On the Interconnectedness of the Leadership of Health Care Organizations: the Abbott Laboratories Case

We just posted about some misbehavior by Abbott Laboratories: a physician Abbott paid as a "key opinion leader" to help market its cardiac stents was accused of inserting stents in many patients who had no need for them; Abbott settled for over $400 million a lawsuit alleging the company defrauded Medicare and Medicaid; and it settled an unrelated suit for over $40 million alleging the company paid kickbacks to physicians for prescribing its drugs.  I thus thought it would be interesting to see how well paid are the corporate leaders who presided over these activities, and who are the board members who were supposed to be providing stewardship of this company.

According to the company's 2010 proxy statement, the five highest-paid executives were:

Miles D White, Chairman of the Board and CEO - $26,213,966 total compensation
Thomans C Freyman, Executive Vice President, Finance, and CFO - $9,561,227
Olivier Bohuon, Executive Vice President, Abbott Pharmaceutica Group - $5,232,589
Laura J Schumacher, Executive Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary - $5,724,060
James V Mazzo, Senior Vice President, Abbott Medical Optics - $10,394,085

Now, let us turn to the company's board of directors.  Note that I looked for board members who also held leadership positions in other health care organizations whose interests may not be aligned with the corporation.  I also looked for those who held leadership positions in the discredited financial services corporation who helped usher in the global financial collapse.  (I  used similar methodolgy here.)

Abbott currently has 12 board members, including

• Robert J Alpert MD - Ensign Professor of Medicine, Professor of Internal Medicine, and Dean of the Yale School of Medicine.  He also "serves as a Director on the Board of Yale-New Haven Hospital."
• Roxanne S Austin - President and Chief Executive Officer, Move Networks Inc, and President, Austin Investment Advisors
• William M Daley -"Vice Chairman and Head of the Office of Corporate Responsibility and Chairman of the Midwest, JP Morgan Chase & Co."  He is the board of directors of  "Loyola University of Chicago and Northwestern University."
• W James Farrell - Retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Illinois Tool Works Inc
• H Laurence Fuller - Retired Co-Chairman of BP Amoco, former chief executive officer of Amoco
• William A Osborne - Retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Northern Trust Corporation and the Northern Trust Company.  He is "Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Northwestern University."
• Rt Honorable Lord Owen - Chairman of Europe Steel Ltd
• Roy S Roberts - Managing Director, Reliant Equity Investors.
• Samuel C Scott III - Retired Chairman,  President and Chief Executive Officer of Corn Products International.  He "currently serves on the board of directors of Bank of New York Mellon Corporation."  He also is on the board of "Northwestern Healthcare."
• William D Smithburg - Retired Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Quaker Oats Company.  He is on the "board of trustees of Northwestern University."
• Glenn F Tilton - Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of UAL Corporation and United Airlines Inc.  He is on the "board of directors of Northwestern Memorial Hospital."
• Miles D White - Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Abbott Laboratories, "is on the board of trustees of "Northwestern University." 

Of Abbott's 12 directors, seven have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities (Northwestern University, its medical school and teaching hospitals, in particular, are stewarded by six Abbott directors). 

Two have leadership positions in  financial services corporations that were implicated in the global financial collapse.  (Note that JP Morgan Chase staffers helped to invent some of the kinds of financial derivatives widely viewed as causative of the collapse, but the firm itself did not fail. [See Tett G. Fool's Gold.]  Through TARP, the US government took preferred equity stakes in both JP Morgan Chase and Bank of New York Mellon.  [See Ritholtz B.  Bailout Nation. p. 222]) 

Two more are leaders of financial services firms.  All but one are current or former high-level hired executives (seven are or were CEOs), or chairpersons or co-chair persons of corporations (the one exception is a dean of a medical school.) 

Note how similar our findings were here to those found after our perusal of the boards of Genzyme and Medtronic (see post here).   So we find again that executives of health care organizations who preside over various questionable activities not only rarely pay any penalty, but usually become extremely wealthy in the process.

We also find how interconnected is the leadership of health care.  The boards and leadership of drug and device companies overlap with the boards and leadership of medical schools, teaching hospitals, and their parent universities. 

Yet, as we have noted before, there are obvious conflicts.  In particular, teaching hospitals and medical schools are supposed to provide unbiased teaching, including about issues relevant to drug and device corporations, such as choice of diagnostic strategies and treatments, and relevant health policy.  They are supposed to perform unbiased research, including research that evaluates drugs and devices.  They are supposed to provide the best possible patient care at a reasonable cost, which relates to choices of and prices paid for drugs and devices. 

On the other hand, drug and device companies are supposed to put making a profit for their share-holders first.  The directors of such companies, like the directors of all for-profit corporations, are supposed to show an unyielding loyalty to their companies' financial health and profits, although contemporary corporate directors have been accused of acting more like cronies of the hired management.  (See this post.)

Also, we note that the vast majority of people chosen as stewards of a given health care organization are current or former top hired executives of other corporations.  The board members, that is, stewards of health care organizations, to whom the top hired executives reports, are usually not people with large ownership interests in the organizations (in the case of public, for-profit corporations.)  For the most part, they also do not seem to be people with clearly demonstrated devotion to the values of health care, in particular, putting the care of individual patients first, and advancing health care teaching and research.  Instead, they seem to be people with the perspective of hired executives, who may be prone to putting the interests of hired executives, rather than patients, doctors, teachers, scientists or the public at large, first.

So here is another admittedly limited case study of the board of directors, that is, the ostensible stewards of a health care corporation, selected this time because of its history of ethical missteps, which showed  - that the leadership of health care organizations is incredibly interrelated, interlocked, incestuous.  Again, it appears that top leaders of various health care organizations may be more familiar with and identify more with each other, and with other hired executives and managers, than with their organizations, their organizations' missions, and their organizations' professionals, staff, students, clients, and patients.

So to repeat-

I strongly believe that there needs to be much more investigation, academic, journalistic, and perhaps legal, of the identity, nature, and culture of the leaders of health care, and their relationships. A few bloggers cannot do it all. Obviously, the anechoic effect mitigates against medical and health care academics looking into their own leaders. However, failing to understand who is leading our march to the brink of health care failure ought not to be something such academics would want on their conscience.

Finally, and obviously, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

The Boards Who Ought to be Accountable for the Misbehavior of Health Care Corporations

I recently posted about the multiple conflicts of interest affecting a university health sciences leader.  While he was supposed to be running a medical school and an academic medical center, he was also responsible for the stewardship, as a board member, of three health major health care corporations, and a food and beverage corporation (whose products have bearing on nutrition and public health.)  .

This one case suggested how pervasive are conflicts of interest affecting the people at the top of health care leadership in the US, and also how such conflicts may be associated with problems for all the organizations involved.  The story originally came to my attention because students were demonstrating against the lavish compensation given the health sciences leader at a time of university cutbacks, suggesting that university leaders were paying more attention to their own enrichment than to the mission of the university.  At the same time, one of the corporations which he was stewarding (Genzyme) had to shut down a factory because the extremely expensive drug it was producing was found to be impure and adulterated, while its CEO continued to be compensated lavishly.  The other corporation (Medtronic) had to settle litigation accusing it of manufacturing defective products for hundreds of millions of dollars, while its CEO again continued to be compensated lavishly. 

So I thought it might be interesting to see who are the other stewards of these troubled corporations.  I consulted the official biographies of their board members from their 2010 proxy statements (Genzyme here, Medtronic here).  I looked for board members who also held leadership positions in other health care organizations whose interests may not be aligned with the two corporations of interest.  I also looked for those who held leadership positions in the discredited financial services corporation who helped usher in the global financial collapse.

The specifics of what I found follow.

Genzyme

Genzyme had 10 directors in 2010.  The following directors had relationships of interest:

-  Douglas A Berthiaume is "Chairman of the Children's Hospital (Boston) Trust Board, a member of the Children's Hospital board of trustees, and a Trustee of the University of Massachusetts Amherst Foundation."  Children's Hospital is a teaching hospital.  The University of Massachusetts includes a medical school. 
-  Robert J Bertolini "retired from Schering-Plough Corp following its merger with Merck & Co in November, 2009."  Schering-Plough was a large pharmaceutical company now combined with Merck to form an even larger company.
-  Gail K Boudreaux "has served since May 2008 as an Executive Vice President of United Health Group Incorporated."  Also, "she serves on the board of directors of America's Health Insurance Plans...."  UnitedHealth is one of the US' largest health insurance/ managed care corporations.  Incidentally,it has frequently misbehaved, as can be seen in this set of posts.  AHIP is the health insurance corporations' trade associations.
-  Robert J Carpenter "is Chairman of Hydra Biosciences Inc... He is also a trustee of the Immune Disease Institute, a non-profit institute affiliated with Children's Hospital in Boston...." 
-  Charles L Cooney "is a director of India-based Biocon Limited, a biotechnology healthcare company."
-  Victor J Dzau MD (discussed in the earlier post) is "Chancellor for Health Affairs and President and Chief Executive Officer of Duke University Health System...."  He "sits on the board of directors of Pepsico Inc, Anylam Inc, Medtronic Inc, and the Duke University Health System."
-  Senator Connie Mack III is "Chairman Emeritus of the parent board of the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute...."  He also is director of "EXACT Sciences Corporation and Moody's Corp."  EXACT Sciences is a biotechnology company that develops diagnostic test technology.  Moody's Corp is a financial ratings agency whose lax ratings of financial derivatives, perhaps arising from conflicts of interest produced by payments from the producers of the derivatives, have been implicated as a major cause of the global financial collapse.
-  Richard E Syron was from "January 2004 to September 8, 2008 ... Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, commonly referred to as Freddie Mac...."    Freddie Mac as bailed out and taken over by the US government when he departed, or was forced out.  Freddie Mac, was a "government-sponsored enterprise," (GSE) one of another group of companies whose enthusiastic participation in securitizing dubious mortgages was implicated as a major cause of the global financial collapse.
- Henri A Termeer (CEO of Genzyme) is a "director of Massachusetts General Hospital, a board member of Partners HealthCare, and a member of the board of fellows of Harvard Medical School." 

So the box score for Genzyme's 10 directors: six have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities (some such institutions are lead by more than one Genzyme director).  Seven have leadership positions in other drug, device or biotechnology corporations.  One have leadership positions in health insurance/ managed care corporations.  Two had or have leadership positions in discredited financial services corporations that were implicated in the global financial collapse.

Medtronic

Medtronic had 11 directors in 2010.  The following directors had relationships of interest:

- Richard H Anderson "was Executive Vice President of UnitedHealth Group Incorporated."  As above, UnitedHealth is a health insurance/ managed care corporation.
- Victor J Dzau (see above) is "Chancellor for Health Affairs at Duke University and President and Chief Executive Officer of the Duke University Health System."  He is "a director of Alnylam Pharmaceuticals Inc, ... PepsiCo Inc, and Genzyme Corporation." (See discussion above.)
- James T Lenahan "served as President of Johnson & Johnson from 2002 until June 2004...."  He is "director of Telecris Biotherapeutics Inc, Alton Pharma Inc and Imacor Inc."  Johnson & Johnson is a large drug, device, and biotechnology company.  Telecris, and Alton Pharma are biotechnology pharmaceutical companies.  Imacor is a medical device company.
- Denise M O'Leary "is a director of Lucille Packard Children's Hospital and Stanford Hospitals and Clinics."  Also, "she was a member of the Stanford University Board of Trustees from 1996 through 2006, where she chaired the Committee of the Medical Center...."
-  Robert C Pozen is "an advisor to Gelesis Inc."  Gelesis is a biotechnology company.
-  Jack W Schuler "has been a director of Stericycle Inc since March 1990...."  He is a "director of Quidel Corporation and Elan Corporation plc...."    Stericycle company disposes of medical waste, including that produced by medical devices.  Quidel is a biotechnology and (medical diagnostic) device company.  Elan is an multinational biotechnology and pharmaceutical company.

So the box score for Genzyme's 11 directors is: Two have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities (some such institutions are lead by more than one Genzyme director). Ten have leadership positions in other drug, device or biotechnology corporations. One has a leadership position in health insurance/ managed care corporations. None had or have leadership positions in discredited financial services corporations that were implicated in the global financial collapse.

Summary

Just to summarize the sorts of conflicting interests these relationships suggest. 

Teaching hospitals and medical schools are supposed to provide unbiased teaching, including about issues relevant to drug and device corporations, such as choice of diagnostic strategies and treatments, and relevant health policy.  They are supposed to perform unbiased research, including research that evaluates drugs and devices.  They are supposed to provide the best possible patient care at a reasonable cost, which relates to choices of and prices paid for drugs and devices. 

Other drug, device, and biotechnology corporations may be producing, or developing products that compete with those of the index corporations.

Health insurance companies ostensibly try to control costs and improve quality in part by reducing excess utilization and bargaining down prices of drugs and devices. 

So this limited case study of the boards of directors, that is, the ostensible stewards of two health care corporations, selected because they have a common member who is the leader of a large medical school and academic medical center, and which both have histories of poor management or ethical missteps showed  - that the leadership of health care organizations is incredibly interrelated, interlocked, incestuous. 

This gave an example of how pervasive are the conflicts of interest that affect all kinds of health care organizations.  Companies that ought to be competing have interlocked directors.  Companies that ought to be negotiating at arms length have interlocked directors.  Not-for-profit academic medical institutions have leaders who are also directors of companies whose drugs their patients may take, whose devices their patients may receive, whose insurance their patients may buy, and whose products and services they may teach about and evaluate through clinical research and policy research. 

This also gives an example of how the failed culture of finance may be linked to the culture of medicine and health care.  Some of the stewards of health care organizations were also the stewards of financial services corporations whose reckless, if not arrogant, greedy and amoral leadership is widely believed to have caused the global financial collapse and our ongoing economic problems. 

Finally, this suggests how top leaders of various health care organizations may be more familiar with and identify more with each other than with their organizations, their organizations' missions, and their organizations' professionals, staff, students, clients, and patients. 

What is to be done?

I strongly believe that there needs to be much more investigation, academic, journalistic, and perhaps legal, of the identity, nature, and culture of the leaders of health care, and their relationships.  A few bloggers cannot do it all.  Obviously, the anechoic effect mitigates against medical and health care academics looking into their own leaders.  However, failing to understand who is leading our march to the brink of health care failure ought not to be something such academics would want on their conscience.

Finally, and obviously, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment.  Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. 

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.   

More Than $1 Million to Run a Public Health Agency

After a well-publicized story that managers of small town in California were paid in the high six-figures, reporters in California have gotten interested in the pay of public officials.

Thus the San Diego Union-Tribune reported on the compensation received by CEOs of local public health agencies, called public health care districts, two of which run hospitals. One in particular received generous compensation:

The top official at Palomar Pomerado Health, a public agency serving health-care needs in Poway and Escondido, receives in excess of $1 million in compensation per year.


Michael Covert, who has run the North County hospital district since 2003, receives a base salary of $736,000 a year. Retirement, bonuses and other benefits push Covert’s total pay past $1.1 million.

One other public health CEO, also responsible for a hospital, made somewhat less:

Tri-City chief executive Larry Anderson collects a base salary of $480,000 and benefits that drive his total compensation past $625,000 a year. He also received a $50,000 relocation benefit when he arrived last year.

Two CEOs of health districts that did not run hospitals, having leased them out, made less still:

Grossmont chief executive Barry Jantz makes about $183,000 a year in base pay and benefits that increase his total compensation to just under $250,000 a year.

Fallbrook administrator Vi Dupre, ... is paid a base salary of $61,000 a year and benefits that raise her compensation to just over $69,000,....

Why is Mr Covert paid so much?

Bruce Krider, the health-care district chairman, said Covert does an excellent job managing a complex enterprise that includes two major hospitals. Covert juggles the interests of staff, physicians, patients, volunteers, board members and other stakeholders, he said.

'A million dollars sounds pretty good to anybody, but my view is, pay a lot and expect a lot,' said Krider, a management consultant who also is a former hospital executive. 'You can’t have some mediocre public servant. You need somebody that has got vision, that can see the issues that are most important and put it all together.'

So now even the managers of public health agencies have become million dollar babies. And of course, according to the boards of trustees who are supposed to supervise them, they all do excellent work and therefore are underpaid even then. As we have noted before, it seems that every board supervising every health care executive thinks their executives are above average, if not stellar. Note, though, that the chair of the board overseeing Mr Covert is himself a retired hospital administrator. So, as we have noted before, it seems that the boards of such organizations often have a preponderance of members who are not inclined to be critical of their hired executives, much less limit their pay.

So the rules for top leaders of health care organizations seem to be different from those for you and me.  All these managers seem to be entitled to be above average.  (The only ones who are eventually deemed below average seem to be those up to no good in ways that do not financially benefit their organizations, e.g., see this.)

In my humble opinion, it is unseemly for the leader of a government run public health organization to make so much. 

True health care reform would decrease perverse incentives throughout the systems, spread the power in organizations more broadly, and make leaders accountable.

Making a Community Health Agency into the Leaders' Private Sand-Box

As we predicted, it seems that the US Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) increased reporting requirements for not-for-profit organizations are leading to more examples of the coziness now prevalent among the top leaders of such organizations.  The latest entry in this new parade comes from a story in the Bradenton (Florida) Herald about a not-for-profit community health agency whose mission is to provide health care to the poor and disenfranchised:

Providing medical services to the indigent and uninsured in Manatee and Sarasota counties has financially benefitted some of Manatee County Rural Health Services Inc.’s officers, board members and their families, records show.

The nonprofit agency has paid nearly $2 million in recent years to businesses owned by board members, officers, employees or their relatives, according to tax documents obtained by the Bradenton Herald. And its chief executive officer, Walter “Mickey” Presha Sr., has long been the highest-paid CEO of any such agency in Florida: His salary last year was $433,000 — $140,000 more than that of his closest counterpart, records show.

The article listed multiple examples self-dealing by the top leaders of Rural Health Services.

According to tax returns filed since 2004, Rural Health has paid:

- $558,121 to John Lewis, a board member, for optometry services.

- $536,591 to The Pinnacle Group of West Coast Florida Inc. for construction, maintenance and repair work. One of its principals is Trina Presha-Rosier, Presha’s daughter.

- $344,766 to The Lawn Authority of Manatee County Inc. for lawn care maintenance at the agency’s facilities. Wardell Jackson, the agency’s vice president of support services, is a principal in the business.

- $387,673 to A to Z Complete Property Management Inc. for janitorial cleaning and maintenance services. It is owned by Chris Mullinex, the agency’s facilities director.

- $96,000 to R & L Healthcare Advisors, whose principals include Marc Lazarus, a board member, for consulting services.

- $44,242 to More Power Properties and Investments LLC, co-owned by board Chairman J. Garry Lowe, for storage of agency files and equipment and the purchase of a modular building.

Leaders of rural health offered mostly the usual explanations:

>>As long as we say it is not a conflict, it is not a conflict<<

According to a conflict of interest statement that board members are required to sign, Rural Health prohibits them, management and their families from having any 'beneficial interest or substantial obligation to' any entity engaged in business with the agency. But some have been able to bypass that prohibition because of this loophole: 'Unless it has been determined by the board, on the basis of full disclosure of facts, that such interest does not give rise to a conflict of interest.'

>>We, our relatives, and our firms are the best possible source of the services<<

Jackson, Mullinex and Presha-Rosier’s businesses won competitive bids, which are reviewed by a board committee and approved by the full board, Lazarus said. Presha said he is not involved in reviewing bids for construction projects that his daughter might seek.

The agency chose to do business with the three board members’ companies because of special circumstances, agency officials said.

Lewis is one of Manatee Rural Health’s founders and has overseen its optometry services since the beginning. Lowe offered the storage space for less than what commercial storage facilities charged, then sold one of the storage buildings to Manatee Rural Health for a reduced price. And Lazarus has 36 years’ experience in the health care field, including as an executive at Sarasota Memorial Hospital.

They were hired because they provide needed services at a lower cost, thus allowing the agency to spend more money on patient care, officials said.

>>Trust us, because we are wonderful people<<

'It’s always disclosed to the board, so we always have the opportunity to not do it,' said Juanine Lowery, a board member since 1984. 'It hasn’t been a problem. It’s always been competitive.'

And a slightly more coherent version of that:

'Everything’s checked out and vetted,' Lazarus said. 'The arrangements are as good as or better than what we could get on the open market.'

The explanation for the CEO's out-sized salary should come as no surprise. He got that high salary because

>>I am a wonderful CEO and I deserve it<<

Rural Health board members also defend Presha’s $433,000 salary, which makes him the highest-paid chief executive officer of any federally qualified community health center in Florida. His job performance, managerial skills and the organization’s complexity and size are all reasons he makes the top salary, board members say.

Of course, the CEO himself thinks he is a wonderful CEO and deserves it:

'I know what I do,' said Presha, who said he took a pay cut to take the Manatee Rural Health job in 1984 and has turned down job offers with higher salaries since then. 'If I could do it for free, I would do it for free. But I earn my keep.'

So here we have another case of the cozy leadership of a not-for-profit health care organization, who all think they are doing just a wonderful job, who never seem to question their own actions, and who all believe all their buddies are also doing just a wonderful job. So naturally, since they are all such wonderful people doing a wonderful job, we should not begrudge them a few dollars here and there.

Of course, if they were the leaders of a privately held company that made widgets, it would be their own money that they are spending, and maybe no on else should care.

Even if the amounts involved seem relatively small relative to some of the cases that appear on Health Care Renewal, we should care particularly about how the leaders of Manatee County Rural Health Care Services throw around money (to each other), because of the nature of the organization's mission, as described by CEO Presha himself:

MCRHS has served the poor and underserved in our communities with the mentality of a 'provider of choice.'

Our group is not only compassionate, but also innovative,....

It is truly unseemly for a not-for-profit community health care organization dedicated to serving "the poor and undeserved" lead by people so complacent about their own entitlement.

So to repeat what I have written before, in my humble opinion, this sort of coziness, this sort of fuzziness at the boundaries of institutional duties and personal interests, may be a fundamental reason that our current health care system has become so solicitous of the interests and prerogatives of its leaders, and so cold to the needs of patients and the values of professionals.


The need for more transparent, accountable leadership of health care who explicitly are subject to clear ethical rules was never more apparent.

Stay tuned as more and more cases like this appear....

Where No Hospital CEOs are Below Average

In Lake Woebegon, all children are above average.  Now it seems that hospital CEOs have moved there. 

Ventura County, Where No CEO is Below Average

The Ventura County (California) Star reported on the uniformly high remuneration of the CEOs of local, mostly small, not-for-profit hospitals and hospital systems.

T. Michael Murray reaped $330,545 in 2008 as chief executive officer of St. John’s hospitals in Oxnard and Camarillo. He drew an additional $187,071 in bonuses with $73,113 more in benefits and other compensation.

His total package, according to IRS records, reached $590,729.

And he may have been underpaid, according to a statewide survey of 118 nonprofit hospitals. The report by the Payers & Providers healthcare business publication suggests the base salary for CEOs averaged $514,237.

Kick in bonuses, retirement money, reimbursement for education costs, expense accounts and the average total compensation hit $732,004.

Public records show similarly lofty numbers at Ventura County’s three nonprofit, tax-exempt hospital groups. Gary Wilde of Community Memorial Health System, which runs hospitals in Ventura and Ojai, was the highest paid CEO in 2008. He earned a base salary of $508,682 and his total compensation was $853,528, with much of the additional money placed into a retirement fund that won’t be paid out until Wilde serves six more years as CEO.

Simi Valley Hospital changed its leadership in 2008, with a total compensation of $1.25 million recorded in 990 tax forms for two different CEOs. That’s slightly more than the hospital provided in treatment for poor uninsured patients where there was no attempt to collect payment, though hospital leaders say charity care definitions encompass only a fraction of the total care they provide without pay.

Outside the county, tax records from the Cottage Health System in Santa Barbara showed a base salary of $848,826 for CEO Ronald Werft and other compensation of $546,846. His total topped $1.3 million.

Ken Anderson of the John Muir Health System, which operates hospitals in Walnut Creek and Concord, was the highest compensated CEO in the Payers & Providers study. He made $745,000 in base salary and nearly $7 million in other compensation, much of it deferred over his career for retirement.

Recall that these people are leading relatively small, not-for-profit community hospitals whose missions are to provide health care to the community.  Total compensation ranging from three-quarters of a million dollars to multi-millions seems vastly disproportionate to the jobs and their settings.

Explanations and Excuses
As expected, those supporting the CEOs have all sorts of explanations and excuses:

Hospital leaders in Ventura County and throughout California say the numbers are inflated by retirement plan accumulations that must be included on tax records even before executives qualify to receive the money. They defend the half-million-dollar salaries, with bonuses on top, as the only way to compete with for-profit hospitals for executives who can lead a facility that may employ more than 1,000 workers, drive a community’s economy, provide access to the uninsured and deliver care that saves lives.

'Given the context, it’s not out of line,' said Murray, a CEO with 28 years of experience who is now semiretired after resigning from St. John’s at the end of March. 'I think you need to retain and also attract sufficient talent. I’m not saying there aren’t inappropriate salaries out there. I don’t think mine was one of them.'

Also,

But [economist Sung Won] Sohn said that paying below average is risky.

'When you try to get somebody at $400,000 rather than $700,000 you will get plenty of takers but they’re not competent,' he said. 'Hospitals are so important in the community that you want to make sure it’s run properly.'

Nor does he see any problem with paying more than average if a hospital board wants to reward an executive.

Furthermore,

John Romley, an economist at the Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics at USC, said the amount hospitals spend on executive pay is a sliver of their total expenses and can’t legitimately be blamed for driving the rising cost of healthcare.

'I guess I’m not shocked even though I’m jealous,' he said of the compensation.

Some people were not pleased about this use of health care dollars:

Others worry the compensation may push hospitals into spending more on executives than their nonprofit mission of providing care for the poor. Federal regulations already limit compensation for CEOs of corporations bailed out by the government to $500,000. Similar caps placed on nonprofit hospitals could create dramatic differences, said Ron Shinkman, author of the Payers & Providers statewide survey on CEO salaries.

'You’re looking at close to $39 million that could be used on uncompensated patient care,' he said. 'It’s a lot of money.'

Consumer advocates aim much of their concern at nonprofit hospitals that not only reward CEOs with lucrative paydays but also provide little charity care to poor, uninsured patients. The Payers & Providers research identifies 17 hospitals — all outside of Ventura County — where the total compensation to CEOs exceeded the cost of charity care.

'It would be outrageous if hospitals are paying more to their (entire) executive teams than in indigent care in their community,' said Anthony Wright of Health Access California. 'For some hospitals to provide more to one individual just seems wrong.'

The Mechanism: Ego Bias

The mechanism making CEO compensation constantly increase appears to be simple:

Typically, hospital boards hire consultants to conduct studies showing market averages for comparable hospitals in their regions. They often try to pay somewhere around the 50th percentile.

That’s a reasonable way to do it, but such studies tend to push up the salaries, said economist Sung Won Sohn, who was involved in setting compensation at two Minneapolis hospitals.

'People at the low end try to increase the CEO closer to the average,' said the professor at CSU Channel Islands. 'If everyone does that, the average CEO salary will go up.'

So there you have it. At no hospital is the CEO deemed by a sympathetic (and sometimes crony filled board) below average. If the CEO's compensation has somehow dropped below average one year, it is immediately raised to at least average the next. Apparently almost never is the CEO's pay deemed to be too high.

That notion is corroborated by the assumption by the CEO documented above that all CEOs have "sufficient talent," and the assertion above that anyone who would accept a lower salary would be "not competent."

So every year all the CEOs who had below average compensation the previous year get compensation increased at least to last year's average.  Almost no CEO gets a reduction.  So the average moves up relentlessly year after year. 

Of course, unless all CEOs are exactly alike, some CEOs must be below average. 

So this becomes a great example of the ego bias at work. Ego bias is a common cognitive bias usually discussed in the context of making probabilistic judgments. A simple definition is that people tend to believe that outcomes of what they do, or what a group with whom they identify does will be above average. A long time ago, colleagues and I showed that interns in an intensive care unit judged the survival of their patients on average to be better than their judgments of the mean survival of all patients in the ICU. On the other hand, ICU attending physicians displayed a slightly more sophisticated version of the bias. They judged their patients' survival accurately, but judged the mean survival of their ICU's patients to be higher than it really was. [Poses RM, McClish DK, Bekes C, Scott WE, Morley JN.  Ego bias, reverse ego bias, and physicians' prognostic judgments.  Crit Care Med. 1991 Dec;19(12):1533-9.  Link here.]

So we have the ego bias writ large in judgments made about the performance and compensation of hospital CEOs, at least in Ventura County, California.

The Implications

I agree that paying a CEO more than a hospital's entire expenditures for the care of the poor is unseemly.

However, in my humble opinion, the issue is even bigger than that. It is not so much how much of the hospital's budget goes to executive compensation, but what lessons this teaches CEOs.  I propose they are:
-  I am a wonderful person.   I can do no wrong.
-  If I do wrong, I cannot be punished.
-  I can get rich and powerful doing this.

Of course, as we have written many times, being the CEO of a small community hospital is supposed to be a calling, whose goal is to uphold the institution's mission.  Instead, CEOs are learning to be tin-pot dictators.  Some are probably sensible enough to resist learning this message.  I am afraid many are not.

Furthermore, there is no reason to think that this phenomenon is confined to Ventura County, California, or to small community hospitals.  We have discussed how the management of health care organizations have become unsympathetic to, or even hostile to the mission.  We have discussed their organizations' institutional conflicts of interests.   We have discussed how they have wound up with imperial CEOs. 

The resulting ill-informed, mission-ignorant or mission-hostile, self-interested, conflicted, or even corrupt leadership is a major, but still largely anechoic cause of our health care dysfunction.

As I have said endlessly, true health care reform will require finding well-informed leaders who understand and support the mission, put the mission before their own self-enrichment, and are unconflicted and honest.

The Hospital CEO as Debt Collector

Last year we noted that the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) required more detailed reporting starting in 2009 by US not-for-profit organizations. Many US health insurance companies/ managed care organizations, most hospitals, nearly all medical associations, nearly all disease advocacy organizations, all health care charities, and nearly all medical schools are not-for-profit organizations. We suggested then that this reporting might lead to more transparency about the leadership and governance of these organizations.  The 2009 990 forms seem to be trickling into public view, sometimes leading to some striking disclosures about how US not-for-profit health care organizations are lead.

The California Watch blog just reported about the interesting part-time job of a hospital CEO:

The former president of a Laguna Beach hospital has been operating a debt-collection company that recovered medical payments from his own facility, raising conflict-of-interest questions as the CEO moves to a new hospital in Riverside County.

Bruce Christian ran South Coast Medical Center from 2005 until it was sold in 2009. At the same time, Christian was owner of Metro Republic Commercial Services, a consulting and medical debt-collection firm that provided at least $110,000 in services to South Coast while Christian was a top manager, records show.

South Coast Medical Center disclosed the arrangement as 'self-dealing' in federal tax filings. State law allows self-dealing by board members of nonprofits, typically as long as the body explores other options and determines they are not unduly enriching one of their own.

Of course, I also get to write, but wait, there is more:

Christian was also at the helm of the hospital in 2006 when Adventist hired one of his Metro Republic consultants as interim chief financial officer, tax records show.

Adventist said it appointed the interim CFO when it believed the hospital would be sold quickly.

Additionally, a version of the Metro Republic website in 2006 said the firm supplied South Coast Medical Center with health care financial consulting, managed care-revenue recovery and accounts-receivable services.

The website, which appears to have been offline since 2006, describes Christian as a health industry leader for 30 years who built the Corona-based Metro Republic from a three-person office to one with 150 employees.

Predictably, the response from the hospital and its parent health system was that it was all no big deal.

Adventist Health West, the Roseville-based company that owned South Coast, acknowledged that the arrangement was 'unusual' and 'not the norm' for the firm.

In a statement, Adventist said Christian's firm collected hospital debts for years before Adventist bought the hospital and prior to Christian’s tenure as president and CEO.

Board members were aware of the arrangement. It remained in place while the chain sought to sell the medical facility throughout Christian’s tenure, the statement said.

'Unfortunately, it took much longer than originally envisioned to sell the hospital,' Adventist Health said in a statement. 'Adventist Health continues its deep commitment to providing mission-driven, quality health care to the communities we serve.'

Some thought otherwise:

But allowing a hospital administrator – who can have considerable power over setting prices on medical procedures – to operate as the hospital’s own bill collector presents a thorny conflict of interest, said Ken Berger, executive director of Charity Navigator, a New Jersey-based charity evaluation group.

'Just because the (hospital) board may sanction it doesn’t make it right, appropriate or ethical,' he said. 'The mission of hospitals and the mission to squeeze money out of those that are slow to pay can be quite contradictory. It’s just wrong.'

Another expert thought something ought to be done:

Kathryn Peisert, managing editor for publications at the San Diego-based Governance Institute, said a hospital CEO’s duty is to further the interests of the hospital. As such, she said, Christian should have eliminated all appearances of impropriety and cut ties between the medical center and his consulting firm.

'That’s really a big no-no,' said Peisert, whose organization advises hospital boards. 'I’m surprised some regulatory agencies haven’t been after this.'

We will see if anything will be done, but this conflict of interest seems not to have gotten in the way of Mr Christian's career advancement.

Christian is now chief executive of a Loma Linda University Medical Center campus expected to open in 2011 in Riverside County. A Loma Linda University Medical Center spokesman said the Murrieta campus will not contract with Metro Republic.

As I have said before, I expect that as more 990s dribble out, seemingly as slowly as many organizations can manage, we will see many more examples of these sorts of conflicts of interest, in which top organizational leaders also turn out to be vendors, consultants, etc.

In theory, and perhaps in a golden era in the past, leaders of not-for-profit health care organizations were supposed to regard their work as a calling, and to be primarily concerned with upholding the mission of the organization. Instead, we now see more leaders who seem to regard their organizations as their own personal sand boxes, providing opportunities for play, and sometimes personal enrichment. (Note that Mr Christian's total compensation from the hospital was "$360,000 and $400,000 in salary, benefits and deferred compensation in 2006 and 2007 at South Coast Medical Center.")

Unfortunately, Mr Christian's case demonstrates that leaders who get used to their organizations as personal sand boxes, rather than face punishment,  may be given the opportunity to play in larger venues. One wonders how much he will make at the helm of a new academic medical center, what other side deals he will manage, and how much he will be concerned with the academic and clinical missions.

Once again, I say that true health care reform will only be achieved when health care organizations are lead by people who put the mission ahead of their personal enrichment, and are held accountable for their ability to do so.

More Hospitals Hiring CEOs' Children, Doing Business with Board Members' Firms

As we predicted (here), the new reporting requirements imposed on US not-for-profit organizations are beginning to yield interesting results about the coziness of the leadership of some health care organizations. 

Western Pennsylvania

For example, we start with an article in the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review about hospitals in western Pennsylvania.

Board members at Western Pennsylvania hospitals have provided legal, real estate, insurance and advertising services to their organizations, according to IRS reports examined by the Tribune-Review.

The reports, which cover the fiscal year ending June 30, 2009, are the first under new reporting requirements imposed on nonprofit hospitals by the IRS. Still more requirements will kick in next year.

Details of the filings by the two largest area health care firms, UPMC and West Penn Allegheny, were made public last month. UPMC reported $10 million and West Penn reported $5 million in dealings with board members or top executives.

Five other major nonprofit health care providers reported business dealings with board members and, like UPMC and West Allegheny, cited in-place reporting and monitoring systems to avert or minimize any conflict of interest.

The specifics include this about Ohio Valley General Hospital:

At Ohio Valley General Hospital, the tax return shows two relatives of the chief executive officer are on the payroll.


Dr. David Provenzano, son of CEO William F. Provenzano, was paid $613,781 in salary and benefits. The CEO's daughter-in-law, Dr. Dana Dellapiazzo, was paid $130,525.


David Provenzano is the medical director of the hospital's pain center. Dellapiazzo is an anesthesiologist.

About Excela Health:

At Excela Health, which operates the Westmoreland Regional Hospital and two other hospitals, a company part owned by CEO David Gallatin was paid $253,835 for direct mail services.

Excela spokeswoman Robin Jennings said Mailing Specialists 'processes our mail in preparation for sending to the post office with appropriate bar coding.'

Excela reported payments of $683,250 to Westmoreland Emergency Medicine, which employs board member Dr. Robert Whipkey.

About Washington Hospital:

At Washington Hospital, board member Thomas Northrop's Observer-Reporter newspaper was paid $212,071 for advertising services. The hospital paid $308,185 in premiums to the Campbell Insurance Agency, where board member John Campbell is an owner.

About Jefferson Regional Medical Center:

Jefferson Regional Medical Center in Jefferson Hills, according to its report, paid $151,940 in legal fees to the law firm of board member Gregory Harbaugh. It paid $331,280 in real estate commissions to the firm run by board member Kevin Langholz.
The hospital paid $75,035 to the Thorpe Reed law firm where board member Anne Mulaney works.

About St. Clair Hospital:

At St. Clair Hospital in Mt Lebanon, a radiology firm that employs Dr. Donald Orr, who is a board member, was paid $1.95 million for providing medical services, according to the hospital's filing.

The hospital paid $80,000 for insurance related services to the HGH Group headed by hospital board member Bryan Hondru.

New Hampshire

The New Hampshire Union-Leader reported on Catholic Medical Center:

The head of Catholic Medical Center, whose salary is being questioned by the Attorney General's Office, has two offspring and two step-children employed or in one case recently employed there, the hospital acknowledged.

A hospital official defended its hiring practices, saying no favoritism is shown and that of the 11 members of senior CMC management, seven have relatives who either work or have worked at the hospital, some on a per-diem basis.

Executive Vice President Ray Bonito said his own son held a per-diem job during college. Offspring of trustees can also work at the hospital, he said.

Alyson Pitman Giles has been CMC president and chief executive officer since 1999. Her bid to intertwine CMC with Dartmouth-Hitchcock Health has been stalled by the New Hampshire attorney general, who deemed it an acquisition of CMC and said it violates state law and would need court approval.

CMC provided the following information on Giles' four relatives.

-- Son Seth Pitman has worked per-diem over the past several years. Late last month, the hospital said he was working as a project writer in the marketing office. But last week, the hospital said he is not actively employed there.

-- Daughter Sarah Pitman manages a primary-care physician practice. The hospital has not said when she started at that job. She was a hospital volunteer from June 1999 to January 2001, when she started working per-diem.

Two Giles stepchildren are also employed at the West Side hospital.

-- Stepdaughter Megan DeSantis is a physician assistant at Surgical Care Group, where she was hired six years ago. CMC acquired the group in May 2009.

-- Stepson William Giles is a physician recruiter. He started as a program analyst with the IT department in June 2000 and received several promotions over the last 10 years, CMC said.

Summary

The defenses for hiring top leaders' relatives, and doing business with top leaders' firms were similar in both locations. For example, in western Pennsylvania,

All reported that any dealings with connected firms individuals were 'at arm's length' with prices set at 'fair market value.'

In New Hampshire,

'It's not just a question for hospitals,' Bonito said of hiring relatives. 'It's a question for all companies.'

What's important, he said, is that a strict process be followed.

'Everyone goes through the same process. I don't care whose kids they are,' said Bonito. 'Everyone gets treated the same. We hire the most qualified candidate.'

It all smacks of an excess of coziness.  One wonders if there was any effort made to find other candidates when the CEO's family members showed up, or to find any other vendors when the board members' firms were available. Maybe they could have found writers, physician recruiters, and even physicians other than the immediate family members of the hospital CEO. Maybe they could have found direct mail companies, advertising agencies, and law firms available where no relatives of the CEO work, and which were not run by hospital trustees.  However, rejecting a CEO's child, or a board member's firm may require an independence of spirit rarely found in today's bureaucratic health care environment.  Instead, it may be easier to "go along to get along."

Once hired, furthermore, even when there are "processes and procedures" in place, it may become all to easy to treat the CEO's relatives differently than run of the mill employees, and to treat the trustees' firms differently than the usual vendors.  That is where the real conflicts of interest set in.  The sort of coziness that allows hiring leaders' relatives and doing business with leaders' firms could soon lead to confusion between leaders' interests and the institutions' mission.  However, leaders of hospitals and other not-for-profit health care organizations have a duty to put the mission of the organization ahead of their personal interests. 

In my humble opinion, this sort of coziness, this sort of fuzziness at the boundaries of institutional duties and personal interests, may be a fundamental reason that our current health care system has become so solicitous of the interests and prerogatives of its leaders, and so cold to the needs of patients and the values of professionals. 
The need for more transparent, accountable leadership of health care who explicitly are subject to clear ethical rules was never more apparent. 

Stay tuned as more and more cases like this appear....

The Stewards of an Elite University, or a "Politburo" of "Shadow Bankers?"

We have postulated that one of the key reasons US health care has become so dysfunctional is that the leaders of some of the most august health care institutions have strayed from, if not totally abandoned their organizations' fundamental missions.  There are many possible reasons for this phenomenon, but one is that the ultimate stewards of not-for-profit health care organizations, their boards of directors or trustees, have become uninterested in the mission, or impotent to uphold it.  So, we have tried to figure out what has happened to these boards that has lead to this sorry state.

Dartmouth College: the Packing of the Board of Trustees

One example we have come frequently discussed (beginning here) is that of Dartmouth College, despite its name, really a university, and one of the elite American universities which includes a well-regarded medical school.   For a long time, Dartmouth had one of the more accountable and representative systems of governance found in US universities.  Recently, however, this accountability and transparency was challenged by some of the College's own leaders. 

Most boards of trustees are self-elected.  When an old member leaves, the new members elect his or her successor.  Dartmouth alumni, however can elect eight members of the board of trustees. Until recently, eight others were "charter trustees," who were individually chosen by the other charter trustees, and two were ex-officio. Although the College's Association of Alumni traditionally nominated alumni to run for trustee positions, candidates could be nominated by petition, and starting in 2004, four such petition candidates were elected.

As described by FIRE, the Foundation for Integrity and Responsibility in Medicine, this more open process fostered change in how the university was lead, and seemed to foster renewed attention to the institution's mission:

These trustees spoke out when they perceived their alma mater as not living up to its mission, and Dartmouth students benefited. In May 2005, the college repealed its speech code, and it immediately moved from FIRE's 'red-light' rating and became a 'green-light' institution.

As might be expected, the reigning leadership was not pleased.

Some campus officials viewed the propensity of petition candidates to voice their opinions on illiberal policies as detrimental to the school's image. The Wall Street Journal profiled T.J. Rodgers, a petition-nominated trustee, who explained the criticisms leveled at the 'divisive dissidents.'

'If 'divisive' means there are issues and we debate the issues and move forward according to a consensus, then divisive equals democracy, and democracy is good. The alternative, which I fear is what the administration and [Board of Trustees Chairman] Ed Haldeman are after right now, is a politburo-one-party rule.'

In 2007, in apparent response to the "divisiveness" of the petition trustees, the Charter Trustees proposed increasing their own numbers. Chairman Ed Haldeman's rationale for this, as we discussed here, was to ensure that the board "has the broad range of backgrounds, skills, expertise, and fundraising capabilities needed," and that the board members would possess "even more diverse backgrounds."

Charter Trustees or "Shadow Bankers"?

Yet when we examined the backgrounds of the current charter trustees, we found that they exhibited little diversity. Remarkably, three-quarters (6/8) were in leaders of the finance sector. The board chairman, Ed Haldeman, was then the leader of Putnam Funds.  Now, he is the CEO of "Freddie Mac."  In 2007, the significance of this kind of lack of diversity were not clear.  However, it did seem strange that those accused of seeking to form a "politburo" came from the Wall Street, the street that the left once loved to hate.

However, by late 2008, the world economy descended into an unprecedented financial collapse. Many concluded that the global economic collapse was caused by arrogance, greed, and corruption within the financial sector. This suggested that leadership of academia, and academic medicine in particular, by leaders of the finance sector might not, in retrospect, have been a such a good idea. When we reexamined the composition of the now enlarged cohort of Charter Trustees, however, we found nine of 13 "charter" trustees were leaders in finance, now including three in asset management, two in private equity, one in the field formerly known as investment banking, one in venture capital, one in mutual funds, and one in strategic consulting and investment. Of the remaining four, one was the CEO of a large diversified corporation that has a major finance subsidiary. The remaining three were two physicians and a pharmaceutical corporate CEO.

Given the ongoing financial chaos at the time, we again suggested that a board dominated by business leaders in the finance sector might not be a good idea. Last week, a report came out suggesting why we were right.

Charter Trustees as Dartmouth's Own "Shadow Bankers"

"Educational Endowments and the Financial Crisis: Social Costs and Systemic Risks in the Shadow Banking System," published by the Center for Social Philanthropy, Tellus Institute, focused on how prominent educational institutions, including Dartmouth College, came to invest much of their endowments in risky, illiquid "alternative" investments, the sort provided by the "shadow banking system." The report noted that this change lead to greater financial risks, leading to recent losses and consequent sharp cutbacks in spending, programs, and employment at the affected institutions. In particular, however, it focused on leadership and governance problems at the institutions that lead to this state of affairs.

Although the emergence of the high-risk Endowment Model of Investing has taken place against the backdrop of powerful forces of financial globalization and the influence of Modern Portfolio Theory, its consolidation and influence today at colleges and universities depend vitally on college leaders: senior administrators, trustees, and investment managers, especially the increasingly prominent role of chief investment officer, or CIO. The financial crisis has in many ways been a crisis of leadership. The precipitous declines endowments have suffered during the credit crisis need to be understood as the logical outcome of the Endowment Model’s high risk strategies, but behind the model stand those who are ultimately responsible for its execution: whether as professional money managers, investment officers, affiliated investment management companies, outside managers, or investment consultants, or as the fiduciaries sitting on governing boards and investment committees.

At Dartmouth, in particular, the report focused on conflicts of interest among the board of trustees:

When it comes to weakened endowment oversight, the most glaring problem arises from trustees from the finance industry whose firms provide investment management services. One of the most disconcerting cases in this respect is that of Dartmouth College, where the sudden departure of CIO David Russ in 2009 created a leadership vacuum over endowment management. The college’s investment committee chair and trustee Stephen Mandel has played the CIO role on a voluntary, part-time basis since last summer and will continue to do so until he becomes chair of the board of trustees later this year. At the same time, Mandel’s firm, Lone Pine Capital LLC, a well known hedge-fund complex he founded in 1997, has also managed an investment mandate from the college’s endowment valued originally at $10 million. Although the college has a conflict-of interest policy and is required to disclose such 'pecuniary benefit transactions' with the state of New Hampshire, it would seem difficult for fellow trustees to provide proper oversight of investments managed by a fellow trustee serving as the de-facto CIO. Additionally, if Mandel recuses himself from committee or board deliberations related to his firm, then the investment committee must function without its chair.

However, the problem is magnified because Mandel is only one of more than half a dozen Dartmouth trustees whose firms manage multimillion-dollar investments for the endowment, according to the college’s filings with Charitable Trusts Unit of the New Hampshire Department of Justice. Leon Black’s firm Apollo Management has reportedly managed at least $40 million in Dartmouth investments. Russell Carson’s private equity firm[Welsh, Carson, Anderson and Stowe] has reportedly received at least $45 million in commitments of capital from Dartmouth. William Helman, IV’s venture capital firm Greylock Partners, has reportedly received $10 million investment mandates from the college, while R. Bradford Evans’ firm Morgan Stanley has done multiple transactions
with the college, varying from investments in international real estate and hedge funds to bond issuances, all at undisclosed levels. P. Andrew McLane [T A Associates] and Jonathan Newcomb [Leeds Weld and Co] have also had reported interests in college investments at undisclosed levels. For an endowment of its size— Dartmouth’s endowment fell to less than $3 billion in fiscal year 2009—the deep dependence on trustees’ own businesses for endowment management seems disproportionate.

Thus, one half of the membership of Dartmouth's Charter Trustees were also being paid by Dartmouth to manage its endowment investments.  However, as the Tellus Institute report noted,

Leading experts on nonprofit board governance, such as Richard Chait at Harvard University, stress that colleges should simply not do business with the companies of their board members, in order to avoid inevitable distractions and the sense of divided loyalties that arise, to say nothing of appearances of self-dealing and personal enrichment

Another "Missing Link": Board Members Doing Business with the Organizations They are Supposed to Steward

We have frequently discussed the web of conflicts of interest that now permeates health care.  Most of the conflicts we have discussed up to now involve physicians or academicians who have financial ties to pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and device companies.  Health care organizational leaders also do business  with the organizations they lead have not until recently been a topic of discussion, mainly because such conflicts of interest have rarely been disclosed.

It looks like this is going to change.  The US Internal Revenue Service sought disclosure of such conflicts of interest affecting hired executives and boards of trustees of not-for-profit organizations beginning in 2009.  These disclosures, reported on IRS form 990, are just beginning to be made public.  We just posted about members of the board of directors of a large academic health care system who also lead or owned companies that did substantial business with the system.  Now we see that a substantial portion of the board of trustees of Dartmouth lead financial firms that managed a major portion of the College's endowment, perhaps to the overall detriment of the endowment's performance.  No wonder the Charter Trustees got nervous about petition trustees poking about their business.

 As summarized by BoardSource, there are three traditional duties of members of boards of trustees of not-for-profit organizations:

Duty of Care

The duty of care describes the level of competence that is expected of a board member, and is commonly expressed as the duty of "care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances." This means that a board member owes the duty to exercise reasonable care when he or she makes a decision as a steward of the organization.

Duty of Loyalty

The duty of loyalty is a standard of faithfulness; a board member must give undivided allegiance when making decisions affecting the organization. This means that a board member can never use information obtained as a member for personal gain, but must act in the best interests of the organization.

Duty of Obedience

The duty of obedience requires board members to be faithful to the organization's mission. They are not permitted to act in a way that is inconsistent with the central goals of the organization. A basis for this rule lies in the public's trust that the organization will manage donated funds to fulfill the organization's mission.

Letting a board member's firm manage millions of dollars worth of the institution's endowment portfolio seems an obvious violation of the duty of loyalty. (Letting a board member's legal firm handle the institution's legal issues, or having a board member's advertising firm do its marketing, as described in our earlier post, also seem to be obvious violations of this duty.) A board member who sees nothing wrong with doing business with the organization he or she is supposed to steward would likely see nothing wrong in allowing the organization's mission to become a casualty of the means used to protect that business relationship.

I suspect we are soon to see many more examples of hired executives and board members of revered not-for-profit organizations who have been doing business on the side with the organizations of which they are supposed to be leaders or stewards.  These sorts of conflicts of interest may be another "missing link" explaining why the leadership and governance of health care organizations has gone so far astray. 

As disclosure continues, maybe enough outrage will ensue so that improved leadership and governance will become possible. 

At UPMC: Dealings with Board Members' Firms and Executives' Relatives, a $5 Million Plus CEO, and 8 $1 Million Plus Executives

Last year we noted that the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) required more detailed reporting starting in 2009 by US not-for-profit organizations.  Many US health insurance companies/ managed care organizations, most hospitals, nearly all medical associations, nearly all disease advocacy organizations, all health care charities, and nearly all medical schools are not-for-profit organizations.  We suggested then that this reporting might lead to more transparency about the leadership and governance of these organizations.  Some of these new 990 forms are now being publicly disclosed, with some interesting findings. 

The Pittsburgh Tribune-Review just reported some interesting findings about financial ties between the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) and its board members and hired executives.

Health giant UPMC paid more than $10 million last year to companies and individuals with ties to its directors and high-ranking executives, newly released tax records show.

The payments include more than $3 million in salaries and contracts to relatives of UPMC CEO Jeffrey Romoff, who earned $5.16 million in fiscal 2009.

It was no surprise that a UPMC spokesman pooh-poohed the significance of these relationships.

'Given that UPMC is the largest employer in Pittsburgh and attracts talent from across the world, it's easy to understand why there are hundreds of employees with family members who also work at UPMC,' said spokesman Paul Wood.

'We seek to hire the best and brightest in every position, regardless of family relationships, and take appropriate steps to manage any conflicts that those relationships might entail.'

The specifics about payments to the relatives of top hired executives were:

Tax records show UPMC paid $264,274 to Rebecca Kaul, the CEO's daughter. Wood said UPMC then billed a contractor for her services. Kaul now works for UPMC as executive director of the Technology Development Center, Wood said.

UPMC paid $259,488 to Scott Gilstrap, who joined the health care giant before marrying Romoff's daughter. Gilstrap, now divorced, no longer works for UPMC, Wood said.

Wood said UPMC's contract for $2.48 million with Paradise Group, an advertising firm owned by the CEO's brother, Douglas Romoff, was not renewed after its March 2009 expiration.

'Jeffrey Romoff was not involved in any of the decisions pertaining to this contract,' Wood said.

In addition to Romoff's family connections, the tax records show UPMC paid Scott Cindrich, son of its chief counsel Robert J. Cindrich, $141,599.

Wood said the younger Cindrich joined UPMC before his father left a federal judgeship in 2004 to become UPMC's top lawyer. Robert Cindrich was paid $1.86 million.

Cindrich did not return telephone calls seeking comment.

The specifics about dealings between UPMC and its board members were:

Tax records show companies affiliated with board member Anne V. Lewis do the most business with UPMC. Oxford Development Company, where Lewis is board chair, received $4.84 million from UPMC.

Lewis is affiliated with Central Securities Services, which received $201,198 from UPMC, and Central Property Services, which received $457,051. Lewis did not return repeated telephone calls from the Tribune-Review.

According to the returns, the Downtown law firm of Pietragallo Gordon Alfano Bosick and Raspanti earned $348,616 in legal fees. William Pietragallo is a UPMC board member. The law firm paid $792,215 to UPMC for heath insurance.

Pietragallo said he filled out a conflict-of-interest form, as he has in past years.

'It reminds me of how much I pay for health insurance,' he said.

IGate Mastech, the tech company founded by UPMC board member Sunil Wadhwani, received $204,215 for computer services. JJ Gumberg and Co., affiliated with board member Ira Gumberg, was paid $103,521, tax records show. Neither Wadhwani nor Gumberg returned telephone calls.

Board member John R. McGinley Jr.'s law firm, Eckert Seamans Cherin and Mellott, was paid $804,414 for legal services, according to the returns. McGinley and board member Robert A. Paul and members of their families are affiliated with Pittsburgh Steelers Premium Tickets LP, which was paid $129,425, tax returns show.

McGinley said he believed the figures UMPC reported are correct. Paul did not return telephone calls.

Also, in a separate article, the Tribune-Review noted transactions between UPMC's insurance subsidiary and its board members' firms

Recent federal tax filings show companies associated with some UPMC board members also buy their employee health insurance through the health care giant's insurance arm.

The tax returns show that health insurance premiums paid by the companies affiliated with board members totaled about $8 million in the fiscal year ending June 30, 2009. Nine firms affiliated with board members purchased UPMC health insurance.

That figure includes nearly $1.8 million by Bank of New York Mellon. UPMC board member Stephen Elliott is affiliated with the bank.

Oxford Development paid $2.1 million in premiums. The development firm's chairman is Anne Lewis, a UPMC board member.

The law firm headed by UPMC board member William Pietragallo paid $792,215 in premiums, according to the returns. AMPCO-Pittsburgh, which is affiliated with UPMC board member Robert A. Paul, paid a little more than $1 million in premiums.

Of course, Mr Wood pooh-poohed that too:

UPMC spokesman Paul Wood said the premiums paid by the companies were at "market rates."

He also apparently stated that the hospital system follows "strict conflict-of-interest rules. Board members are barred from voting or acting on matters relating to their business interests...." 

The standard approach of most not-for-profit organizations to conflicts of interests involving their board members or executives is to have these people recuse themselves from votes or actions that directly affect their own or their families' business interests.  I submit that whether this prevents the conflict of interest from influencing decision making by the organizations is questionable.  I doubt that the board members are unaware of their fellow members' and executives' direct or familial business interests.  The fact that certain individuals need to step out of meetings when votes come up on particular contracts would be a good reminder that they or their relatives have business interests at issue at these times.  Board members tend to keep their seats for a long time, and tend to get to know their fellow members pretty well.  Even if an individual member cannot vote on a contract or action relating to his or her business interests, would it be any surprise that his or her buddies on the board might look favorably on such a contract?

Furthermore, would it really be that hard to find development companies, property management firms, advertising agencies, law firms, or information technology companies in a large metropolitan area that are not affiliated with board members or top executives and their families?  Instead, UPMC seems to have found quite a few vendors affiliated with board members which do not seem particularly specialized in their organizational attributes.  Can we be sure that they are run by the best and the brightest?

Maybe board members who are too cozy with each other, and too cozy with the hired executives they are supposed to supervise, would be distracted from the attentiveness required to their organization's mission by their buddies' businesses? 

Perhaps coziness among board members and hired executives might have something to do with the munificent compensation given to numerous hired leaders of UPMC.  A separate article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette stated:

Jeffrey Romoff, president and CEO of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, received $3.563 million in salary in 2009, a 24.4 percent decrease from his 2008 salary of $4.711 million.

However,

In addition to Mr. Romoff's $4.711 million in cash compensation in 2008, he received $428,214 in deferred compensation and $21,671 in nontaxable benefits, for a total package valued at $5.161 million.

In addition,

Other top UPMC earners include Elizabeth Concordia, executive vice president and president of the Hospital and Community Services Division, $2.139 million; Amin Kassam, the department of neurological surgery chair who resigned in July, $2.083 million; Robert Cindrich, senior vice president and chief legal officer, $1.869 million; neurosurgeon Ghassan Beijani, $1.798 million; neurosurgeon Adnan Abla, $1.620 million.

Also, Marshall Webster, executive vice president and chief medical officer, $1.514 million; Diane Holder, president and CEO of UPMC Health Plan, $1.485 million; James Luketich, co-director of surgical affairs at the University of Pittsburgh Cancer Institute, $1.442 million; Daniel Drawbaugh, senior vice president and chief information officer, $1.335 million; and David Farner, senior vice president and chief of staff in the office of the president, $1.253 million.

By my count, that was eight executives with yearly total compensation greater than $1 million (in addition to two very well paid neurosurgeons.)  These payments, which most people would say are sufficient to make their recipients rich, were handed out by a not-for-profit organization whose mission statement includes being "committed to providing premier health care services to our region and contributing to this community" at the end of a bog of business-speak.  I suspect most people would think "contributing to this community" means something in addition to contributing to the wealth of a few top executives, and contributing to the business income of board members and executives' relatives.  Again, are board members who have become cozy with each other and the executives they are supposed to supervise more likely to be distracted from their fiduciary duty to the not-for-profit organization by their buddies' friendships?

We often discuss conflicts of interest on this blog.  Many of these involve financial relationships among health care professionals and academics on one hand, and pharmaceutical, biotechnology, device and other health care corporations on the other.  However, I suspect that conflicts involving leadership of hospitals and local businesses and vendors may be more common.  The latter may not always have as much influence on the quality of care, teaching and research as former group of conflicts.  However, they may have more effects on the total costs of health care, and may contribute more to the coziness, sense of entitlement, and inattention to the mission that seem to characterize much of health care leadership.  They may contribute to the perception that health care, like finance, may now be about , as Prof Mintzberg said, "All this compensation madness is not about markets or talents or incentives, but rather about insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit."

The new version of the IRS forms are just beginning to become public, so we expect to see many more juicy stories about the financial and family ties of leaders of health care not-for-profit organizations.  Watch your local newspapers for details about conflicts of interest at your local health care not-for-profit organizations.

Maybe as more is revealed, the need for more transparent, accountable, and ethical governance of health care organizations will become apparent.

Board Member Blows Whistle on Health Insurance Company's Accounting

We previously posted about some of the travails of for-profit health insurance company/ managed care organization Wellcare.  In August, 2009, we posted about Wellcare's "admission" that it had made numerous questionable campaign contributions.  In May, 2009 we posted about WellCare's submission to a deferred prosecution agreemeent based on charges that it defrauded state programs by inflating its expenses. In 2007, we posted about how the state of Connecticut stopped WellCare from running a plan for poor children after the company refused to reveal what it was paying physicians, and why it was failing to pay for particular services. So WellCare has been cited for three different kinds of unethical behavior in 2007-09.

Here's a story about Wellcare with a new twist in the Wall Street Journal:

A prominent director at WellCare Health Plans Inc. resigned Wednesday and raised questions about accounting practices at the Medicare and Medicaid company.

Regina Herzlinger, the head of the board's audit committee and a professor of business administration at Harvard Business School, said internal audits found WellCare overbilled the Illinois Medicaid program by $1 million in 2009 and potentially overcharged states for almost $500,000 worth of maternity care. Additionally, the Tampa, Fla., company ran afoul of Georgia's requirements that it account for each patient visit for which it paid providers, resulting in a $610,000 fine, she said.

Ms. Herzlinger said those problems, which the company corrected last year and this year after an internal auditor discovered them, are evidence of weak accounting practices. Ms. Herzlinger said she had hoped to provide oversight, as chairwoman of the audit committee, but that the board didn't renominate her for re-election at this year's annual meeting of shareholders. Ms. Herzlinger alleges that the board forced her out for asking questions about accounting problems and corporate-governance practices.

Wellcare offered the response one might expect:

WellCare said good corporate-governance practices require it to bring in new board members periodically to provide a fresh perspective. The company said the accounting errors Ms. Herzlinger identified were relatively small and the company's own internal controls identified them, indicating that its processes are working well. The company said the board chose not to renominate Ms. Herzlinger.

'At any company, you are always going to have these kinds of immaterial amounts pop up,' said Thomas Tran, WellCare's chief financial officer, who added that it is important to 'address them and document them and learn from them to change your processes.'

That might have been more convincing were Wellcare not to have the track-record discussed above.

Every now and then we have discussed cases of whistle-blowers from within health care organizations, but I cannot remember another instance in which the whistle-blower was on the board of directors.  In our post of August, 2009, we noted Prof Herzlinger's position on the Wellcare board, and urged her, as a main stream health policy expert, "to acknowledge that health care leadership may be unaccountable, opaque, dishonest, and sometimes flagrantly corrupt."  We also urged her to "pay a bit more attention to the mischief being committed by those who answer to her."  From this new story, it looked like she did just that, and hopefully made a contribution to more transparent and honest governance of health care organizations.  Good for her!

It is time for the often well-paid and not over-worked members of the board of directors of health care corporations to take some responsibility for the actions of the corporations over which they are supposed to exercise stewardship.

Failed Leaders of Citigroup as Leaders of Health Care

When we began this blog, I never dreamed I would do so much writing about finance and the financial services sector of the economy, but,... 

The Governance of Citigroup

The discussions and revelations generated by the global financial collapse/ great recession continue to provide insights into the ongoing health care crisis.  Let me start with a small item from the Dow Jones Newswire this week:

The California Public Employees' Retirement System said it opposes the re-election of two Citigroup Inc. (C) directors, in part because of their roles in the recent financial crisis.

The nation's largest public pension fund, which owns about 61.2 million Citigroup shares, plans to cast 'withhold' votes for board nominees Andrew Liveris, chairman and chief executive of Dow Chemical Co. (DOW), and Judith Rodin, Rockefeller Foundation president, at the annual shareowners meeting Tuesday.

Both served on the company's audit and risk committee before the financial crisis. During the crisis, the banking giant accepted a total federal government infusion of $45 billion, which it has repaid.

'It's time for new blood in the boardroom,' said Anne Simpson, the senior portfolio manager who heads the Calpers corporate governance program....

Let me back up a bit.

The near-failure of global banking giant Citigroup, prevented only by a massive US government bail-out, was one of the central components of the global financial collapse. We noted recently how Mr Robert Rubin, one of the key leaders of Citigroup was accused of "being asleep at the switch," "irresponsibility and misjudgment," and being a "very well paid boob" after his testimony at hearings by the committee investigating the collapse. We also noted his link to health care. As senior member of the Harvard Corporation, Rubin is one of six top stewards of the US' oldest and arguably most presigious university, containing one the country's most prestigious medical schools and teaching hospitals.

Although all those who were members of the Citigroup at the time it collapsed have not been hauled in front of the committee, there has been considerable discussion of their responsibility for the company's failures. For example, in 2008, soon after the government rescue of Citigroup began, the Wall Street Journal published an editorial:

"Citi never sleeps," says the bank's advertising slogan. But its directors apparently do. While CEO Vikram Pandit can argue that many of Citi's problems were created before he arrived in 2007, most board members have no such excuse. Former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin has served on the Citi board for a decade. For much of that time he was chairman of the executive committee, collecting tens of millions to massage the Beltway crowd, though apparently not for asking tough questions about risk management.

Chairman Sir Win Bischoff has held senior positions at Citi since 2000. Six other directors have served for more than 10 years -- including former CIA Director John Deutch, Time Warner Chairman Richard Parsons, foundation executive Franklin Thomas, former AT&T CEO C. Michael Armstrong, Alcoa Chairman Alain Belda, and former Chevron Chairman Kenneth Derr.

When taxpayers are being asked to provide the equivalent of $1,000 each in guarantees on Citi's dubious investments, how can these men possibly say they deserve to remain on the board?

While other banks can claim to be victims of the current panic, Citi is at least a three-time loser. The same directors were at the helm in 2005 when the Fed suspended Citi's ability to make acquisitions because of the bank's failure to adhere to regulatory and ethical standards. Citi also needed resuscitation after the sovereign debt disaster of the 1980s, and it required an orchestrated private rescue in the 1990s.

Last year, as reported by Bloomberg,

Citigroup Inc. investors should vote against re-electing four of 14 board members, including John Deutch and Michael Armstrong, to improve management of the company’s risks, a shareholder advisory group said.

Deutch, former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency director, Armstrong, former AT& T Inc. chief executive officer, and Alain Belda, chairman of Alcoa Inc., should be opposed 'for poor risk oversight,' RiskMetrics Group Inc.’s ISS Governance Services said today. Xerox Corp. CEO Anne Mulcahy shouldn’t be re-elected because she sits on more than three boards, which may limit her effectiveness, the group said.

'The pattern of chronic oversight failure at Citi and the magnitude of the corresponding shareholder losses warrant removal from the board of directors most responsible for risk oversight,' RiskMetrics said in the statement.

Furthermore,

'Despite the fact that the board has many incumbent directors that have been successful in their respective fields and have been on the board for some time, their track record taken as a whole is dismal given that the company is currently surviving on federal assistance,' RiskMetrics said.

Rick Conrad, of the Seeking Alpha blog, thus berated the CEO of Citigroup at its 2009 shareholders meeting,

Mr. Armstrong, who has been a director since 1989 is no longer part of the Audit Committee, as of this year, continues his 'service' to our Company on the Nomination as well as the Compensation Committee. Much as this company has suffered under an illusion of prosperity, it appears to continue to suffer under an illusion of competence.

John [Deutch] has served on the Audit Committee of our Company since 1997 and hence, likely drank the Kool-Aid as to the Illusion of Prosperity.

I note that the audit and risk management committee has many members who, like Mr Deutch and MrArmstrong presided over this seemingly out of control disaster.

Andrew Liveris since 2005 on Audit

Ann Mulcahy since 2007 on Audit

Dr Judith Rodin since 2004 on both Executive and Audit Committees.

Overlaps Among Citigroup's Board and Health Care Organizations' Leadership
So there seems to be good reason to believe that the board of Citigroup at the time the firm collapsed were a collective example of inattentive goverance and poor stewardship. We have previously documented overlaps among poor governance and leadership of finance, and the governance and leadership of health care, suggesting that the poor leadership and governance of the latter may be in part a result of infection from the former. So I looked for overlaps among the Citigroup board and health care organizational leadership.

A list of the membership of the failed board comes from the 2008 Citigroup proxy statement.  The biographies provided therein, supplemented with some Google searching, produced the following overlaps:

- C Michael Armstrong - is also Chairman, Johns Hopkins Medicine, Health Systems and Hospital

- Alain J P Belda - was a Trustee and member of the Corporation of Brown University (including the Warren Alpert Medical School) (see link).  (He stepped down prior to 2009 at an unknown time.)

- Sir Winfried Bischoff, Chairman of the Board - is a director of Eli Lilly and Co.

- Kenneth T Derr - is a director of the University of California San Francisco Foundation.

- John M Deutch - no overlap found

- Roberto Hernandez Ramirez - no overlap found

- Andrew N Liveris - is a Trustee of Tufts University (including the School of Medicine and Tufts- New England Medical Center)

- Anne M Mulcahy - in 2009, was appointed to the Board of Directors of Johnson and Johnson (see link)

- Vikran S Pandit, CEO - is a Trustee of Columbia University (including the College of Physicians and Surgeons and Columbia University Medical Center)

- Richard D Parsons - is a Trustee of Howard University (including the College of Medicine and Howard University Hospital)

- Judith Rodin - is President of the Rockefeller Foundation

- Robert E Rubin - is a member of the Harvard Corporation (including Harvard Medical School and multiple Harvard teaching hospitals), and a Trustee of Mount Sinai Medical Center

- Robert L Ryan - was a director of UnitedHealth Group, is a Trustee of Cornell University (including Weill Cornell Medical College, and Weill Cornell Medical Center), and was a Senior Vice President and CFO of Medtronic

- Franklin A Thomas - no overlaps found

Summary

So in summary, of 14 board members, 2 are trustees of major medical centers (Johns Hopkins and Mount Sinai), 6 were or are trustees or equivalent of universities that include medical schools and medical centers (Brown, Tufts, Columbia, Howard, Harvard and Cornell), one is a trustee of such a university's foundation (University of California San Francisco Foundation), 2 are or would be board members of pharmaceutical corporations (Eli Lilly and Johnson and Johnson), one was a board member of a commercial managed care organization/ health insurance company (UnitedHealth), one was a former top executive of a medical device company (Medtronic), and one is the President of a large charitable foundation which historically has supported multiple medical and public health initiatives (Rockefeller Foundation).  Only 3 of 14 did not have a major leadership role of a health care organization.  

Most of these health care organizations have been involved with cases we have discussed on Health Care Renewal (see links above).

Given the seriousness of the failure of Citigroup, one has to wonder why so many of the directors who presided over it still have such influential positions in health care organizations?

As we have pointed out, as the world economy was driven to near ruin by "masters of the universe," some of the same also became leaders of academia and academic medicine in their spare time. Maybe this made sense 10 or 20 years ago, but why does it still make sense? On the other hand, now that we understand how bad the leadership of finance really was, it is a little easier to understand why the leadership of health care has become so bad. Iit seems reasonable to hypothesize that some of the problems of academia, and particularly the problems of medical academia, may have been at least enabled by leadership more used to working in an increasingly amoral marketplace than to upholding the academic mission.  The failures of the leadership and governance of finance thus suggest we need to re-examine the leadership of health care.