New CMS Chief Donald Berwick: a Trojan Horse for Quackery?

On July 7, President Obama appointed Dr. Donald Berwick as Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Dr. Berwick, a pediatrician, is well known as the CEO of the non-profit Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), which "exists to close the enormous gap between the health care we have and the health care we should have — a gap so large in the US that the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in 2001 called it a 'quality chasm'.” Dr. Berwick was one of the authors of that IOM report. His IHI has been a major player in the patient safety movement, most notably with its "100,000 Lives Campaign" and, more recently, its "5 Million Lives Campaign."

Berwick's CMS gig is a "recess appointment": it was made during the Senate's July 4th recess period, without a formal confirmation hearing---although such a hearing must take place before the end of this Senate term, if he is to remain in the position. A recent story suggested that Obama made the recess appointment in order to avoid a reprise of "last year's divisive health care debate." The president had originally nominated Berwick for the position in April, and Republicans have opposed "Berwick's views on rationing of care," claiming that he "would deny needed care based on cost."

A "Patient-Centered Extremist"

If there is a problem with the appointment, it is likely to be roughly the opposite of what Republicans might suppose: Dr. Berwick is a self-described "Patient-Centered Extremist." He favors letting patients have the last word in decisions about their care even if that means, for example, choosing to have unnecessary and expensive hi-tech studies. In an article for Health Affairs published about a year ago, he explicitly argued against the "professionally dominant view of quality of health care":

I think it wrong for the profession of medicine—or any other health care profession, for that matter—to “reserve to itself the authority to judge the quality of its work.” I eschew compromise words like “partnership.” For better or worse, I have come to believe that we—patients, families, clinicians, and the health care system as a whole—would all be far better off if we professionals recalibrated our work such that we behaved with patients and families not as hosts in the care system, but as guests in their lives. I suggest that we should without equivocation make patient-centeredness a primary quality dimension all its own, even when it does not contribute to the technical safety and effectiveness of care.

A new definition. My proposed definition of “patient-centered care” is this: The experience (to the extent the informed, individual patient desires it) of transparency, individualization, recognition, respect, dignity, and choice in all matters, without exception, related to one’s person, circumstances, and relationships in health care.

Does this mean that Dr. Berwick would also eschew professional, i.e., expert, judgment in favor of patients' wishes? In a word, yes:

Evidence-based medicine sometimes must take a back seat. First, leaving choice ultimately up to the patient and family means that evidence-based medicine may sometimes take a back seat. One e-mail correspondent asked me, “Should patient ‘wants’ override professional judgment about whether an MRI is needed?” My answer is, basically, “Yes.” On the whole, I prefer that we take the risk of overuse along with the burden of giving real meaning to the phrase “a fully informed patient.”

Dr. Berwick is not so naive as this opinion might suggest. He envisions a "mature dialogue" in such a case, and argues that "if, over time, a pattern emerges of scientifically unwise or unsubstantiated choices...then we should seek to improve our messages..." He also admits that there might be an occasional patient whose demands are so unreasonable that "it is time to say, 'No'." That exception, he argues, should not dictate the rule.

There are situations in which most civilized people would agree with Dr. Berwick's view of 'patient-centeredness'. In both the Health Affairs article and in his recent address to the 2010 graduating class of the Yale School of Medicine, he offered real examples of petty, arbitrary hospital rules causing unnecessary sorrow for patients and their loved ones. It is in such contexts that he makes a convincing case that health professionals ought to behave "as guests in their lives." In an interview for the New York Times, he argued:

We don’t have a standard of services or processes that are comfortable for patients. We have built a technocratic castle, and when people come into it, they are intimidated.

Nothing to disagree with there. To create that standard, moreover, would not undermine settled medical practice ethics---it would celebrate them, even as it rightly embarrasses the profession for having taken so long to do so.


Enter the Woo

Eschewing the scientific basis for modern medical practice, however, is another matter. In February of 2009, Dr. Berwick gave a 'keynote' address at the IOM and Bravewell Collaborative-sponsored Summit on Integrative Medicine and the Health of the Public. He shared the podium with Mehmet Oz, Dean Ornish, Senator Tom Harkin, and other advocates of pseudoscientific health claims. I wrote about the conference at the time, mainly to call attention to its misleading use of the term "integrative medicine": literature emanating from the Summit characterized it as "preventive" and "patient-centered," whereas the only characteristic that distinguishes it from modern medicine is an inclusion of various forms of pseudomedicine.


I noticed that Dr. Berwick was on the speaker roster, which I found disappointing: I imagined that he had either gone over to the Dark Side or, perhaps, was sufficiently naive about the topic to have been duped; or, more likely, that he had cynically accepted the offer to further his ambitions. I didn't bother to listen to his speech until the CMS appointment was announced a few days ago.

It is troubling, to say the least. Dr. Berwick did not argue, as he had in the NYT piece, that "If we doctors feel a person is going to make unwise choices, we have to take on the responsibility of being teachers, educators and informers." Rather, he praised his fellow speakers, most of whom were spouting nonsense, for their "reach" and "eloquence." He praised the IOM for its "glorious record...in pursuit of better designs in health care...traditional, allopathic curative care and now migrating into this distinguished and important new arena." He mentioned homeopathy and acupuncture, not to wonder why they should be promoted as effective, but merely to warn that they will fail---presumably in some economic sense---if they try to compete with each other for reimbursement.

Such language, and Dr. Berwick's very presence at the Summit, were a far cry from advocating "patient-centeredness." What they amounted to was a generous endorsement of pseudoscientific practices and of the socio-political movement that promotes them. Even granting some naivete on his part (he called himself "an amateur at this topic"), he must have known this. Such an endorsement, unlike tearing down the "technocratic castle," has ethical implications at least as profound as those that Dr. Berwick tacitly or explicitly relies upon to support his arguments for patient-centeredness.

"Physicians have no Immunity to Moral or Ethical Constraints"

The relevant medical ethics treatises (reviewed here) are in substantial agreement that it is unethical for physicians to prescribe scientifically implausible methods or to refer patients to other practitioners for the same purpose. They are also in agreement that it is unethical to prescribe a placebo to a patient while claiming that the treatment has specific biologic activity---a point that has been vigorously argued in the UK this year, with regard to homeopathy. These ethical tenets are not mere odes to nerdy, sciency thinking; they are matters of honesty and integrity---fundamental bases for ethical interactions between physicians and patients.

In 1983, philosophers Clark Glymour and Douglas Stalker published an article in the New England Journal of Medicine titled “Engineers, cranks, physicians, magicians.” They framed modern medicine as follows, comparing it to what was then called "holistic medicine" (the article is quoted extensively here):

Medicine in industrialized nations is scientific medicine. The claim tacitly made by American or European physicians, and tacitly relied on by their patients, is that their palliatives and procedures have been shown by science to be effective. Although the physician’s medical practice is not itself science, it is based on science and on training that is supposed to teach physicians to apply scientific knowledge to people in a rational way.

The practice of medicine in the United States and in other industrialized nations is a form of consultant engineering...

That statement is just as accurate now---even more so, in this era of Evidence-Based Medicine---as it was nearly 30 years ago, even if some might find the likening of medicine to engineering displeasing. Nor is it at odds with almost any definition of "patient-centeredness," other than one that presumes that the patient's desires trump the physician's ethics:

A physician engineer can act as consoler; nothing in either logic or social psychology forbids it. But certain combinations are impossible or extraordinarily unlikely. A physician engineer cannot honestly claim powers of magic or occult knowledge. The principles governing scientific reasoning and belief are negative as well as positive, and they imply that occult doctrines are not worthy of belief. Moreover, physician engineers have no immunity to moral or ethical constraints. On the contrary, they are by training and by culture enmeshed in a tradition of rational thought about
the obligations and responsibilities of their profession.

Dr. Berwick---if he really believes what his presence and words at the "Integrative Medicine" Summit imply---is playing with ethical fire. (If, as I hope, he doesn't really believe those things, he's playing with ethics of another kind). Will we begin to see pseudomedicine "integrated" into Medicare and Medicaid? That is certainly the expectation of those who observed Dr. Berwick's performance at the Summit, and who appear intent to hold him to his word.

KA

Two other blogs that have addressed this issue are:

Dr. RW: Not only evidence based medicine but science based medicine may take a back seat in Donald Berwick's vision for patient centered care

Dr. David Gorski: Dr. Donald Berwick and “patient-centered” medicine: Letting the woo into the new health care law?

RUC Off - the New England Journal Once Again Fails to Mention the Unmentionable

Last week, the influential New England Journal of Medicine published an article by Bruce Vladek entitled "Fixing Medicare's Physician Payment System."(1)  Although only identified as working for Nexara, a health consulting business, Mr Vladek was a former administrator of what was then called the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the part of the department that then ran the US Medicare program.  Vladek thus can reasonably be viewed as an expert on Medicare. 

Vladek identified two main problems with the current way physicians are paid by Medicare.  First,

Medicare is captive to an arbitrary, if elegantly conceived, formula for total payments to physicians — the sustainable growth rate (SGR). In the alternate reality of the Congressional budget process, the SGR will reduce Medicare's physician payments, which already trail those from private insurers, as far into the future as the eye can see.

Second,

there is widespread consensus that the relative fees in the current system are a significant cause of the growing imbalance in supply and utilization between primary care and specialty services in the U.S. health care system. That imbalance, in turn, is widely perceived as a major cause of both excessive costs and inadequate quality of care. This is not just a Medicare problem: the Medicare Resource-Based Relative Value Scale is used by most private insurers to set relative prices for physicians.

Vladek expanded on the second point as follows

the basic mechanics of the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, which was supposed to change physician payment to increase rewards for primary care services at the expense of procedural and interventional services, appears to have gone totally off track. For various reasons, the fee schedule, which originally did increase the prices of evaluation and management services relative to those of surgery or invasive procedures, turned in the other direction through the process of annual updating of relative value units. Surgeons, radiologists, and some medical specialists are now paid two to three times as much per hour as providers of cognitive services, which is about where we began 20 years ago; this was the situation that the fee schedule was supposed to fix.

The question of the relative virtues of primary versus specialty care can be debated ad nauseam, but in other wealthy countries that serve their populations at least as well as we do, the ratio of primary care physicians to specialists is much higher than in the United States, and the gap in compensation is much smaller or the poles even reversed. Young physicians, burdened by increasing educational debts, may well choose a career path on the basis of a major difference in compensation, especially when the better-compensated positions require less ongoing responsibility for patients and offer better working hours.

This is about all that Vladek wrote about how the imbalance between how Medicare pays for primary care and other "cognitive services," and for procedures came about. Vladek, and many others have argued that this imbalance has lead to strong financial incentives that have been slowly destroying primary care, and strong incentives that have lead to the use of too many procedures, both strong drivers of rising costs in the most expensive health care system in the world.

Vladek noted vaguely that "through various reasons," the incentives were imbalanced by "the process of annual updating of relative value units."

However, as we have discussed in several blog posts, a lot more is known about how this process got "totally off track."

In fact, in 2007, an article by Bodenheimer et al in the Annals of Internal Medicine explained the problems in considerably more detail.(2)  As we wrote then, Its main points included

• Proceduralists are often able to learn how to do their procedures more quickly, and thus increase the volume of procedures done, while office and hospital visits can only be sped up so much.
• The process used to update the RBRVS system is biased towards procedures for three main reasons: 1. "specialty society influence in proposing RVU [relative value unit] increases," 2. the specialist-heavy RUC [Relative Value Scale Update Committee] membership," and 3. "the desire of RUC specialists to avoid increases in evaluation and management [that is, cognitive, or non-procedural] RVUs."
• Medicare now uses a formula to limit increases in overall spending. The use of this formula leads to across the board cuts in all reimbursements. Since cognitive services reimbursements were never high to begin with, and have rarely been individually increased, these cuts tend to have disproportionate decreases.
• Private insurers and managed care organizations tend to follow Medicare's lead in their reimbursement procedures, but tend to tilt the playing field even more in favor of procedures versus cognitive services. Several studies showed that such payers paid more for procedures than did Medicare, but about the same for office and hospital visits.

The role of the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) is complex and in many ways mysterious.  As we wrote before, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments. However, the identities of RUC members are opaque, and the proceedings of the group are secret.

To expand on the penultimate point, the current page on the AMA web-site that describes the RUC only lists its members in terms of their specialties and organizational affiliation.  Their names do not appear.  A response to a previous post by me on the subject by the then Chair and Chair-Elect of the RUC suggested that the RUC membership is not quite secret. They stated that "a list of the individual members of the RUC is published in the AMA publication, Medicare RBRVS 2009: The Physicians Guide." This publication is available from the AMA here for a mere $71.95. However, the book is not on the web, or in my local or university library, and I have no other way to easily access it.  Thus, the RUC membership as at best relatively opaque.

To expand on the ultimate point, as Goodson(3) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."

The fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about.  We have posted (here, here, and here) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC.  In 2010, post the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seems to remain the great unmentionable.  Even the leading US medical journal seems reluctant to even print its name. 

Thus, as we noted before, however, the mysteries about it remain:

• How did the government come to fix the payments physicians receive? Government price-fixing has not been popular in the US, yet this has caused no outcry.
• Why is the process by which they are fixed allowed to be so opaque and unaccountable? Why are there no public hearings on the updates, and why is there no input from practicing physicians or organizations other than those related to the RUC?
• How did the RUC become de facto in charge of this process?
• Why does the AMA keep the membership on the RUC so opaque, and give no input into the RUC process to its general membership?
• Why is the RUC membership so dominated by procedural specialists? Why were primary care physicians, who made up at least a sizable minority of physicians when the update process was started, not represented according to their numbers?
• Why has there been so little discussion of the RUC and its responsibility for an extremely expensive health care system dominated by high-technology, expensive, risky and invasive procedures?

Without discussing how the incentives for physicians became so unbalanced, do we really expect we can fix them?  In this case, the persistence of the anechoic effect seems to be doing real damage to the discussion of the critical issues we in the US face today.
References


1. Vladek B. Fixing Medicare's physician payment system. N Engl J Med 2010; 362:1955-1957. (Link here.)
2. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link here.)
3. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310.  (Link here.)

Healthcare IT: A 'goldmine' for fraudsters

Health IT is serving another unexpected purpose: it's becoming a landmine for fraud.

In "Health care: A 'goldmine' for fraudsters", CNN senior writer Parija Kavilanz observes that:

NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) -- There's a group of people who really love the U.S. health care system -- the fraudsters, scammers and organized criminal gangs who are bilking the system of as much as $100 billion a year.

Health care identity theft dominated all other crimes in the sector last year, according to Louis Saccoccio, executive director of the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA), an advocacy group whose members include insurers, law enforcement and regulatory agencies.

The most common method of health care identity fraud occurs when someone with legitimate access, such as a hospital administrator or a doctor's assistant, sells patients' information to organized criminal groups.

Increasingly, criminal groups are hacking into digital medical records so that they can steal money from the $450 billion, 44-million-beneficiary Medicare system -- making the government, by far, the "single biggest victim" of health care fraud, according to Rob Montemorra, chief of the FBI's Health Care Fraud Unit.

All the stolen information includes medical insurance data and Social Security numbers, explained James Van Dyke, president of Javelin Strategy & Research, a research firm specializing in trends in security and fraud initiatives.

Van Dyke said that, with the information, the fraudster falsely bills Medicare and private insurers for drugs, equipment or treatment that were never prescribed.

I have somewhat constrained confidence in the health IT prowess of a government that cannot implement proper processes and information systems to prevent $100 billion per year in Medicare fraud. The fraud is not sophisticated; it is performed in the most simplistic manner via simple submission of fraudulent claims via boiler-room billing companies:

To collect the money, the criminals set up shell billing companies that disappear as soon as there's any indication of an investigation, according to the FBI.

I have less than stellar confidence that the very same government can oversee a national project for health IT to implement technology that is not just a panacea to healthcare's ills as effectively claimed, but goes far beyond that as an alterative that will revolutionize healthcare.

-- SS

The Role of the RUC in Medicare's Price-Fixing and Rationing Remains Anechoic

An important part of the noisy and contentious debate about health care reform in the US centers on the role of the government as a provider of health insurance. Some on the left want a government "single-payer" plan to be the only health insurance available. Some left of center want a government "public option" health insurance plan to be available, particularly to those who have trouble obtaining commercial insurance. Some on the right want none of it, and sometimes note that the existing government single-payer plan for the elderly and disabled, Medicare, has important faults that would only become more significant if the plan is extended or duplicated. Yet even critics of Medicare on the right do not seem to want to talk about what may be its worst fault.

The latest example, an op-ed piece by Dr Scott Gottlieb, appeared in the Wall Street Journal yesterday. Dr Gottlieb's main point was that health care rationing by either government or private insurers is inevitable, but that "government does it in far more byzantine and arbitrary ways." In particular,

Consider the $450 billion Medicare program. It provides a model for—indeed its bureaucracy could well end up running—the 'public option' health plan that Mr. Obama wants to offer all Americans under the age of 65. In recent years, Medicare's staff has been aggressively restricting coverage for costly treatments.

This often means limiting access to the costliest technologies. To do this Medicare relies on its rationing and pricing systems.

Gottlieb then cited several examples, "tortured decisions concerning the use of implantable defibrillators," and "the travails of the pharmaceutical company Spracor and its drug Xopenex, an innovative respiratory medicine that competes with the chemically distinct and much cheaper generic albuterol."

Finally Gottlieb decried Medicare's decision making processes applied to costly technologies as "impenetrable." His summation was

There's nothing inherently wrong with a program like Medicare seeking value for taxpayers. But it shouldn't make up the rules as it goes.

Let me first say that I actually agree with Dr Gottlieb's main points. Any government or private health insurance plan ought to seek value for its money. However, how it does so ought to be rational, based on understanding of medicine and the clinical context, and transparent and accountable to the patients on whose behalf such plans pay. "Covert rationing" (as has been well discussed in the Covert Rationing Blog) raises worries that decisions are being made just to save money, not to improve value, and even that decisions are being made without informed consideration of the clinical context, or based on the self-interest of the decision makers, or even that decisions may result from bribery and corruption.

But if Dr Gottlieb is so concerned about Medicare rationing care as a result of opaque and unaccountable decision making, why is he not more concerned about how Medicare controls the prices of physicians' services than about its decisions about a few expensive, high-tech and infrequently used treatments?

We have written again and again about how Medicare has allowed decisions about what physicians are paid for providing various services to be made de facto by an opaque private committee run by the American Medical Association. This decision-making process has lead to relatively generous payments for procedures, versus miserly payments for "cognitive services," (that is, "evaluation and management services," or for physicians interviewing, examining, and counseling patients, making diagnoses, predicting prognoses, and making decisions about treatment.) The resulting perverse incentives are a major reason that primary care has become increasingly unavailable, and for our expensive patterns of care dominated by high-technology and invasive procedures. More detail quoted from a previous post appears below.

As we have discussed, the US Medicare system determines what it pays physicians using the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS). This system determines the pay for every kind of medical encounter according to a complex formula that is supposed to account for physicians' time and effort, physicians' practice expense, and the cost of malpractice insurance. The components of physicians' effort assessed are, in turn, technical skill and physical effort; the required mental effort and judgment; and stress due to the potential risk to the patient.

To keep the system, which was started in 1990, current, requires addition of new kinds of encounters, which means encounters involving new kinds of procedures, and updating of the estimates of various components, including physicians' time and effort. To do so, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC). The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments. However, the identities of RUC members are secret, as are the proceedings of the group.

This opaque and unaccountable process has resulted in increases outstripping inflation in fees paid for procedures, while fees paid for 'cognitive" medicine,' i.e., for primary care, and for services that involve diagnosis, management of acute and chronic disease, counseling, coordination of care, etc, but not procedures, have lagged inflation. The effects of the RUC have been amplified by the unexplained tendency of commercial managed care and health insurance to track the RBRVS system when making their own payments to physicians.For further details about the RUC, see these posts on Health Care Renewal (here, here, here, here, and here) and important articles by Bodenheimer et al,(1) and Goodson.(2) By the way, why the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies de facto exclusively on the RUC to control the RBRVS system, and why the AMA made the RUC into a secret organization apparently beholden only to the organization's proceduralist members are unanswered questions.

Our most recent posts about the RUC are here, here, and here. Other bloggers, notably including Dr Robert Centor on DB's Medical Rants, have criticized the RUC. The Society of General Internal Medicine seems to be the only medical society that has criticized the RUC (see this post). Yet even ostensibly conservative and libertarian pundits who decry price-fixing and rationing by Medicare have ignored this vivid and important example of opaque and unaccountable price-fixing and rationing. And ostensibly liberal proponents of public options and single-payer systems have not explained how they would make their rationing more rational, transparent, and accountable, or how simply insuring more patients under Medicare-like programs would not result in even higher costs, poorer access, and worse quality.

The lack of discussion of the RUC remains one of the more striking examples of the anechoic effect. Failing to address why our costs are so high, are access is so poor, and our quality is so challenged will make it likely that any supposed reform effort will only make these problems worse.

References

1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. Link here.
2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. Link here.

Congress expects physicians to implement EHR's when they can't post a PDF on the web?

Congress expects physicians to implement EHR's and review patient histories in detail, when they can't even review their own bills before acting, and post a PDF on the web?

This has to be the lamest, most inept, and/or most patronizing Congress in history (with approval ratings to match, 16% as of Sept. 25 according to Rasmussen):

Washington Examiner
Baucus claims it's too difficult to put health care bill online
By: BARBARA HOLLINGSWORTH
09/24/09

A proposal by Sen. Jim Bunning, R-Ky., that would have required the Senate Finance Committee to post the final language of the $900 billion health care reform bill, as well as a Congressional Budget Office cost analysis, on the committee’s website for 72 hours prior to a vote was rejected 12-11.

... Chairman Max Baucus, D-Mont., himself admitted that “This probably sounds a little crazy to some people that we are voting on something before we have seen legislative language.” Indeed.

Baucus’ excuse - that it would take his committee staff two weeks to post the bill online – sounds a little crazy too.

This very same Congress is pushing physicians to implement EHR's under penalty of Medicare payment reductions, while they claim an inability to post a PDF or Word document online. Implementing EHR's is only several orders of magnitude more complex...

Or, perhaps the "inability" to post the text has to do with text that appears at pages 80-81 of the bill:

"Beginning in 2015, payment [under Medicare] would be reduced by five percent if an aggregation of the physician's resource use is at or above the 90th percentile of national utilization." Thus, in any year in which a particular doctor's average per-patient Medicare costs are in the top 10 percent in the nation, the feds will cut the doctor's payments by 5 percent."

As in the Washington Times:

This provision makes no account for the results of care, its quality or even its efficiency. It just says that if a doctor authorizes expensive care, no matter how successfully, the government will punish him by scrimping on what already is a low reimbursement rate for treating Medicare patients. The incentive, therefore, is for the doctor always to provide less care for his patients for fear of having his payments docked.

And because no doctor will know who falls in the top 10 percent until year's end, or what total average costs will break the 10 percent threshold, the pressure will be intense to withhold care, and withhold care again, and then withhold it some more. Or at least to prescribe cheaper care, no matter how much less effective, in order to avoid the penalties.

No metrics on quality of care, outcomes, patient satisfaction, or other aspects of the complex process of medical care are apparently involved. Just an "aggregation of the physician's resource use."

May I use the words "capricious and arbitrary" to describe this metric?

Now, we should ask:

• Is this what our government means by "data driven healthcare?"
• Do they realize the likely adverse consequences of such half-baked measures?
• Are those who would propose such a bill friends of patients, and friends of physicians?

Where have I seen this before? (How about: biomedical dilettantes helping impair R&D at a pharmaceutical company, now in sale mode due to a poor pipeline of new drugs, through cutting drug discovery resources on the simplistic metric of "cost per user per database?")

Ultimately, this Medicare strategy is the end result of allowing medical dilettantes (no matter how well they've "self educated" themselves about medicine) to control the playing field. It is a poster example of a perverse incentive in direct conflict with the obligation of physicians to provide the best care.

In the end, patients and physicians get screwed.

-- SS

SGIM Urges "Chuck the RUC"

This week, Society of General Internal Medicine (SGIM) members received the 5 August, 2009, Update in Health Policy that urged we "chuck the RUC," (quoted in its entirety below, italics added for emphasis):

Who will assign the value of primary care services? Chuck the RUC!

How does Medicare determine physician payment rates? The answer to this question is a core element of the ongoing debate about health care reform. Changing how Medicare sets payment rates for physicians is especially critical since Medicare rates also guide the rates set by private insurers. Since 1992, Medicare has paid physicians according to the Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), a fee schedule that multiplies relative values for physician services by a conversion factor to determine the amount of payment. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has historically used the Relative Value Scale Update Committee, or RUC, as the sole source of recommendations. This committee within the AMA performs broad reviews of the RBRVS every five years. Twenty three of the RUC's twenty nine members are appointed by major national medical specialty societies, including those that account for high percentages of Medicare expenditures for procedures. All meetings are closed and discussions are confidential. The over-representation of procedure-driven subspecialties and under-representation of generalist physicians in the RUC has contributed to the current undervalued cognitive services (especially for primary care) and over-valued reimbursement for procedures. In March 2007, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) identified the RUC process as a major reason for undervalued primary care services and a significant contributor to the crisis in primary care. MedPAC has recommended that an independent expert panel of economists, technology experts, physicians and private citizens be created to supplement the RUC's recommendations to CMS regarding fee schedules. Health reform discussions have included moving MedPAC into the executive branch and giving it authority to review and recommend Medicare payment policy, thus reducing the RUC's influence. Not surprisingly, both the AMA and the American College of Surgeons have opposed this proposal. Groups representing primary care physicians, including SGIM, are in favor of this proposal which could ensure fair and unbiased assignment of work RVUs to all the service codes used by physicians. We believe that this will correct the payment inequalities of the current fee scale and ultimately renew trainees' interest in primary care. In the coming weeks, SGIM may ask you to act on this issue and contact your legislators to urge them to support these transformative proposals for primary care. Please monitor your e-mail for action alerts and be prepared to act.

We have previously posted (most recently here in considerable detail) about the perverse incentives given US physicians by the payment schedule dictated by the US Medicare system. These incentives have been largely responsible for the increasingly dire status of primary care/ generalist care in the US. Revisions to the Resource-Based Relative Value System (RBRVS) disproportionately reward physicians for performing procedures and diagnostic tests instead of talking with, examining, thinking about, diagnosing, recommending decisions for, and counseling patients. The US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) uses the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) de facto as its sole source for advice on revising the system. The RUC is dominated by representatives of medical societies whose members predominantly perform procedures and do diagnostic tests. The RUC is secretive. The identities of its individual members are difficult to ascertain. Its proceedings are secret.

Thus, the RBRVS updating process run by the RUC is opaque, unaccountable, and not representative of patients and "cognitive" physicians. The result of this process has been perverse incentives that have driven up health care costs without obvious improvements in quality or outcomes.

I applaud SGIM for being the first medical society to challenge how the RUC controls payments to physicians, and the perverse incentives the RUC process has generated.

As the Update above says, meaningful health care reform in the US will not occur unless we address the perverse incentives that drive up costs without improving care.

The RUCkus Continues: Former Medicare Administrator Calls the "RUC Process" "Incredibly Flawed," and the AMA Chair Says He's "Inaccurate"

We have posted frequently about the role of the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) in fixing the rates at which Medicare pays physicians. These payment rates have been much more generous for procedures than for "cognitive" services, (that is, services including interviewing and examining patients, making diagnoses, forecasting prognoses, recommending tests or treatments, and counseling patients.) Several authors have suggested that how the RUC fixes payment rates is a major cause of the decline of primary care. (See our previous posts on this here, here, here, here, here, here, and here and important articles by Bodenheimer et al,[1] and Goodson.[2])

An Interview with a former Medicare administrator

Health Affairs just published an interview(3) with Kerry Weems, a recent administrator of the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) under the Bush administration, who had some remarkable criticism for the RUC.

Iglehart: The last question I wanted to ask you relates to the Specialty Society Relative Value Scale Update Committee [RUC] of the American Medical Association. The AMA formed the RUC to act as an expert panel in developing relative value recommendations to CMS. The twenty-nine-member committee essentially determines, through the relative values it establishes for the codes that form the basis of Medicare payments, how much doctors will earn from providing services to beneficiaries. In recent years the RUC has come under criticism based on the view that its specialty- dominated composition undervalues primary care services and, in some instances, overvalues specialty services. I have two questions, Kerry, regarding the RUC. You have been in government for twenty-six years; have you ever heard of an administration that has seriously questioned the RUC process, and whether CMS ought to somehow internalize it or delegate it to another body?

Weems: I think there is a general consensus that the RUC has contributed to the poor state of primary care in the United States. In many ways the supposition behind the RUC process, behind the whole relative value scale, is incredibly flawed. It's an input measurement system, so it asks, What's the cost of my inputs, and that's how I'm going to price my outputs. It has no relationship to perhaps the market value of what you might buy. So because it's highly procedure based, it's prejudiced against just standard primary care evaluation and management [E&M] visits, because in an E&M visit it's hard to document what happens in the same way that it is when you remove a mole, or perform some other procedure.

So the process itself is flawed. I don't think that we can make a change without a statutory change giving us the ability to do that. But it's something that is drastically needed. You know, it's funny that we talk about better coordination of care and creating the medical home. Well, the place where this can occur is in an E&M visit, which has been highly undervalued by the RUC.

Iglehart: You say that the RUC process is seriously flawed and needs to be overhauled. Was there ever any discussion during the eight years of the George W. Bush administration about doing that?

Weems: There were a number of discussions, but it's a hard nut to crack. Those discussions never ripened to the point where we could say we've got something better.

Iglehart: But you'd anticipate under the Obama administration that those discussions will continue?

Weems: Sure. And, you know, you can even see the early attempts at trying to crack that. Representative [Pete] Stark [D-CA] introduced last year the so-called CHAMP [Children's Health and Medicare Protection Act] bill, in which he proposed to develop a new payment approach that would have provided more money to primary care physicians. He split it up into several different categories. This probably wasn't the right approach, but again, he was trying to work through the problem, trying to provide more money for primary care. His heart was in the right place.

There are a number of important points here.

First, a former CMS administrator charged that the RUC has a substantial role in the decline of primary care in the US. Such charges have been made by well-reputed academics who have analyzed the role of the RUC from the outside. But as we have said before, aspects of what the RUC does are obscure, especially because the proceedings of RUC meetings are not made public. But now someone more directly involved has made the same charges.

Second, a former CMS administrator has called the "RUC process ... incredibly flawed." Even the second Bush administration felt these flaws were sufficient to have "a number of discussions," but found "it's a hard nut to crack." Hence he said that although there is something fundamentally wrong with the "RUC process," the government could not easily fix it.

Yet RUC leadership has repeatedly said that the RUC is merely a private advisory committee which gives recommendations to CMS using its rights to free speech and to petition the government. (Note also that above, Inglehart first said that the RUC was formed as "an expert panel" to make "recommendations." But then he said the committee "determines ... how much doctors will earn.") If the RUC is simply an advisory committee, and CMS did not like the advice the RUC was giving, why couldn't CMS leaders simply ignore the RUC?

Weems' remarks do not make sense if the RUC is merely an outside private group providing advice. But they do make sense if the RUC is acting like a government agency.

So this interview once again raises the question: why does CMS rely exclusively on the RUC to update the RBRVS system, apparently making the RUC de facto a government agency, yet without any accountability to CMS, or the government at large?

A response by the Chair of the Board of the AMA

Within days of this interview, Dr Rebecca Patchin, the Chair of the Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association (AMA), wrote a response to the Weems interview. (Amazingly, the response appeared as a blog post on the Health Affairs Blog.)

First, she implied that a former CMS administrator did not know what he was talking about when it came to the RUC.

In the interview, inaccurate statements were made about the role of the AMA/Specialty Society RVS Update Committee (RUC), which advises CMS regarding the relative levels of reimbursement for different medical procedures performed by physicians.

Now I feel like I am in good company. The leaders of the RUC have charged that I made inaccurate statements about the RUC as well (see post here).

However, Dr Patchin failed to identify any particular statements by Kerry Weems or his interviewer as inaccurate, much less provide any evidence to that effect. Note that while the RUC leaders also charged me with making inaccurate statements, they did not specify any particular statements as inaccurate, much less produce evidence in support of their contentions.

Next, Dr Patchin wrote:

Every time the RUC has been asked to review payments for E&M (evaluation and management) codes, the RUC has sent CMS recommendations that would lead to higher payments.

This may be so, but it ignores an important issue. While the RUC may have made some recommendations to increase payments for cognitive services, it has made many more recommendations to increase payments for procedural services. Furthermore, while payments for individual procedures went up, and the volume of procedures also went up, the global budget for physicians' services, called the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR), resulted in across the board cuts. Since raises for procedures were larger and more frequent than raises for cognitive services, the net effect was that payments for procedures increased relative to cognitive services.

Even more important, it begs that question: what has the RUC done at times when no one asked it "to review payments for E&M ... codes?" After all, the RUC leadership has argued again and again that it is only a private advisory committee (and see below for another such argument). As such, it should be able to choose how often it deals with payments for cognitive services. It should not have to wait to be asked to review them. So why wasn't the RUC reviewing these payments more frequently?

Then, Dr Patchin reiterated:

To clarify: The RUC makes recommendations to CMS, and then CMS makes its payment decisions.

and again,

Bottom line: the RUC makes recommendations, CMS makes payment decisions.

This, once more, begs the questions. Why didn't the RUC make more recommendations to improve payments for cognitive services? Why doesn't CMS get recommendations about payments to physicians from sources other than the RUC? Why doesn't CMS make the process for setting physicians' payments, and updating and revising the RBRVS system more broad-based and transparent? Why did the administrator of CMS feel unable to change or ignore the "RUC process?"

I don't have the capacity to find out the answers to these questions. Answering them might take some investigative reporting, or even a Congressional investigation. Given that physicians' payments are key incentives driving the health care system, and that payments favoring procedures are likely to be a major cause for rising volume and costs of procedures, which, in turn, is likely to be a major reason our health care system is so expensive, why do we know so little about how these payment rates are set?

References

1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. Link here.
2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. Link here.
3. Iglehart JK. Doing more with less: a conversation with Kerry Weems. Health Aff 2009; http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.28.4.w688/DC1

BLOGSCAN - How US Medicare Will Pay for Cancer Drugs

On the GoozNews blog, Merrill Goozner dissects the recent decision by the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to make more lenient the criteria it uses to decide which off-label anti-cancer drugs it will pay for. Now any drug rated favorably in at least one of several drug compendia will be approved. Yet it turns out that intricate, but important conflicts of interest may affect how drugs get positive reviews in some of the compendia. It does seem that nearly every piece of our fiendishly complex health care system is affected by conflicts of interest. To put the most positive interpretation on it, most US government agencies that deal with health care seem to have operated up to now in ignorant bliss when it comes to these conflicts.

NB: see also the post by Dr Howard Brody on the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog, and the links he provides.

SouthernCare Settles

'Tis the season for settlements, it appears. The Birmingham (Alabama, USA) News reported,

SouthernCare is paying the federal government $24.7 million to settle claims that the Birmingham-based hospice company fraudulently enrolled elderly people in hospice and charged Medicare for services when the patients were not dying, according to the U.S. Department of Justice.

The lawsuits alleged that SouthernCare purposefully enrolled ineligible patients for hospice care, which is restricted to patients who have six months or less to live.

One of the whistle-blowers said a patient who had successful heart bypass surgery and yet stayed on hospice through SouthernCare for four years ultimately apologized for not dying.

[Whistle-blowers Tonja] Rice and [Nancy] Romeo said many of SouthernCare's patients didn't need or didn't get hospice care because they were not terminally ill, but the federal government was billed as though they were. Some patients were receiving aggressive curative treatment at the time from other doctors, and other patients barely needed home health care.

Rice said the company mined Birmingham-area nursing homes and doctors' offices for patients they could dupe. Romeo said employees risked losing their jobs if they didn't meet a quota of enrolling 21 patients each per month, no matter whether they qualified for hospice. At times, employees from outside Alabama came into the state to help 'slam' more patients into the program, the whistle-blowers said.

The whistle-blowers' lawyers said SouthernCare had a marketing strategy of going into churches and other places, telling patients they could get Medicare to pay for services not normally covered.

'A lot of these people, when they were approached, thought they were getting home health care,' said Stephen Heninger, Rice's attorney. 'They were just elderly and didn't need hospice.'

SouthernCare, founded in 1995, touts itself as one of the nation's largest hospice providers. The company said in a statement that it admitted no liability through the settlement and that the allegations did not involve the quality of the hospice care provided.

Well, here we go again. Yet another large US health care corporation pays a multi-million dollar settlement of charges alleging unethical, perhaps illegal business practices. The amount, although large, is not big enough to seriously impact the corporations's profits. Although the corporation pays money, the impact is apparently spread amongst stock-holders (here, private owners) and employees. The people responsible for directing the questionable activities are not identified, and apparently pay no penalty.

As we have said before, settlements like this just slightly add to the "cost of business," and are unlikely to deter bad behavior. Until the people who make the decisions that lead to the bad behavior face negative incentives, bad behavior is likely to continue.

Particularly worthy of challenge is the company's statement that this settlement had nothing to do with the quality of its care. If a corporation's leaders are willing to fool vulnerable, elderly patients about their Medicare coverage, why should we trust them to deliver pristine health care? If a corporation's leaders push their employees with recruitment quotas so ambitious as to require duping patients to fulfill them, why should we trust them not to otherwise intimidate and demoralize their employees, making the care they deliver all the more suspect?

Regrettably, the contempt with which many businesspeople who lead health care organizations treat patients, employees, and health care professionals alike explains much of what is wrong with health care today.

See related comments about for-profit hospices in this post by Maggie Mahar in the Health Beat blog.

Can We Fix Medicare While Pretending the RUC Does Not Exist?

There has been much media discussion of how the US Congress just forestalled an across-the-board cut in Medicare's payments to physicians that threatened to markedly decrease access to care. There was some discussion that this was just a temporary fix, but more fundamental solutions would be difficult. Some of the media discussion made some points that previously went unsaid, including:

• Medicare fixes payments to physicians - For example, a Wall Street Journal editorial noted, "As a virtual monopoly, Medicare uses a complex formula to set reimbursement rates for thousands of services. In short, it controls prices. That's why doctors are supposed to eat a pay cut, even though everyone knows this would prompt more doctors to stop seeing Medicare patients."
• Changing the system would be difficult, because it might mean some people would make less money - For example, a New York Times article noted, "lawmakers are pleading with physicians’ groups to come forward with a comprehensive proposal. But that could be difficult because any new formula would almost surely produce winners and losers among doctors."

Those are two good points that start getting at some basic parts of the problem. But even this new clarity seems to miss other fundamental questions, most notably: how did the current Medicare system of fixing prices end up doing so in a way that is so unfavorable to primary care and other cognitive physicians' services, and so favorable to surgery and other procedures?

How the current system arose is no longer a mystery, and was certainly a work of mankind, rather than the supernatural.

As we have discussed before (here, and see this post with links backward), based on several key published articles,(1-4) it is the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) that seems most responsible for the current state of affairs. Medicare payments to physicians are based on the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS). RBRVS was put in place in the early 1990s, mainly to try to restore then present imbalance in payments that already favored procedures over primary care and cognitive services. Medicare apparently gave the RUC de facto authority over how the system would be updated. The updates the RUC put in place over the years generally involved increasing payments for specific procedures over time, even though most procedures actually get easier to do in the years after their development, and the volume of procedures was increasing much faster than that of office visits. This probably was related to how representatives of specialties that emphasize procedures dominate the membership of the RUC, (although the names of individual members of the RUC, and its deliberations are kept secret). Since the Medicare payment system requires that the overall payments to physicians grow no faster than inflation and the increase in the elderly population, increases in costs due to increasing prices and volume and procedures lead to across-the-board cuts of all payments, which mainly hurt payments for office and hospital visits.

What is mysterious is why Medicare relies on the RUC to the exclusion of any other input; how the AMA can claim the RUC is merely an "advocacy group," rather than the de facto controller of payments to physicians; what individuals are currently RUC members and what goes on during its proceedings; why do managed care organizations and health care insurers base their payments to physicians so slavishly on the RUC governed Medicare fee schedule; and why, outside of a few academics and bloggers, is discussion of the RUC so scanty?

Any real attempt to reform the fundamental inequities in what we pay for health care, inequities which have driven our over-use of procedures and high-technology and devalued thoughtful compassionate, continuing, comprehensive, and continuous care, must address the bizarre and mysterious way payments are fixed. To do so, health care policy makers and the public at large will first have to acknowledge and publicly discuss the problem. It should not be only a few academics and bloggers who are willing to talk about it.

References

1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (link here)
2. Maxwell S, Zukcerman S, Berenson RA. Use of physicians' services under Medicare's resource-based payment system. N Engl J Med 2007; 356: 1853-1861. (link here)
3. Newhouse JP. Medicare spending on physicians - no easy fix in sight. N Engl J Med 2007; 356: 1883-1884. (link here)
4. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. (link here.)

"An Impending Hurricane of Outrage" About the RUC?

We have posted a number of times, (most recently here, and see links to earlier posts) about the RBRVS Update Committee's (RUC) responsibility for Medicare's relatively poor payments for primary care and other "cognitive" physicians' services, compared to procedures. This imbalance has rippled through all of US health care, affecting how private insurers and managed care organizations reimburse physicians, and generally how the US systems favors procedures over talking, examining, thinking, diagnosing, prognosticating, deciding, and prescribing and super-specialization over generalism and primary care.

The RUC ostensibly is just an advocacy group sponsored by the American Medical Association, yet it seems to be the only source of outside input about physicians' reimbursement used by the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Given this influence, it is dismaying that it is secretive, unrepresentative, and unaccountable. Neither its membership nor proceedings are public. It is dominated by proceduralists and sub-specialists. It is unaccountable to US physicians, much less the general public.

We therefore recently commented skeptically about how CMS put the RUC in charge of setting physicians' payments for the patient-centered medical home (PCMH). The PCMH seems to be a newly fashionable concept for reviving primary care. It turns out a lot of other medical and health care bloggers were equally skeptical. In this post on the e-CareManagement Blog, Vince Kuraitis describes physician bloggers as "spewing venom" at the idea of the RUC determining how the PCMH might work. He linked to five blogs other than Health Care Renewal (and the Happy Hospitalist, to whom we linked in the post above), and then noted "you can add me to the list." His final question was, " Are these reactions just a few lone bloggers, or the first whispers of the impending hurricane of outrage? I suspect the latter."

Payments for the Patient-Centered Medical Home Mired in the RUC

We have posted a number of times, (most recently here, and see links to earlier posts) about the RBRVS Update Committee's (RUC) responsibility for Medicare's relatively poor reimbursement of primary care and other "cognitive" physicians' services compared to procedures. This imbalance has rippled through all of US health care, affecting how private insurers and managed care organizations reimburse physicians, and generally how the US systems favors procedures over talking, examining, thinking, diagnosing, prognosticating, deciding, and prescribing and super-specialization over generalism and primary care.

The RUC ostensibly is just an advocacy group sponsored by the American Medical Association, yet it seems to be the only source of outside input about physicians' reimbursement used by the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Given this influence, it is dismaying that it is secretive, unrepresentative, and unaccountable. Neither its membership nor proceedings are public. It is dominated by proceduralists and sub-specialists. It is unaccountable to US physicians, much less the general public.

CMS in its wisdom also put the RUC in charge of figuring out how physicians' practices participating in trials of the patient-centered medical home (PCMH) would be paid. The PCMH has gotten a lot of buzz lately. It purports to be the modern way to characterize a well-functioning primary care practice. Various powers that be that now want to support primary care seem only interested in supporting such care that fits the PCMH model. Yet putting the RUC, which seems to be the single most important cause of the decline of primary care, in charge of payment for this new version of primary care, appears to be a great case of putting the fox in charge of the hen-house. On the Retired Doc's Thoughts blog, Dr James Gaulte first pointed this out.

The RUC just released its report on how physicians providing medical homes ought to be paid. Now, on the Happy Hospitalist blog, this post dissected how the RUC came up with its recommendations, in all their mind-numbing detail. That blog summarized the results as "punching primary care in the face," and furthermore,

The payment rates that are recommended are insulting and downright degrading. Do they think nobody is paying attention? These people have no business trying to create public policy.

Unless I'm completely off base in my interpretation, if I was an outpatient doc, I would run faster than Forest Gump from this proposed financial disaster.

This is a reminder of what can go wrong with a "single-payer health care system," which is what Medicare is. When the government sets what physicians are paid, which is what happens in Medicare, (and de facto happens for our entire health care system, as private insurance companies and managed care organizations seem to slavishly follow the CMS' lead as engineered by the RUC), the government ought to provide a rational, transparent, accountable method of doing so. The current RUC based system is the opposite, irrational, opaque, and unaccountable. If we don't fix it, we can kiss primary care goodbye, with all the negative consequences that would entail. And further woe unto us if the calls for health care reform lead to "Medicare for all," with the RUC based system intact.

More Wooden-Headed Reimbursements and Perverse Incentives: Medicare Proposes Penalty for Supposed "Never Events"

The Associated Press just reported that the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which administers the Medicare single-payer insurance system for elderly and disabled Americans, just proposed a new policy for paying hospitals:

Federal health officials on Monday proposed adding dangerous blood clots in the leg and eight other conditions to the list of complications that Medicare won't pay to treat if they were acquired at the hospital.

Medicare set a new precedent last year by saying it would no longer pay hospitals for treating certain "never events" — conditions that occur as a result of hospital error. For example, if a patient were given the wrong blood type, Medicare would not pay the hospital more for the subsequent care a patient required. Originally, eight conditions were covered under the new rules, which take effect Oct. 1.

The rules proposed Monday add nine conditions....

The full list of conditions was not in the article, but can be found in a CMS press release:

* Surgical site infections following certain elective procedures
* Legionnaires’ disease (a type of pneumonia caused by a specific bacterium)
* Extreme blood sugar derangement
* Iatrogenic pneumothorax (collapse of the lung)
* Delirium
* Ventilator-associated pneumonia
* Deep vein thrombosis/Pulmonary Embolism (formation/movement of a blood clot)
* Staphylococcus aureus septicemia (bloodstream infection)
* Clostridium difficile associated disease (a bacterium that causes severe diarrhea and more serious intestinal conditions such as colitis)

That press release further asserted,

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) today proposed additional steps to strengthen the tie between the quality of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries and payment for the services provided when they are in the hospital.

CMS is proposing to expand the list of conditions which are reasonably preventable through proper care and for which Medicare will no longer pay at a higher rate if the patient acquires them during a hospital stay.

Thus, this proposal would be a form of a pay-for-performance (P4P) system, and one based on outcomes. That is, if the patient develops one of the conditions above while in the hospital (the outcomes), the hospital's performance is deemed inadequate, and the hospital is paid less.

This, in my humble opinion, seems a remarkably wooden-headed way to implement P4P for hospitals. The problems here are:

• The outcomes are at best only partially preventable. There are no clear way to completely, or even nearly completely prevent most of these outcomes
• The outcomes more commonly afflict sicker and more complex patients.

Let us examine, for example, one outcome about which I know something more than the others, delirium occurring in the hospital.

A Cochrane review of "interventions for preventing delirium in hospitalised patients," published in 2007, included only six studies, all in surgical settings [Siddiqi N, Stockdale R, Holmes J. Internventions for preventing delirium in hospitalised patients. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 2008. Link here. ]. The review found only one study that appeared to be adequately powered. The review's abstract described that study thus,

Only one study of 126 hip fracture patients comparing proactive geriatric consultation with usual care was sufficiently powered to detect a difference in the primary outcome, incident delirium. Total cumulative delirium incidence during admission was reduced in the intervention group (OR 0.48 [95% CI 0.23, 0.98]; RR 0.64 [95% CI 0.37, 0.98]), suggesting a 'number needed to treat' of 5.6 patients to prevent one case.

It is obvious that although this intervention reduced the incidence of delirium, it hardly totally prevented it.

The review concluded,

Research evidence on effectiveness of interventions to prevent delirium is sparse. Based on a single study, a programme of proactive geriatric consultation may reduce delirium incidence and severity in patients undergoing surgery for hip fracture. Prophylactic low dose haloperidol may reduce severity and duration of delirium episodes and shorten length of hospital admission in hip surgery. Further studies of delirium prevention are needed.

Furthermore, a well-known predictive model for in-hospital delirium [Inouye SK, Viscoli CM, Horwitz RI et al. A predictive model for delirium in hospitalized elderly medical patients based on admission characteristics. Ann Intern Med 1993; 119: 474-481. Link here. ] suggested that sicker patients (that is, those with "severe illness," pre-existing cognitive impairment, and a high BUN/Creatinine ratio) are more likely to get delirium.

Is delirium a "never event?" Well, hardly ever...

Thus, it appears that the surest way to avoid incurring CMS' proposed financial penalty for delirium occurring in the hospital would be to avoid admitting sicker patients who are most likely to become delirious. This, of course, is a perverse incentive that could make care less accessible for those who need it the most, and would violate hospitals' fundamental mission to care for the sick.

Similarly, I would challenge the brainiacs who came up with this proposed rule to show how any of the supposed "never events" could be reliably prevented, short of turning away the sicker patients who are likely to suffer these events.

This is an example of wooden-headed and perverse incentives at their worst, perpetrated by government bureaucrats who apparently have no understanding of the practice of medicine in the hospital.

This comes from the same folks who rely on the secretive RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) to come up with a reimbursement scheme that does not allow physicians enough time to interact with, get information and actually think about their patients. (See post here.)

Paying physicians for the time it takes to gather information, think about it, and thoughtfully come up with the best possible plan for each individual patient would do a whole lot more to improve quality and patients' outcomes than penalizing hospitals (and physicians indirectly) for events that they could not have prevented.

Woe unto us for turning control of health care's largest and most powerful organizations over to wooden-headed bureaucrats and ill-informed, self-interested, and sometimes corrupt executives!

ADDENDUM (18 April, 2008) - See comments by DrRich on the Covert Rationing blog.

ADDENDUM (22 April, 2008) - See also comments on Retired Doc's Thoughts blog.