Former NIH Director Spins Through Revolving Door, Ends Up at Sanofi-Aventis

A bit of news that got little attention this month was a new job for the former head of the US National Institutes of Health (NIH).  Dr Elias Zerhouni had left the NIH in October, 2008.  Here is the Reuters version of the story of his hew career:

French drugmaker Sanofi-Aventis (SASY.PA) replaced its head of research and development with a leading academic and former top U.S. health official on Tuesday to raise its game in medical innovations.

The company said Elias Zerhouni would lead R&D of drugs and bring R&D for vaccines under his control too as Sanofi reshapes its portfolio and looks to vaccines as one area for growth to offset sales losses from mounting generic competition.

The appointment of Zerhouni, a professor of radiology and biomedical engineering, comes as Sanofi battles to buy U.S. rare disease specialist Genzyme.

Chief executive Chris Viehbacher brought in Zerhouni in February 2009 as his scientific adviser, shortly after taking charge of the group which he has been transforming to include the development of drugs based on biotechnology.

Zerhouni's Embrace of Corporate Health Care

Although Zerhouni ostensibly left the NIH to return to academia at Johns Hopkins University, note that by February, 2009, four months after his resignation was announced, Zerhouni was already advising the Sanofi CEO. 

Soon after he joined the corporate health care world in earnest.  In April, 2009, he was proposed for membership on the board of directors of Actelion Ltd, a Swiss biotechnology company.  On December 8, 2009, he was elected to the board of Danaher Corp, a diversified technology corporation which makes medical devices.  At some time he had become President of the Zerhouni Group, which advertised itself as a resource to "pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, trade organizations, sovereign wealth funds, government agencies, and research entities around the globe."

Zerhouni at the NIH: His Response to the Conflict of Interest Scandal

There is more than a little irony inspired by Zerhouni's quick circuit through the revolving door.

Zerhouni became director of the NIH in 2002, and announced his departure in October, 2008. In December, 2003, David Willman published his landmark article in the Los Angeles Times on severe conflicts of interest affecting NIH scientists and leaders.  It revealed that formerly stringent conflict of interest policies at the Institutes were rescinded by then director Dr Harold Varmus in 1995, during the Clinton administration, and increasingly since 1998, disclosure of NIH personnel's conflicts of interest had been reduced.  Thus, in 2002, Zerhouni had taken charge of an agency already deeply affected by conflicts of interest affecting many of its leaders, even though that was not yet public.  He initially did nothing about the situation. 

Willman published another series of articles revealing even more breathtaking conflicts of interest in December, 2004.  (See our post here.)   By then, a Los Angeles Times editorial said there was the "appearance of corruption" at the NIH, and called for Dr Zerhouni's resignation. 

Only after the second series of articles did Dr Zerhouni swing into action (see post here).  In February, 2005, he announced that he would now hold the NIH to a "higher standard."  Yet new conflict of interest stories kept surfacing and their handling kept provoking concern (e.g., see this post from 2007, and this post from 2008), and concerns about how NIH deals with conflicts of interest affecting the extramural researchers it funds persist to this day (e.g., see this post). 

By the late 1990s, the NIH, like many other government agencies, seemed to have become extremely cozy with the world of big corporations.  Dr Zerhouni did nothing to obvious to reduce the local version of this coziness until it had become a public scandal.  His actions let questions about the relationships of the NIH, once a pristine example of a government run biomedical research agency, with big health care business persist to this day. 

So it should perhaps be no surprise that he so quickly transitioned from the government that is supposed to be"of the people, by the people, for the people" to top leadership positions in corporate health care.

Other US Government Health Care Agency Leaders Transit the Revolving Door

Meanwhile, the previous commissioner of the US Food and Drug Administration, Dr Andrew von Eschenbach, is Senior Director for Strategic Initiatives at the Center for Health Transformation, a group whose membership includes some of the biggest health care organizations, many of which have had their own moments in the sun on Health Care Renewal.  For example, see Charter Members, AstraZeneca, Sutter Health, and Wellpoint; and Platinum Members, GlaxoSmithKline and Merck.  Dr Eschenbach is also on the board of directors of Histosonics Inc. 

Also, the previous director of the Centers for Disease Control, Dr Julie Geberding, became President of Merck Vaccines in late 2009. 

Conclusions

So the revolving door just keeps spinning, its revolutions suggesting how closely tied together big government and big corporations have become in what is now the health care business.  Whatever the motivations of Doctors Zerhouni, von Eschenbach, and Geberding were, the message to every person in a leadership position in health care in the US government has to still be: you too can earn big corporate compensation soon after you leave here.  Who knows how much that siren song will lead current government leaders to avoid antagonizing the leaders of big health care corporations during their government "service."  That is, of course, not what we want them to be thinking about if government agencies ae to serve the people, not the CEOs of big corporations. 

I am sure that the career transitions of Doctors Zerhouni, von Eschenbach, and Geberding were perfectly legal.  If we want government health care agencies to put the peoples' interests ahead of those of the CEOs of big health care corporations, should not, however, the law be changed to at least slow down the revolving door?

"Unreasonably Dangerous" Heparin

It is time for an update on the case of the deadly contaminated heparin sold by Baxter International, which has received much less attention than seems warranted given its human costs (81 lives).  How the heparin was contaminated, and how the contaminated heparin ended up being sold as a US Food and Drug Administration approved American product are still unknown.  Despite the fact that the outcome of this case were so bad, it received disproportionately little attention when it was first made public, and now seems to have become nearly anechoic.

Case Summary 

Baxter International imported the "active pharmaceutical ingredient" (API) of heparin, that is, in plainer language, the drug itself, from China. That API was then sold, with some minor processing, as a Baxter International product with a Baxter International label. The drug came from a sketchy supply chain that Baxter did not directly supervise, apparently originating in small "workshops" operating under primitive and unsanitary conditions without any meaningful inspection or supervision by the company, the Chinese government, or the FDA. The heparin proved to have been adulterated with over-sulfated chondroitin sulfate (OSCS), and many patients who received got seriously ill or died. While there have been investigations of how the adulteration adversely affected patients, to date, there have been no publicly reported investigations of how the OSCS got into the heparin, and who should have been responsible for overseeing the purity and safety of the product. Despite the facts that clearly patients died from receiving this adulterated drug, no individual has yet suffered any negative consequence for what amounted to poisoning of patients with a brand-name but adulterated pharmaceutical product.  (For a more detailed summary of the case, look here, and for all our posts on this topic, look here.)

Civil Cases Plod Forward
If there is any ongoing official investigation of this case, it has not been made public.  Civil cases filed by patients allegedly injured by the heparin, or by relatives of patients who died allegedly from the heparin, seem to be proceeding at a glacial pace.  However, there is one development in one set of civil cases worthy of note.  As reported two weeks ago by Alicia Mundy in the Wall Street Journal:

A state court in Illinois has granted a partial summary judgment to two plaintiffs suing Baxter International Inc. over contaminated blood thinner, saying that some of the company's heparin was 'unreasonably dangerous.'

The suit involves tainted imported heparin ingredients from China that caused a public health crisis in 2008, and were linked to more than 80 deaths in the U.S. and many other serious allergic reactions.

Some 300 cases nationwide against Baxter and its main ingredient supplier, Wisconsin-based Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC, were consolidated in Chicago in Cook County Circuit Court.

Both companies have said that they weren't negligent and weren't responsible for the deadly reactions among patients.

The Illinois judge's ruling, dated Wednesday, involved a motion for partial summary judgment that named only Baxter. The motion was filed on behalf of two plaintiffs in the consolidated cases, one of whom died.

The ruling cites statements by Baxter's corporate quality vice president and the president of the company's medication delivery division that the heparin was defective.

Baxter argued in its defense that a jury should address the question of whether a product is 'unreasonably dangerous.' The company noted that the two Baxter executives who agreed in depositions that the heparin was defective aren't doctors or scientists. However, Judge Jennifer Duncan-Brice wrote that the issue before her wasn't whether heparin actually caused the death or injury to the plaintiffs, but just whether the product was, as a matter of fact, contaminated.

The most basic responsibility of a pharmaceutical company is to produce pure, unadulterated product.  As the current director of the US Food and Drug Administration wrote in this week's New England Journal of Medicine, the agency's "modern regulatory functions began with the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act, a law, more than a quarter of a century in the making, that prohibited interstate commerce in adulterated and misbranded food and drugs."  However, in the 21st century, drug companies are increasingly failing to produce unadulterated products, and the FDA is having increasing difficulty assuring patients that the drugs they take meet even the most basic safety standards. 

I submit that corporate cultures increasingly influenced by the arrogant, greedy, amoral leadership of the financial services industry that lead us to the brink of another depression are also leading us to the brink of a poisonous era in health care.  Corporate leaders intent on cutting costs, and paying themselves as much of the resulting proceeds as possible, may see quality and safety as just another cost cutting target.  Corporate leaders brought up in the culture of finance, but untrained and inexperienced in engineering, science, and medicine find it all too easy to ignore quality and safety and focus on the bottom line.  (It is ironic that in the quote above, Baxter International's attorneys made light of the judgments of the company's own executives because they are not physicians or scientists.)

Meanwhile, society seems to have been so mesmerized by the mantra that laissez faire capitalism will lead to miraculous "innovation" that we do not even attend to instances in which it lead instead to death.

As we have said until being blue in the face, as long as the leaders of health care organizations are not held accountable for the results of their decisions on health care quality, cost, and access (even in such extreme quality violations as those resulting in multiple patient deaths), we can expect continuing decisions that sacrifice quality, increase costs, and worsen access, but that are in the self-interest of the people making them.


To really reform health care, we must hold health care organizations and their leaders accountable (and not blame all the problems on doctors, other health care professionals, patients, and society at large).

EHRevent.org CEO Edward Fotsch MD: The Real Challenge with EHRs is -- User Error?

Additional detailed answers to the questions I raised here and here about a new site EHRevent.org, for reporting of healthcare IT-related medical errors, can now be found at a HIStalk interview entitled "HIStalk Interviews Edward Fotsch MD, CEO, PDR Network (EHR Event)" at this link.

It is an interesting interview. I certainly find the recognition of need for an EHR/clinical IT problems reporting service a major cultural advancement in healthcare.

It's still unclear to me how -- and why -- this organization originated with little to no public knowledge and involvement, especially considering the organization types mentioned below that participated, and how it will function in interactions with myriad healthcare IT stakeholders.

Here's an explanation by Dr. Fotsch:

... We work with a not-for-profit board called the iHealth Alliance. They Alliance is made up of medical society executives, professional liability carriers, and liaison representatives from the FDA. They govern some of the networks that we run, and in exchange for that, help us recruit physicians. Professional liability carriers, for example, promote our services that send drug alerts to doctors because that’s good and protective from a liability standpoint.

In the course of our conversations with them roughly a year ago, when we were talking about adding some drug safety information into electronic health records, we came across the fact that there were concerns from the liability carriers that there was no central place for reporting adverse EHR events or near misses or potential problems or issues with electronic health records.

[Translation: the carriers saw their losses potentially increasing as a result of litigation arising from EHR-related lawsuits, and decided to do something proactive- ed.]

They were interested in creating a single place where they could promote to their insured physicians that they could report adverse EHR events. Then it turned out that medical societies had similar concerns.

[That must have been one of the best-kept secrets on Earth considering the promotion EHR's have received as a miracle-working technology, and the lack of expression of concerns from those societies - ed.]

Rather than have each of them create a system, the Alliance took on a role of orchestrating all of the interests, including some interest from the FDA and ONC in creating an electronic health record problem reporting system. That’s how it came into play.

Our role in it, in addition to having a seat on the iHealth Alliance board, was really in network operations — in running the servers, if you will, which didn’t seem like a very complicated task. Since business partners we rely on for our core business were interested in it, it was easy to say yes. It frankly turned out to be somewhat more complicated than we originally thought [I predict they haven't seen anything yet; wait until they get knee deep into real world EHR issues - ed.], but now it’s up and available.

While I find the recognition of need for an EHR/clinical IT reporting service a major advancement, I am nonetheless troubled by certain statements made by Dr. Fotsch. They seem at odds with the theoretic and empirical findings of medical informatics, social informatics, human-computer interaction and other fields relevant for health IT evaluation, and/or seem to demonstrate biases about HIT. My comments are in red italics:

Fotsch:

… Probably what we’re seeing more often than not, the real challenge with EHRs like any technology, turns out to be some form of user error.

[What about contributory or causative designer error? – ed.]

“I didn’t know it would do that"

[Why did the user not know? Lack of training, poor manuals, or overly complex information systems lacking informative messages and consistency of control-action relationships, as an example? -ed]

... or “I didn’t know that it pre-populated that"

[Why did it pre-populate? Was that inappropriate for the clinical context, such as in this example?]

... or “I didn’t know I shouldn’t cut and paste"

[Then why did the software designers enable cut and paste, without some informative message on overuse, such as length of text cut and pasted?– ed.]

... or “I wasn’t paying attention to this"

[Perhaps due to distractions from mission hostile user interfaces? -ed]

... or maybe the user interface was a little confusing

[What is "a little confusing?" (Is that like "A little pregnant?) And why was it confusing? User intellectual inadequacy, or software design issues leading to cognitive overload? - ed.]

Actual software errors appear to be the exception rather than the rule as it relates to EHR events.

["Actual software errors" are defined as, what, exactly--? Loss of database relational integrity as a result of a programming error, as apparently recently happened at Trinity Health, a large Catholic hospital chain as reported in HIStalk? Memory leaks from poor code? Buffer overflows? What?]

That’s at least as I understand it.

[Understand it from whom? Hopefully not from me or my extensive website on the issues, the site whose header sadly now appears as below - ed.]

A new, unfortunate header for my website on health IT failures. Click to enlarge the shaded area, or click here to go to the site.

In summary, a "blame the user" attitude seems apparent. There appears to be little acknowledgment of the concept of IT "errorgenicity" - the capacity of a badly designed or poorly implemented information system to facilitate error, and of the systemic nature of errors in complex organizations to which ill-done IT can contribute.

These are concepts understood long ago in mission critical settings, as in this mid 1980's piece from the Air Force cited in my previously-linked eight part series on mission hostile health IT:

From "GUIDELINES FOR DESIGNING USER INTERFACE SOFTWARE"
ESD-TR-86-278
August 1986
Sidney L. Smith and Jane N. Mosier
The MITRE Corporation
Prepared for Deputy Commander for Development Plans and Support Systems, Electronic Systems Division, AFSC, United States Air Force, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts.

... SIGNIFICANCE OF THE USER INTERFACE

The design of user interface software is not only expensive and time-consuming, but it is also critical for effective system performance. To be sure, users can sometimes compensate for poor design with extra effort. Probably no single user interface design flaw, in itself, will cause system failure. But there is a limit to how well users can adapt to a poorly designed interface. As one deficiency is added to another, the cumulative negative effects may eventually result in system failure, poor performance, and/or user complaints.

Outright system failure can be seen in systems that are underused, where use is optional, or are abandoned entirely. There may be retention of (or reversion to) manual data handling procedures, with little use of automated capabilities. When a system fails in this way, the result is disrupted operation, wasted time, effort and money, and failure to achieve the potential benefits of automated information handling.

In a constrained environment, such as that of many military and commercial information systems, users may have little choice but to make do with whatever interface design is provided. There the symptoms of poor user interface design may appear in degraded performance. Frequent and/or serious errors in data handling may result from confusing user interface design [in medicine, this often translates to reduced safety and reduced care quality - ed.] Tedious user procedures may slow data processing, resulting in longer queues at the checkout counter, the teller's window, the visa office, the truck dock, [the hospital floor or doctor's office - ed.] or any other workplace where the potential benefits of computer support are outweighed by an unintended increase in human effort.

In situations where degradation in system performance is not so easily measured, symptoms of poor user interface design may appear as user complaints. The system may be described as hard to learn, or clumsy, tiring and slow to use [often heard in medicine, but too often blamed on "physician resistance" - ed.] The users' view of a system is conditioned chiefly by experience with its interface. If the user interface is unsatisfactory, the users' view of the system will be negative regardless of any niceties of internal computer processing.

I am not entirely happy when the CEO of an organization taking on the responsibility of being a central focus for EHR error reporting makes statements that are consistent with unfamiliarity with important HIT-relevant domains, as well as a possible pro-IT, anti-user biases.

For that reason as well as the other questions raised at my prior posts (such as the onerous legal contract and apparent lack of ability of the public to easily view the actual report texts themselves), I cannot recommend use of their site for EHR problems reporting.

I recommend the continued use of the FDA facilities until such time as a compelling argument exists to do otherwise.

-- SS

Addendum 11/28/10:

This passage ends the main essay at my site "Contemporary Issues in Medical Informatics: Common Examples of Healthcare Information Technology Difficulties" and is quite relevant here:

... An article worth reviewing is "Human error: models and management", James Reason (a fitting name!), BMJ 2000;320:768-770 (18 March), http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/320/7237/768:

Summary points:

• Two approaches to the problem of human fallibility exist: the person and the system approaches
  

• The person approach focuses on the errors of individuals, blaming them for forgetfulness, inattention, or moral weakness

• The system approach concentrates on the conditions under which individuals work and tries to build defenses to avert errors or mitigate their effects

• High reliability organizations---which have less than their fair share of accidents---recognize that human variability is a force to harness in averting errors, but they work hard to focus that variability and are constantly preoccupied with the possibility of failure.

-- SS

There You Go Again: Richard Epstein Says "Conflict-of-Interest Rules Thwart Medical Progress"

Richard Epstein, a professor at the New York University and University of Chicago law schools, just authored a report on the perils of conflict of interest rules.  In his blog, "The Libertarian," he summarized his beliefs that strict conflict of interest (COI) rules and restrictions on pharmaceutical marketing "spell lower rates of innovation and slower dissemination of new products." 

Prof Epstein is extremely prominent.  The Manhattan Institute, of which he is a fellow, claimed, "Professor Epstein's influence is profound: he is one of the three most cited law professors in the United States and the most cited professor writing largely in private law." Thus, it is disturbing that it appears that his objections are based on a series of logical fallacies.  (Note that we critiqued a defense of certain conflicts of interest he made in 2007 here on similar grounds.)

Ad Hominem: Enemies of Capitalism

Prof Epstein implied that the people who advocate strong conflict of interest rules are enemies of capitalism and free markets.  For example, he wrote, "most of the modern critics of the drug and medical device industries start with the assumption that the profit-motive alone is sufficient to distort the behavior of all scientists and researchers."  Later, "the people who line up most strongly against drug and device companies often treat the phrase 'market forces' as though it embodies the worst things in life."  How he was able to read the minds of those who disagree with him is unclear.  Attacking proponents of strict COI regulation as anti-capitalists (and by implication, socialists or communists) appears to be an ad hominem fallacy.

Burden of Proof: Ignoring Evidence of Harms of COI, Asserting Evidence of Benefits

Prof Epstein argued that COIs rarely if ever leads to bad effects: "the number of instances of serious abuses of power in the drug and device industry, like in medical research itself, is small, relative to the huge number of interactions that have taken place." Thus, he ignored evidence that commercially funded research may be biased in favor of the sponsors' products.(1-4) On the other hand, he implied that financial relationships  among physicians and researchers and commercial firms that sell health care products and services are necessary for "rapid development and deployment of new pharmaceuticals and medical devices," and for "innovation" in the field, but provided no evidence for these points.  Thus, while ignoring evidence of the possible harms of COIs, he failed to provide evidence for their benefits.  By placing the burden of proof on those who disagree with him, while avoiding it himself, he invoked the burden of proof (or appeal to ignorance) fallacy.

Appeal to Common Practice: Scientists Wearing Multiple Hats

Prof Epstein asserted that strict COI rules would disturb what is now common practice.  They would threaten how "the best research scientists in universities ... wear multiple hats.  In addition to researching within the academy, they also offer consulting services to drug companies, or start businesses of  their own."  Academics may currently behave in this way, but that does not mean this behavior is optimal in any sense.  Thus, Epstein employed the fallacy of the appeal to common practice. 

Slippery Slope: Silencing Communication and Collaboration

Prof Epstein asserted that strict rules on COI would "prohibit the collaborative efforts that have long characterized standard practices [in research]."  Specifically, he asserted the rules could stipulate that "no scientist who sits on any Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) review committee, or any hospital conflict of interest committee, should be allowed to have connections with the pharmaceutical industry."  Also, "collaborations between government and industry scientists on research projects of common interests should either be totally eliminated or heavily regulated."  Finally, he asserted, "free interchange of information within and across firm boundaries is best calculated to allow the sharing and coordination of vital information," but "strong conflict of interest regulation poses real threats to these dynamic interactions."

Yet rules about conflicts of interest generally refer to those generated by financial relationships, most often payments by commercial firms to academics, researchers or physicians.  Payments are not necessary for collaboration.  Researchers can communicate, share information, even work together without one party paying the other.  Warning of such dire consequences of regulations that have nothing directly to do with communication or collaboration amount to the slippery slope fallacy.

Appeal to Authority: the "Most Gifted Members of the Academy"


Prof Epstein noted above that it was the best researchers who consult for commercial firms or start their own firms.  Later, he stated, "the ablest scientists often have the most extensive outside practices."  In complaining about rules that limit the pay of faculty members for services on boards of directors of for-profit health care companies, he asked, "why crimp the behavior of the most gifted members of the academy who can also make major contributions to industry?"  Thus he seemed to agree with the arguments made by representatives of pharmaceutical and device companies that the doctors who they pay to speak, consult, or do research are the best and the brightest.  However, there is considerable evidence (e.g., see posts here and here), that such "key opinion leaders" or "thought leaders" are chosen because of their sympathy to the companies and their products, and their malleability.  In addition, there is evidence that medical schools now put more emphasis on ability to attract external funding than any other faculty characteristic in decisions about payment, promotion, and retention (see post here).  Prof Epstein's invocation of the need to honor the best and the brightest appears to be a variant on the appeal to authority fallacy. 

Summary

So here we have another example, by " one of the nation's most prolific legal thinkers, (according to the Manhattan Institute) of a defense of the prevalent conflicts of interest that affect academic physicians and clinical researchers.  Like many previous such defenses, it seemed to be mainly based on logical fallacies. 

Also, like many previous such defenses, it was made by someone with a history of his own financial relationships with health care corporations.  To his credit, Prof Epstein did disclose, "over the years, I have worked extensively with various groups in the pharmaceutical industry, but have done no such work in the past few years."  On the other hand, he did not disclose his previous relationships with eSapience, a company which once claimed it "shapes the debate on issues that intersect law, economics, and policy."  (See post here.)

The currently prevalent relationships with health care corporations among academic physicians, researchers, and other decision makers and influencers in health care have been lucrative for them.  I have yet to see a coherent, logical argument that these relationships are good for patients, medical education, biomedical or clinical science, or public health made by anyone who does not have such relationships.

By the way, Prof Epstein also complained about overly rigorous regulation of pharmaceutical marketing in the same blog post, but since this really seems to be a distinct topic, I will not discuss his arguments here. 

References

1.  Bekelman JE et al. Scope and impact of financial conflicts of interest in biomedical research: a systematic review.  JAMA 2003; 289: 454-465.  Link here.
2.  Lexchin J et al.  Pharmaceutical industry sponsorship and research outcome and quality: systematic review.  Brit Med J 2003; 326:  1167.  Link here.
3.  Jorgenson AW et al. Cochrane reviews compared with industry supported meta-analyses and other meta-analyses of the same drugs: systematic review. Brit Med J 2006; 333: 782.  Link here.
4.  McGauran N et al. Reporting bias in medical research - a narrative review.  Trials 2010; 11: 37.  Link here. 

Internal FDA memorandum of Feb. 23, 2010 to Jeffrey Shuren on HIT risks. Smoking gun? I report, you decide.

From the aforementioned Huffington Post Investigative Fund article "FDA, Obama Digital Medical Records Team at Odds over Safety Oversight" and timeline of industry resistance to government oversight of health IT (link), one document stands out in my mind.

The internal FDA memorandum of Feb. 23, 2010 ("not intended for public use") to Jeffrey Shuren on HIT risks. which I have now re-hosted at this link (PDF) is quite fascinating.

Internal FDA Memo ("not intended for public use") on potential dangers of health IT. Download the PDF here.

The memo begins:

This report serves to characterize medical device reports (MDRs) in the Manufacturer and User Facility Experience (MAUDE) database, inclusive of MedSun reports, pertaining to Health Information Technology (H-IT) safety issues as requested by the Office of the Center Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), in contrast to the previously submitted MedSun and Office of Compliance information.

(I've mentioned MAUDE here and here, including a report of an HIT-related patient death at the latter link.)

To those "anecdotalists" in the healthcare information technology community who believe reports of HIT-related harm are "anecdotal, and anecdotes don't make data" (as opposed to the "Markopolists"):

When an internal FDA review of their own data concludes the following, I invite you to think about the point of view that maintains that reports of HIT-related patient injury and death are so 'fragmentary' as to not merit (actually, demand) significant resources be diverted to rigorously addressing the issue of HIT risk:

In summary, the results of this data review suggest significant clinical implications and public safety issues surrounding Health Information Technology. The most commonly reported H-IT safety issues included wrong patient/wrong data, medication administration issues, clinical data loss/miscalculation, and unforeseen software design issues; all of which have varying impact on the patient’s clinical care and outcome, which included 6 death and 43 injuries. The absence of mandatory reporting enforcement of H-IT safety issues limits the number of relevant MDRs and impedes a more comprehensive understanding of the actual problems and implications.

This is especially true considering the FDA's own noted limitations of their information sources:

Limitations of the MAUDE search and final subset of MDRs include the following:

1. Not all H-IT safety issue MDRs can be captured due to limitations of reporting practices including

... (a) Vast number of H-IT systems that interface with multiple medical devices currently assigned to multiple procodes making it difficult to identify specific procodes for H-IT safety issues;
... (b) Procode assignments are also affected by the ability of the reporter/contractor to correctly identify the event as a H-IT safety issue;
... (c) Correct identification by the reporter of the suspect device brand name is challenged by difficulties discerning the actual H-IT system versus the device it supports.
2. Due to incomplete information in the MDRs, it is difficult to unduplicate similar reports, potentially resulting in a higher number of reports than actual events.
3. Reported death and injury events may only be associated with the reported device but not necessarily attributed to the device.
Memo: H-IT Safety Issues
4 Correct identification by the reporter of the manufacturer name is convoluted by the inability to discern the manufacturer of the actual H-IT system versus the device it supports.
5 The volume of MDR reporting to MAUDE may be impacted by a lack of understanding the reportability of H-IT safety issues and enforcement of such reporting.

If HIT were VIOXX or Phen-Fen, the class action lawsuits would likely be starting already.

(Note: for more on why there is a scarcity of data on HIT related adverse events, see my paper "Remediating an Unintended Consequence of Healthcare IT: A Dearth of Data on Unintended Consequences of Healthcare IT" at this Scribd link. This paper was not accepted on first draft by the medical informatics peer review process. I received anonymous review comments such as one that paradoxically stated that the paper "did not contain anything that could not be read in any big city newspaper", an odd comment indeed considering the topic. On that basis I decided not to attempt a revision but to post the paper publicly. -- SS)

One has to ask why this internal FDA report has not been made public until the Huffington Post article, nor been acted upon vigorously. The term of art is "double standard" compared to pharmaceuticals and other medical devices.

When the NEJM starts publishing unreferenced statements of absolute certainty like this from ONC Chair Blumenthal:

The widespread use of electronic health records (EHRs) in the United States is inevitable. EHRs will improve caregivers’ decisions and patients’ outcomes. Once patients experience the benefits of this technology, they will demand nothing less from their providers. Hundreds of thousands of physicians have already seen these benefits in their clinical practice.

and the HuffPo Investigative Fund quotes him as follows:

“We know that every study and every professional consensus process has concluded that electronic health systems strongly and materially improve patient safety. And we believe that in spreading electronic health records we are going to avoid many types of errors that currently plague the healthcare system,” Blumenthal said when unveiling new regulations in Washington on July 13.

... a statement easily demonstrable to be without merit, in fact, then one has to wonder where science has gone.

One also has to wonder if someone is short-circuiting the FDA's role in regulating this technology.

Could Blumenthal (in essence a family doctor), Sibelius (a trial lawyer), DeParle, or others, or the White House itself be telling FDA how to conduct its business? Are they impeding FDA's regulatory role in the irrationally exuberant multi-billion $$$ race to HIT utopia?

Finally, it is my belief that numerous health IT/medical informatics academics and talking heads who've steadfastly avoided the issue of health IT-related patient harm, or scoffed at it in legally-discoverable forums, might find themselves as defendants in upcoming plaintiff lawsuits. "Knew, or should have known" is the phrase that might apply.

As I learned from my pre-informatics Transit Authority medical management experience, juries will likely not take kindly to academic and marketing arguments akin to Scott Adam's sarcastic example of the logical fallacy of "ignoring all anecdotal evidence":

"I always get hives immediately after eating strawberries. But without a scientifically controlled experiment, it's not reliable data. So I continue to eat strawberries every day, since I can't tell if they cause hives."

-- SS

More About What We Don't Know About the Contaminated Heparin from China

We last blogged about the case of Baxter International's adulterated heparin here.  (For a more detailed summary of the case, look here.)

In summary, Baxter International imported the "active pharmaceutical ingredient" (API) of heparin, that is, in plainer language, the drug itself, from China. That API was then sold, with some minor processing, as a Baxter International product with a Baxter International label. The drug came from a sketchy supply chain that Baxter did not directly supervise, apparently originating in small "workshops" operating under primitive and unsanitary conditions without any meaningful inspection or supervision by the company, the Chinese government, or the FDA. The heparin proved to have been adulterated with over-sulfated chondroitin sulfate (OSCS), and many patients who received got seriously ill or died. While there have been investigations of how the adulteration adversely affected patients, to date, there have been no publicly reported investigations of how the OSCS got into the heparin, and who should have been responsible for overseeing the purity and safety of the product. Despite the facts that clearly patients died from receiving this adulterated drug, no individual has yet suffered any negative consequence for what amounted to poisoning of patients with a brand-name but adulterated pharmaceutical product.

Now, an article in the Wall Street Journal by Alicia Mundy tells us more about what we don't know,

The Chinese government didn't pursue an investigation into contaminated heparin sent to the U.S. in 2007 and 2008, despite repeated requests from the U.S. for help, according to a congressional probe.

Two House Republicans said Food and Drug Administration officials recently told them that the agency has been "severely hampered" by the lack of cooperation from China in finding those responsible.

Furthermore,

'It is shocking to find out two years after Chinese-made heparin was killing Americans, the Chinese government still has done no investigating to find out why,' said Mr. Barton, the top Republican on the House Energy and Commerce Committee. He called on ... [FDA Commissioner Margaret] Hamburg to air the issue with Chinese officials.

Chinese officials denied there is a problem,

Yan Jiangying, spokeswoman for China's State Food and Drug Administration, said the congressmen's accusations are 'not true.'

Ms. Yan said her agency 'did a very thorough investigation, including very detailed inspection and testing, and surveys of enterprises as well. We signed an agreement with the FDA on drug safety in the end of 2007, and strengthened the monitoring of heparin.'

Note that their investigation, such as it was, did not appear to identify any misconduct or wrong-doing by anyone.

So now we know more about what we do not know about the deadly adulterated heparin from China.

But remember this is a case about heparin sold in the USA by Baxter International, an American company as an American product, resulting in the death of Americans.  Also, remember that the American company obtained the heparin from another American company, Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC, which in turn obtained it from a factory in China operated by Changzhou SPL, which in turn was owned by Scientific Protein Laboratories and by Changzhou Techpool Pharmaceutical Co. 

Since Baxter International sold the heparin under its own label, should not its leaders be responsible for the safety and purity of the product?  Since Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC furnished the active pharmaceutical agreement to Baxter, and obtained it from a factory it partially owned in China, should not its leaders also be responsible for the safety and purity of the product?

It would be important to find out ultimately where in China the adulterated heparin entered the supply chain, but the current uncertainty about the initial origin of the contamination does not absolve those in the US who sold the active pharmaceutical ingredient, and then sold that ingredient in bottles with a US company label of responsibility for the safety and purity of the drug.

Why have we heard nothing more from Baxter International's and Scientific Protein Laboratories' leaders about the deadly heparin which they had sold?  Why have we heard nothing more about any investigation of these US based participants in this case? 

Both US companies doubtless saved money by buying the heparin from the cheapest Chinese sources they could find, by not directly inspecting and supervising its production, and by at best ignoring the lack of regulation of producers of active pharmaceutical ingredients in China.  They and their leaders benefited from this out-sourced, off-shore production.  (Note that Baxter CEO Robert L Parkinson Jr received total compensation of $14,361,305 according to the company's proxy statement, and six named officers all received more than $2,200,000.) Why aren't they being held accountable for its bad results?

As we have said until being blue in the face, as long as the leaders of health care organizations are not held accountable for the results of their decisions on health care quality, cost, and access (even in such extreme quality violations as those resulting in multiple patient deaths), we can expect continuing decisions that sacrifice quality, increase costs, and worsen access, but that are in the self-interest of the people making them.

To really reform health care, we must hold health care organizations and their leaders accountable (and not blame all the problems on doctors, other health care professionals, patients, and society at large).

Hat tip to Ed Silverman on the PharmaLot blog.

Prosecuting Doctors for Importing IUDs from Canada, but Still No Penalties for Selling Adulterated Heparin from China

Here in Rhode Island, the big health care story recently was the use of unapproved intra-uterine devices (IUDs) by some local obstetrician-gynecologists (OB-GYNs).  The first nuanced summary of the story which just appeared in the Providence Journal, written by Felice Freyer, suggested how the consequences of possible misconduct in health care depend on the clout of those involved.

The Unapproved IUDs

Here are the main points. The issue that caused so much local controversy was the use of unapproved IUDs:

Ten Rhode Island medical groups with 28 doctors told the Health Department that they bought IUDs, a form of birth control, from a foreign source, at prices about half what they had to pay for IUDs approved for use in the United States. Many had stopped using the unapproved devices long before the Health Department began its investigation in June.

Here is what we know about the actual devices they implanted:

An IUD is a T-shaped device that can fit in the palm of a woman’s hand. To prevent pregnancy, doctors insert it into the uterus, where it can stay for years. There are two types available in the United States: the ParaGard copper IUD and the Mirena hormonal IUD. Mirena, the more costly and more popular brand, has a coating of a progesterone-like drug that reduces heavy menstrual bleeding.

Unapproved IUDs Made by an American Company in Finland and Sold in Canada

Most of the "unapproved devices" the doctors were using were apparently made in Finland by an American company.

In most cases, the doctors were using Mirena, which is made at a factory in Finland by an American company, Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals. Only when it comes through approved channels can doctors and patients be assured that a product meets FDA standards. But it is unclear whether Bayer –– or anyone –– makes a version of Mirena that does not meet those standards.

The doctors imported the devices from far-away, exotic Canada.

Most of the devices apparently came from Canada, where the government negotiates with drug and device makers to keep prices low.

There is no reason to suspect the devices were counterfeit, or defective.

'If they’re really from Canada and from a reputable pharmacy, it should be exactly the same thing [as the FDA-approved version],' said Sheryl Ruzek, a retired public health professor at Temple University and vice chair of the board of the ECRI Institute, a nonprofit organization that evaluates medical procedures and products. 'My hunch is the patients were not harmed,' she said.

Potential Negative Consequences for the Physicians

However, the RI physicians are in big trouble for importing them:

In Rhode Island, the state boards that regulate physicians, nurses and nurse-midwives are investigating all those involved. If any are found guilty of unprofessional conduct, they could face disciplinary action such as a reprimand or license suspension. The state attorney general’s office has a Medicaid fraud unit, but declined to comment. The U.S. Attorney also had no comment.

US doctors in other states have also been importing IUDs, and also are in big trouble:

So many doctors were importing IUDs or considering doing so that the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists recently took an official stand, issuing an advisory opposing the use of imported devices.

In 2006, the California Department of Health found that eight doctors had used imported IUDs in some 850 women.

In October 2009, an Arkansas doctor was indicted by a federal grand jury for using non-FDA-approved versions of Mirena. He was charged with violation of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, health-care fraud (for allegedly billing Medicaid for the unapproved devices) and money-laundering (for the way he allegedly handled Medicaid reimbursements). The doctor, Kelly Dean Shrum, has not yet come to trial, but potential penalties include fines and imprisonment.

Summary, and the Contrast with the Case of the Adulterated, Fatal Heparin
So to summarize, doctors who imported IUDs from Canada that appeared to be identical to those sold with FDA approval in the US, and were made in Finland by an American company at the same factory in which the US approved IUDs were made have gotten into major trouble with state and federal authorities. There is no clear evidence that the IUDs caused any harm to patients.

I am not defending the doctors' actions. However, contrast the treatment they are likely to receive with another case we have frequently discussed.

We last blogged about the case of Baxter International's adulterated heparin here.  In summary, Baxter International imported the "active pharmaceutical ingredient" (API) of heparin, that is, in plainer language, the drug itself, from China.  That API was then sold, with some minor processing, as a Baxter International product with a Baxter International label.  The drug came from a sketchy supply chain that Baxter did not directly supervise, apparently originating in small "workshops" operating under primitive and unsanitary conditions without any meaningful inspection or supervision by the company, the Chinese government, or the FDA.  The heparin proved to have been adulterated with over-sulfated chondroitin sulfate (OSCS), and many patients who received got seriously ill or died.  While there have been investigations of how the adulteration adversely affected patients, to date, there have been no publicly reported investigations of how the OSCS got into the heparin, and who should have been responsible for overseeing the purity and safety of the product.  Despite the facts that clearly patients died from receiving this adulterated drug, no individual has yet suffered any negative consequence for what amounted to poisoning of patients with a brand-name but adulterated pharmaceutical product.

Yet everyone from state health departments to the federal authorities have jumped into the case of the unapproved IUDs imported, but from Canada, and apparently identical to the IUDs sold in the US.  There is, at least so far, no evidence that the IUDs were defective or dangerous, and no evidence they have harmed patients.  One doctor has been prosecuted for violating the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and for health care fraud and money-laundering.  No one working for Baxter International (or for the identified organizations within its supply chain) has been prosecuted for anything.

What the...?   I do not object to discipline and prosecution of individual doctors who appear to have broken the law.  But why are we so vigorously pursuing individual doctors for an apparently technical violation of laws that did patients no apparent harm, when we are not pursuing health care corporate executives for selling adulterated drugs that likely killed patients? 

F Scott Fitzergald wrote that the "very rich are different from you and me," and it appears that very rich health care leaders have impunity when it comes to conduct that let patients be harmed and die. 

Real health care reform would make top health care leaders as accountable as we now make individual doctors.

An Attempt to Hold Health Care Leaders Accountable for Their Organizations' Bad Behavior?

We have frequently noted how health care organizations accused of kickbacks, fraud, and other unethical and sometimes illegal behavior involving how they produce or market health care products or services often are allowed to settle the charges only with a fines to the companies, and sometimes with corporate integrity agreements.  Almost never are the people who authorized, directed, or implemented the unethical behavior required to pay any sort of penalty.  We recently commented on a case in which an executive of a medical device company accused of exaggerating the performance of a diagnostic test in development was charged, not with misleading doctors or patients by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but with misleading investors by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  That executive lost her job, and will be barred from leading any public company.

So up to now, a corporate executive responsible for misleading doctors or patients about issues that could affect clinical decisions or outcomes likely would never pay a penalty, but one responsible for misleading  investors about similar issues could lose his or her job and livelihood.

Now, per an article in Fortune, it appear the situation may be changing,

The federal government is fed up with the amount of fraud, especially recurring fraud from the same companies, happening in the pharmaceutical industry. So regulators have decided that when it comes to punishments, it's time to get personal.

From now on, individual executives risk being ejected from their jobs -- and perhaps even barred from the industry -- for fraud their companies commit, even if they did not participate or even know about the crimes.

Furthermore,

The new approach, emerging from the unusually powerful Inspector General's office in the Department of Health and Human Services, reflects frustration with corporate recidivism even in the face of ramped-up fines, penalties and disgorgements.

'We are going to start to use that authority in the appropriate circumstances to get high level executives out of companies, so that the company has a better shot at changing its behavior, so that it does not become a recidivist,' explains Lewis Morris, chief counsel to the Inspector General.

The article noted some cases in which even large fines and corporate integrity agreements seemingly failed to deter future bad behavior by the companies which paid these penalties. For example,

In the government's most recent major settlement -- in which AstraZeneca agreed to pay $520 million -- the fine represented 16.5% of the $8.6 billion income (between 2001-2006) from U.S. sales of Seroquel, a powerful anti-psychotic. AstraZeneca (AZN) turned this narrowly approved drug into a cash cow by marketing it for much wider use, including by the elderly and children, even though they are particularly vulnerable to 'serious and debilitating side effects.'

All the while, AstraZeneca was operating under a corporate integrity agreement (CIA) with the Inspector General, imposed after a 2003 off-label marketing case.

We discussed the AZ settlement here in October, 2009. We asked then, "Does anyone really still believe that integrity agreements, and settlements assessed against huge corporations deter such profitable bad behavior?"

Another example:

Drug company Pfizer (PFE, Fortune 500), which was fined $2.3 billion just last September, is now on its third CIA. Steeper fines and harsh individual penalties should help put more teeth into these agreements and keep companies from flouting them.

We discussed the repeated lack of effect of settlements by Pfizer here in September, 2009. We concluded, "So will even a $2,300,000,000 settlement and yet another corporate integrity agreement make Pfizer or any other health care corporation act more ethically? I doubt it."

The Fortune article quoted Peter Rost, former Pfizer executive turned whistle-blower and ethics advocate (and to whose blog I offer a hat tip for first mentioning the Fortune article), on aspects of corporate culture and corporate incentives that foster repeated unethical behavior by management,

'Usually by the time someone becomes a senior executive they are very aware of the pitfalls in the organization, and they have become masters at not doing something wrong or not getting caught doing something wrong,' explains Peter Rost, a former senior Pfizer executive turned industry gadfly.

Incentive-based compensation systems -- typically 40% to 50% of salespeople's income comes from hitting their numbers -- are one weak point. 'They are going to work real hard to increase those numbers and do whatever it takes, and if they think somebody gave them a wink about doing this or that, they are going to run with it.' says Rost.

Booting senior executives out for any fraud under their watch might end the wink-and-nod system, giving hope to critics.

In my humble opinion, the government's new approach looks like real progress. Giving corporate executives personal impunity was a recipe for increasing unethical, and sometimes criminal behavior. The sorts of marketing fraud they authorized or directed certainly lead to increasing costs, and overuse of unnecessary and sometimes harmful tests and treatments. While there have years of complaints about health care's increasing costs and decreasing quality in health policy circles, it is just amazing that until now, there has been so little action against the bad behavior that was undoubtedly responsible for much of these problems.

So three cheers for making health care organizations' leaders accountable for the bad behavior of their organizations.

After cheering, however, there ought to be some serious inquiry about why they were not held accountable much sooner.  It turns out that there has been legal justification for holding leaders so accountable available for a long time:

All that's required for the government to flex this remarkably broad authority -- embedded in the Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine -- is that the executives were in a position to have stopped the fraud that resulted in a criminal conviction or plea.

Note that the Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine apparently derives from a US Supreme Court case about the selling of misbranded or adulterated drugs into interstate commerce under the US Food and Drug Act, decided in 1943.

However, it looks like in the hyper laissez faire climate of the last 20 or more years, no one wanted to bother to invoke it. After all, the formerly highly regarded leader of the US Federal Reserve believed there was no need for regulators to punish fraud, because the magic of the market would take care of it. US health care has paid a heavy price for such breathtaking naivete (see the PBS Frontline show, "The Warning." )

Genzyme Settles

In late 2009, we posted about problems at a Genzyme plant that manufactured some fabulously expensive drugs, e.g. Cerezyme whose cost to patients approximated $160,000 a year.  We thought then that for a drug costing that much, the company ought to have figured out a conservative process to provide pure and unadulterated product.  In a later post we also why a company that could afford to make its CEO very rich could not afford to adequately maintain its manufacturing facilities.

Now Genzyme has reached a settlement with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on the matter.  As reported by the Boston Globe,

Genzyme Corp will remain under federal oversight for the next seven to eight years as it works to fix quality-control problems that have bedeviled its Allston Landing plant for 15 months.

The timetable was spelled out in a consent decree struck between Genzyme and the Food and Drug Administration.

Under its terms, Genzyme will pay a previously disclosed $175 million federal fine, the first in its 29-year history. The agreement, filed with the US District Court in Boston yesterday, is subject to court approval.

Although the company said last month that it expected to pay the $175 million fine, other terms of the consent decree were not known until yesterday. Among them, Genzyme agreed to move fill-finishing work for its domestic drug shipments out of the Allston site by November. The transfer of fill-finishing for overseas shipments will take place by Aug. 31, 2011.

Fill finishing is the process of pouring drugs into vials for shipments to hospitals and clinics, where they are administered to patients.

Late last year, inspectors found bits of steel, rubber, and fiber in some drugs during the fill-finishing process in Allston. The work will be moved to a Genzyme operation in Waterford, Ireland, and to subcontractors such as Hospira Inc., subject to approval by federal regulators.

The firm faces additional fines if it fails to meet FDA deadlines

In all, the Cambridge biotechnology giant will spend two to three years in remediation under the consent decree, and another five years under oversight by a third-party contractor, the Quantic Group, a Livingston, N.J., consulting firm focused on boosting manufacturing quality and safety.

Quantic will craft a remediation plan with Genzyme, and the company could be fined $15,000 a day for missing milestones.

So now Genzyme is marching in our parade of settlements.  While this settlement is of charges related to very fundamental violations, failure to manufacture pure and unadulterated drugs, in one important way its provisions seem similar to many other such settlements we have now seen.  The settlement fines the company as a whole, but results in no penalties for any individuals. 

As we have noted before, fines, even fines larger than this one, can be regarded just as a cost of doing business (especially when the business is very lucrative.  The company's 2010 proxy statement noted that even in 2009, when production was affected by the plant closure, "sales of Cerezyme were $793 million, compared with $1.2 billion in 2008. Sales of Fabrazyme were $431 million compared with $494 million in the previous year. So the company was fined $175 million for production problems with two drugs that brought in over $1.2 billion in revenue in 2009.) 

Furthermore, the fine's impact may be diffused over the whole company, and ultimately comes out of the pockets of stockholders, employees, and customers alike.  It provides no negative incentives for those who authorized, directed, or implemented the behavior in question.  So it is not clear that settlements like this deter future wrong-doing.

Additionally, as we noted in the earlier post, the current CEO of Genzyme has gotten quite rich by virtue of his position.  While the 2010 Genzyme proxy statement indicates his compensation was affected by the financial impact of the production slowdown, even so he continued to get richer, albeit at a slightly slower pace than he did before.  That statement indicates that in 2009, CEO Henri Termeer's total compensation was a mere $9,507,403, down from $12,699,301 the previous year.  The main difference was that his non-equity incentive plan compensation dropped from $1,962,725 to 0.  While a $3 million plus salary decrement seems sizable, it is hard to conceive of an executive who makes nearly $10 million a year as suffering major financial consequences from the current debacle. 

As I have said before, endlessly, we will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

Epic Stupidity: Does the Award for the Most Laughable Statement Made by a Health IT Vendor Belong to EPIC?

It may, because I am hard pressed to find any statement that approaches this one in vacuousness.

Regarding reporting of healthcare IT problems and defects that might cause, or have caused, patient harm, the executive VP at EPIC stated at a HHS Health IT Policy Committee certification workgroup:

... The FDA might not be the best organization to help the ONC create an environment where people feel comfortable coming forward with incident reports, said Carl Dvorak, executive VP at EHR system provider Epic Systems and a workgroup member

Dvorak said he's also concerned that the FDA's QSR process wouldn't address problems people spoke about in recent workgroup testimony. "If the mission is to build a safer system, I don't know that the FDA can contribute toward that mission," he said.

To this I ask these questions:

1. Where, exactly, does Mr. Dvorak think clinicians and healthcare organizations report defects and problems with devices and drugs now? Consumer Reports? Good Housekeeping?

2. What is Mr. Dvorak's first hand experience with the FDA in terms of reporting on medical devices and medical device IT, and pharmaceuticals? Could that be the reason he "doesn't know" how the FDA can contribute to "the mission" of HIT medical device safety?

Perhaps Mr. Dvorak himself is uncomfortable reporting defects and problems with health IT medical devices to FDA as opposed to some new, amateur medical device safety organization [see note 1] friendly to the HIT industry or in their pockets, but clinicians won't be.

Either that, or this is one of the lamest attempt at FUD in computing history [see note 2].

A possibly real billboard from parts unknown about where to report shoddy HIT: FDA's MedWatch Hotline. (Hat tip to HisTALK blog.)

-- SS

Notes:

[1] See my post "Third-Party Reviews of Medical Devices Come Under Scrutiny at the FDA - Except Healthcare IT Medical Devices, Which Get Special Accommodation" for more on the issue of third-parties and amateurs performing device review.

[2] HIT personnel in my experience often seem to resort to a psyops strategy of trying to instill Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt in others to kill ideas they don't like (usually, ideas that would cause them to have to work harder), although it's usually done in a far more credible manner than in this example.

Third-Party Reviews of Medical Devices Come Under Scrutiny at the FDA - Except Healthcare IT Medical Devices, Which Get Special Accommodation

This WSJ article caught my eye:

Third-Party Reviews of Devices Come Under Scrutiny at the FDA
March 15, 2010
By ALICIA MUNDY and JARED A. FAVOLE

WASHINGTON—When medical-equipment makers like Philips Electronics NV, Siemens AG and General Electric Co. need approval for some new devices, they don't always have to start at the Food and Drug Administration. They can pay companies to do the reviews, which are then routinely approved by FDA officials most of the time.

Now this third-party outsourcing program has come under fire at the FDA, and the agency is weighing whether to end it. Agency officials question the quality of the reviews and whether they have served the program's original purpose: saving U.S. taxpayers money.

The "real value to industry may be that this is perceived as a way to 'sneak things,'" said an FDA official at a December meeting on device approvals, according to minutes reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Some third-party reviewers advertise speed and a friendlier process.

At a time when the FDA is moving against third party device reviews, HHS and its Office of the National Coordinator for health IT (ONC) are soliciting to create third party EHR "certification" bodies for healthcare information technology (HIT) medical devices such as electronic medical records systems, decision support tools, clinician order entry and alerting, etc. (see RIN 0991-AB59, "Proposed Establishment of Certification Programs for Health Information Technology", PDF available at this link.)

This comes at the same time as FDA admitting this technology harms and kills patients, but the extent is unknown (existing FDA data is likely the "tip of the iceberg" reports Jeffrey Shuren MD JD at the HIT Policy Committee, Adoption/Certification Workgroup, special meeting on health IT safety on February 25, 2010).

See:

"FDA on Health IT Adverse Consequences: 44 Reported Injuries And 6 Deaths, Probably Just 'Tip of Iceberg'" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/02/fda-on-health-it-adverse-consequences.html

and

"On ONC's "Proposed Establishment of Certification Programs for Health Information Technology" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/03/on-oncs-proposed-establishment-of.html

More from the WSJ article:

... The agency's concerns about the third-party reviews come as the FDA is re-evaluating its entire device-approval process. In addition, the agency has recently announced tighter regulation of some machines that deliver radiation in the wake of reports of more than 300 cases of overdoses from CT scanners at four hospitals.

Changes under consideration at the FDA include terminating the third-party program, limiting the kinds of devices that it covers, or giving the outside reviewers more data on devices to improve the quality of their work, according to the minutes and interviews with agency officials. Jeffrey Shuren, the device division director, said the FDA will release proposed changes later this year and cautioned that no decisions have been made.

To qualify for an outsourced review, a new device must be similar to a device already on the market, and it must carry low or moderate risk to the patient.

The December 2009 minutes say "third parties often don't have appropriate expertise." The minutes cite "poor quality of review documents— they often just repeat what is in the submission, and don't provide any analysis of the data."

(The point on lack of expertise is a point I raise in my aforementioned commentary on ONC's "Proposed Establishment of Certification Programs for HIT." I wrote: HHS should not be creating new, potentially (likely?) amateur organizations and bureaucracies overseeing these new virtual medical devices that will have variable (or no) experience in software validation, certification, regulation, postmarketing safety surveillance, etc. Rather, HHS should be leveraging existing governmental expertise in certifying, validating and regulating mission critical IT.)

The industry as always is looking out for - itself, patients coming in second:

Terry Sweeney, vice president of clinical affairs at Philips Healthcare, said the third-partyprogram benefits industry and helps relieve the FDA of a burden. "Every week's delay [i.e., in rigorously assuring medical device safety - ed.] can cost the company a large sum of money," he said.

It's not like the time differential is enormous:

It takes an average of about 72 days for a company to get final clearance for a device when it goes the third-party route, according to the FDA. That includes the time for the agency to sign off on the outside reviewer's conclusion and compares with an average 109 days for similar applications that go directly to the FDA.

So, the vendors seem to be saying, let's compromise the device safety evaluation process via third party reviewers so we can get to market a month sooner.

The FDA is having serious second thoughts about this state of affairs.

Worse, on health IT devices, the HHS itself via ONC is soliciting for the creation of third party reviewers for HIT, while the FDA itself seems marginalized or even unwilling to shoulder the burden of patient protection from faulty HIT.

Odd. Why do computerized HIT medical devices such as EMR's get special government accommodation?

-- SS

For more on HIT challenges see "Contemporary Issues in Medical Informatics: Common Examples of Healthcare Information Technology Difficulties" - http://www.tinyurl.com/healthITfailure

Health IT Caused Death & Injury, Extent Unknown, But Regulation Bad Since it Would Slow Government's Campaign To Spur Widespread Adoption

[Note: the hyperlinks in this posting are very informative, so do check them - ed.]

A workgroup of the Healthcare IT Policy Committee, a federal advisory body, will hear testimony on the safety of health information technology during a public hearing tomorrow (Feb. 25, 2010) in Washington.

On the eve of that hearing, an article "FDA Considers Regulating Safety of Electronic Health Systems" was published Feb. 23, 2010 by the Huffington Post Investigative Fund, authored by Fred Schulte and Emma Schwartz.

The article is bylined with "Reports of Patient Harm Include Six Deaths in Two Years."

FDA Considers Regulating Safety of Electronic Health Systems
Reports of Patient Harm Include Six Deaths in Two Years

By Fred Schulte and Emma Schwartz
Huffington Post Investigative Fund
23 Feb 2010

Concerned about potential safety risks in health information technology, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration may be moving closer to regulating the systems for the first time.

In the past two years, the agency has received reports of six patient deaths and several dozen injuries linked to malfunctions in the systems, Jeffrey Shuren, director of the FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health, said in testimony prepared for a government hearing on Thursday.

“Because these reports are purely voluntary, they may represent only the tip of the iceberg,” Shuren said.

In an environment of HIT "hold harmless" provisions and defects gag clauses causing executives to violate their fiduciary and Joint Commission safety standard obligations, sham peer review for "disruptive" or "non-team player" physicians, suppression of HIT research that could cast it in a negative light, conflicts of interest, whistleblower retaliation, and other dysfunctions in the health IT industry, I think "tip of the iceberg" may be a gross understatement.

... Many health policy experts believe that fostering greater use of health information technology, which officials refer to as HIT, will significantly improve the quality of medical care, cut costs and reduce medical errors and waste. The government hopes to have an electronic medical record for every American by 2014.

These beliefs about HIT -- as it is designed, implemented and managed today -- are being contradicted by a growing body of literature, such as in a recent review article here broadly reviewing the literature, a new book here and a collection of 2009 releases here that is largely ignored by policy makers. This literature is largely ignored and unknown to policy makers while the relatively sparse literature "proving" the case for HIT is overemphasized, perhaps due to intense lobbying from the very wealthy HIT trade organizations as in the Washington Post here.

But digital medical systems are not risk-free. Over the past two years, the FDA’s voluntary notification system logged a total of 260 reports of “malfunctions with the potential for patient harm,” including 44 injuries and the six deaths. Among other things the systems have mixed up patients, put test results in the wrong person’s file and lost vital medical information.

That "260 reports" is also likely highly understated; there is no regulations nor accepted national reporting system for HIT problems as there is for drugs and other medical devices. Consequently most clinicians have no idea where to even report such problems and mishaps.

Further, I have probably heard more than that number of "malfunctions with potential for harm" from just a few of my former students and other contacts now in the trenches in the past year or two, who report secretive "defects lists" numbering in the hundreds and even thousands in some organizations. A percentage of items on those lists fall into the "likely to cause harm if uncorrected" category.

In one example cited in the FDA testimony, an operating room management system frequently “locked up” during surgery. Lost data had to be re-entered manually “in some cases from a nurse’s recollection.” Another system failed to display a patient’s allergies properly because of software errors. In another case, results from lab testing done in a hospital emergency room were returned for the wrong patient. None of the patients, hospitals or clinics are identified in the reports.

I noted such a "computer crash/data loss" malfunction in HIT systems for ICU's and for Invasive Cardiology labs a decade ago. Nothing seems to have been learned by this industry about appropriate software engineering for healthcare.

“The FDA recognizes the tremendous importance of HIT and its potential to improve patient care. However, in light of the safety issues that have been reported to us, we believe that a framework of federal oversight of HIT needs to assure patient safety,” Shuren said. He said that to date the agency has “largely refrained” from regulating the industry. Through an FDA spokesman, Shuren declined a request for an interview.

The FDA official outlined three possible approaches for tighter scrutiny. The agency could require makers of the devices to register them with the government and to submit reports on safety issues and correct problems that surface. The FDA could track this information “to help improve the design of future products.”

In a second scenario, the agency could require manufacturers to report safety concerns and set minimum guidelines to assure the quality of products on the market. In a third approach, the systems could be subject to the broader regulatory actions that new medical products must face before they ever reach the market.

Though the FDA didn’t specify which approach it favors, Shuren said that at a minimum the agency could “play an important role in preventing or addressing HIT-related safety issues, thereby helping to foster confidence in these devices.”

I think plan #3 is the most consistent with regulation in other healthcare industries (pharma and medical devices), and is most ethical with regard to patient rights. I cannot think of any good reason why the HIT industry should be given special dispensation and accommodated with respect to regulation.

The manufacturers of the systems generally have opposed regulation by the FDA, arguing in part that imposing strict controls would slow down the government’s campaign to spur widespread adoption of the technology. Regulation will not necessarily create a “safer” electronic medical record “and might actually limit innovation and responsiveness when it is needed most,” Carl Dvorak, executive vice president of Epic Systems Corporation, a Wisconsin-based company that builds the systems mainly for hospitals and large medical practices, said in his prepared testimony for Thursday’s hearing. The hearing is being held by an advisory group created by the stimulus law.

One thing is certain: lack of regulation will NOT create a safer HIT environment.

Further, when the FDA has received reports of patient deaths and injuries linked to HIT malfunctions, but the actual number of death and injury cases is truly unknown; and when the number of "near misses" related to IT but averted by luck or by some human in the work chain, that might have easily gone the other way, is also unknown (but likely with a high degree of probability to be much, much larger than "260 per year", the conclusions that:

Regulation will not necessarily create a “safer” electronic medical record “and might actually limit innovation and responsiveness when it is needed most...

and

"imposing strict controls would slow down the government’s campaign to spur widespread adoption of the technology..."

... are simply perverse.

They do not reflect any ethical medical values of which I am familiar.

Yet some inside the industry favor stepped-up scrutiny. One major vendor, Cerner Corporation, which has voluntarily reported safety incidents to the FDA in recent years, signaled its support for a rule that would make those reports mandatory. Cerner has reported potential safety concerns because it is the “right thing to do,” a company official said.

Indeed.

Others inside the industry have argued for approaches that don’t involve FDA oversight. James Walker, chief medical information officer at Pennsylvania’s Geisinger Health System, said in prepared testimony for Thursday's hearing that a “patient safety organization” should be created to collect “automatic, anonymous reporting of potential hazards” in electronic health systems.

Such an organization already exists, known as the "FDA." Apparently Walker lacks experience in industries that are regulated by FDA such as the pharmaceutical and medical device industries.

IT systems in those industries are regulated and in fact validated, by FDA - e.g., see "General Principles of Software Validation; Final Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff", PDF, introduced with the statement that "this guidance outlines general validation principles that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) considers to be applicable to the validation of medical device software or the validation of software used to design, develop, or manufacture medical devices."

Creating yet another new organization for validating HIT would be once again accommodating that industry, and calling for one is not explicable on any reasonable logic that I can surmise.

The federal government’s Office of the National Coordinator for health information technology also has recognized the need for better surveillance. In January, the office issued a contract to address “undesirable and potentially harmful unintended consequences” of the systems.

What took them so long, I ask?

One industry critic said Tuesday that she hoped the FDA would follow through on its concerns. “We need monitoring and reporting systems for problems,” said Sharona Hoffman, a professor at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. “It has to go through the highest level of oversight and regulation. Every American who goes to a doctor will be affected.”

I could not agree more. Hoffman co-authored several articles on HIT risks (links can be found here). The oversight cannot be done by a rubber-stamp organization; it cannot be performed by those with conflicts of interest; it should not be performed by those who for years have minimized the problems.

Even those who advocate tighter oversight agree that the technology has the potential to revolutionize health care.

No, HIT will not "revolutionize" healthcare. Facilitate incremental improvements, possibly - but only if the IT itself is "done well." I believe the "R" word must be removed from our cultural lexicon about IT. It is an expression of a disease, the irrational overconfidence in computing in fields depending on human cognition and judgment. If the largest single flaw in healthcare provision were lack of information availability and retrieval capabilities, it would be a (somewhat) less risible, less hysterical assertion.

Though officials in some other countries have tightened oversight of the systems, U.S. manufacturers have managed to stave off formal regulation, telling the FDA in May 2008 that their products should be excluded from review partly as a means to speed up their adoption.

The EU's evolving stance on HIT regulation is here.

But critics argue that tighter scrutiny is needed to protect the public. “Oversight and quality control may slow things down, but it’s absolutely critical,” said Hoffman, the law professor. “Patients' lives are at stake.”

Hoffman seems one of the few writing about this industry who understands what the issues are all about. I will repeat the bottom line in bold for all to see:

“Patients' lives are at stake.”

It's ironic that this observation comes from a non-physician (she is a professor of law), while too many HIT industry-connected physicians are chattering about regulation "stifling innovation." Blood for computers? Perhaps they'd like to return to the era when medical experiments such as this were permissible.

Seeking regulatory acquiescence to special accommodations for a technology (HIT) already being pushed by government, which could potentially result in a government-corporatist alliance at the expense of the common person and of medical ethics, is quite troubling.

-- SS