minority (Republican) members of a committee of the US House of Representatives sent a letter to the Commissioner of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) raising a number of concerns of its investigation of contaminated heparin from China.  The letter was summarized in http://www.theheart.org/ (here), but so far has not been noticed by any main-stream media outlets.  The main concerns raised in the letter were:

1. The FDA has not adequately followed up specific and credible information linking Chinese heparin firms to counterfeit heparin or contaminated heparin in several different supply chains.
2. The FDA inspected several Chinese heparin firms in 2008 and 2009 for regulatory compliance issues but did not conduct these inspections consistently and adequately for determining the source of the heparin contamination.
3. The FDA has not adequately followed up with the Chinese government about the heparin contamination-source investigation.

Curiously, though, most of the letter detailed concerns about an FDA inspection of a company called Chongqing Imperial Bio-Chem Co, Ltd, which appears to be separate from any of the firms mentioned above which seemed to be involved with the heparin ultimately sold in the US under the Baxter label.  In fact, I have not seen to date any report on the contamination of that heparin, supposedly whose active ingredient Baxter obtained from  a US company, Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC, which in turn obtained it from a factory in China operated by Changzhou SPL, which in turn was owned by Scientific Protein Laboratories and by Changzhou Techpool Pharmaceutical Co. Changzhou SPL, in turn, got it from several consolidators or wholesalers, who in turn got it from numerous small, unidentified "workshops," which seemed to produce the product in often primitive and unsanitary conditions.  Nor have I seen any report on the responsibility of any of these parties for the purity and safety of the heparin.  In particular, given that the heparin was sold in containers with the Baxter International label, and hence given that the doctors, nurses and pharmacists involved in its administration likely thought that it was actually made by Baxter, I have not seen any further discussion of that company's responsibility to provide a pure, safe, unadulterated product to its US patients. 

And all this still begs the question that most of the coverage of the deadly heparin also begged. Are American pharmaceutical companies so besotted with the need for cost-savings that they are willing to buy active pharmaceutical ingredients with unknown provenance overseas as if they were a pig in a poke? If so, why do we allow company leadership to potentially sacrifice quality, and sell adulterated drugs just to enrich their bottom lines (and their executives' salaries)?

As a postscript, a report last week in a New York Times blog reminds us of the monetary stakes here:

A drug harvested from pigs’ intestines has made a low-profile Chinese couple the nation’s wealthiest overnight. Husband and wife Li Li and Li Tan’s Shenzhen Hepalink Pharmaceutical sold 10 percent of its shares this week in an I.P.O. that values their stake at about $6.2 billion, The Financial Times reported.

The I.P.O. also earned Goldman Sachs a near 200-fold profit on its original $5 million investment.

According to the newspaper, analysts say Hepalink’s high valuation is a result of the company being the only one in China that is accredited by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration [presumably after the above case of the deadly heparin] to export the 'active pharmaceutical ingredient' heparin after it has been harvested.

This amount of money sloshing around suggests that the reason this case remains so persistently anechoic is fear of offending those who have been getting very rich from the products of pigs' intestines.

I hope that more investigators with intestinal fortitude step in to investigate the out-sourcing of drug production to dubious suppliers before more patients are poisoned.