Barry Chaiken, MD, MPH: "Let's be patient" with experimental devices that harm patients

At an interview of Barry Chaiken, MD, MPH, FHIMSS, former Chairman of the Board of health IT trade group HIMSS and chief medical officer of Imprivata, a company specializing in healthcare IT security, Chaiken pleads for the following special accommodations for Health IT relative to other medical sectors:

... We’re still learning, in healthcare, about that user interface. We’re still learning about how to put the applications together in a clinical workflow that’s going to be valuable to the patients and to the people who are providing care. Let’s be patient. Let’s give them a chance to figure out the right way to do this. Let’s give the application providers an opportunity to make this better.

[Why are the health IT applications bad to begin with, I ask? - ed.]

I note the following.

• If 'we're' still learning (and I don't include people with genuine clinical computing expertise in that subgroup, but it does include the plethora of amateurs in the commercial health IT industry), then the technology is experimental.
• Worse, it's unregulated - a major special accommodation in and of itself.
  
• These sentiments about "being patient" would be appropriate - if the subjects of this experimental technology that vendors need to be "given a chance" to make better were experimental lab rats.

Instead, the subjects of the experimental technology are unwitting, unconsenting human beings, who are being used as experimental test subjects for software development, and being put at risk, injured and indeed killed by the disruptions these experimental technologies cause.

Under these realities, the position presented by Chaiken is, in my opinion, ethically perverse.

That such sentiments come from someone who holds the MD degree and who I assume took the Hippocratic oath in some form is stunning.

In the health IT industry, "Primum non nocere" seems to have been replaced with "Kybernetik über alle."

Further, the commercial health IT vendors have had the good part of five decades to "get it right." How long is long enough?

Their software is unavailable for detailed evaluation and open critique of the user experience by impartial experts, unlike open source EHR's like VistA CPRS, demo version available at this link where anyone can:

• Download the latest version of CPRS today and get access to new features including graphing functionality
• Use the software as if you were a provider by entering orders, entering documentation, retrieving reports (and graphs) and viewing alerts and notifications that help with decision support
• Learn first hand how VA’s electronic health record system works

Personally, I've had to use stealth simply to obtain and post graphical representations of some simply inexcusable commercial HIT interface sins (link). Why should a secretive industry be given additional special accommodation?

Dr. Chaiken goes on to state:

Let’s hold them accountable if they don’t [make the applications better]. Absolutely, hold them accountable if they don’t; and the marketplace, I hope, will be able to make those choices and hold them accountable when they don’t. But, we’re still learning.

Again, I'm not sure who the "we're" refers to, but "holding companies accountable" will not really help victims of the experiments who are seriously injured or killed.

A better solution, as I have written on this blog (such as at my Nov. 2008 post "Should The U.S. Call A Moratorium On Ambitious National Electronic Health Records Plans?" and at other sites as well:

Protect patients. Constrain the health IT experiment temporally and geographically, and apply the laws, customs and regulations of medical experimentation until this industry "has learned" whatever lessons Chaiken thinks they need to learn, e.g., from decades of Medical Informatics, Social Informatics, Computer Science, HCI and other research. None of these fields - last time I looked - are classified or protected intellectual property. Share information on patient adverse outcomes and near misses, instead of concealing them and contractually gagging users from openly speaking about problems.

That would be the ethical approach.

Further, how many more decades should we wait for the health IT industry to figure out how to look for better leaders beyond the "school of hard knocks" bias that's existed for at least the past decade? How many substandard health IT leaders were placed in hospitals the past few decades as a result of outrageous attitudes like these below from the major recrutiers, centered on spreading the wealth?

I don't think a degree gets you anything," says healthcare recruiter Lion Goodman, president of the Goodman Group in San Rafael, California about CIO's and other healthcare MIS staffers. Healthcare MIS recruiter Betsy Hersher of Hersher Associates, Northbrook, Illinois, agreed, stating "There's nothing like the school of hard knocks." In seeking out CIO talent, recruiter Lion Goodman "doesn't think clinical experience yields [hospital] IT people who have broad enough perspective. Physicians in particular make poor choices for CIOs. They don't think of the business issues at hand because they're consumed with patient care issues," according to Goodman. Healthcare Informatics, "Who's Growing CIO's."

[No, that line about 'being consumed with patient care issues' as a strike against health IT leadership didn't come from a Scott Adams business-idiot parody cartoon - ed.]

As in clinical medicine itself, if you're going to be anywhere near patient care and making decisions affecting its delivery, a degree damn well "gets you something."

At about the same time the above appeared in Healthcare Informatics, a generalist IT recruiter wrote me this:

... What is happening to MDs trying to change careers is providing a window into broader issues about professionals in society today - narrow training, pigeonholing in the marketplace, difficulty making lateral and cross-industry transition, what a handicap it is to be creative, entrepreneurial, or cross-disciplinary in the current marketplace, and the wasted intellectual capital represented by the high caliber of individuals who can't find ways to fruitfully plug themselves into the marketplace.

I continue to be amazed at this general phenomenon...the remarkable quality of a number of candidates I've met, and the lack of recruiters' ability to get them in the door of good companies. The interesting part of the story is that when I am able to get access to high level execs in some of these companies (not just IT, but devices, pharmaceuticals, etc. also) they are dismayed at the quality of those that they hire. They know that something is wrong in how the recruitment process is working. (eg, one of the major device cos. just devoted the time of 1 FTE in Human Resources to 'finding innovative ways of identifying and recruiting good talent into the company.')

Whose fault were the outrageous, deleterious hiring practices prevalent in this industry that contributed materially to its production of substandard products, hiring practices that persist to this day? (See example here.)

Why should we be "patient", and "give them [yet more chances] to figure out the right way to do this", and why should patients permit themselves to continue to be guinea pigs to such a sloppy, cavalier industry?

I note that Chaiken's credentials appear to fit the template, as colleague Roy Poses describes at various posts including here, of an "executive isolated from the real world of health care" and member of the superclass. From the interview linked above:

... According to your LinkedIn profile, you’re CMO for Imprivata, CMIO for Symphony Corporation, and CMO of DocsNetwork. You’re on a couple of advisory boards, you own a vineyard, and you just finished your term as chair of the HIMSS board.

Perhaps that helps explain the mantra of "computers [and profit] first, patients second."

Finally, in answer to my own question above "Why are the health IT applications bad to begin with", I suggest complacency, incompetence, willful ignorance, and negligence (including criminal negligence) as possible answers.

-- SS

Addendum:

The following in today's WSJ caught my eye ("What we've learned from the Gulf spill", Michio Kaku, July 20, 2010):

The nagging question is: Why did it take so long? Why couldn't they have capped the leak months ago? For three agonizing months, BP's engineers and executives were essentially making things up as they went along, conducting a billion dollar science project with the American people as guinea pigs. The basic science of stopping oil leaks at 5,000 feet below sea level should have been done years ago.

Concepts are similar. With just a few edits, we have this:

The nagging question is: Why is it taking so long? Why couldn't they have learned to create useful health IT decades ago? For at least thirty agonizing years, Health IT vendors' engineers and executives were essentially making things up as they went along, conducting a multibillion dollar science project with the American people as guinea pigs. The basic science of producing safe, effective, usable health IT should have been done years ago.

-- SS

Is H. Stephen Lieber, CEO of HIT Industry Trade Group HIMSS, Misinformed or Simply Lying?

In the Wall Street Journal article today entitled "Can Technology Cure Health Care?" by erstwhile WSJ reporter Jacob Goldstein, H. Stephen Lieber, CEO of the health IT trade group HIMSS disputes the idea that "electronic medical records systems focus on billing [and other administrative tasks] at the expense of patient care" and says:

[These systems] are "primarily designed for improving clinical outcomes, and a secondary benefit is that they improve administrative efficiencies."

Is Mr. Lieber misinformed, or worse, could he simply be lying?

In fact, these systems do neither of these things, as repeated studies are showing such as I aggregated in "2009 a Pivotal Year in Healthcare IT" at http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/failurecases/?loc=cases&sloc=2009, and as in this new 2010 study report in Health Affairs:

Electronic Health Records' Limited Successes Suggest More Targeted Uses

The team, led by Harvard Medical School professor Catherine M. DesRoches, surveyed more than 3,000 U.S. community hospitals to assess factors such as inpatient costs and mortality and readmission rates. Here are their findings:

Understanding whether electronic health records, as currently adopted, improve quality and efficiency has important implications for how best to employ the estimated $20 billion in health information technology incentives authorized by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. We examined electronic health record adoption in U.S. hospitals and the relationship to quality and efficiency. Across a large number of metrics examined, the relationships were modest at best and generally lacked statistical or clinical significance. However, the presence of clinical decision support was associated with small quality gains. Our findings suggest that to drive substantial gains in quality and efficiency, simply adopting electronic health records is likely to be insufficient. Instead, policies are needed that encourage the use of electronic health records in ways that will lead to improvements in care.

... the researchers determined that the technological systems, as currently implemented, do not have a significant impact on improving care and reducing costs, DesRoches said.

A key phrase is "as currently implemented." To that, I'd add "as currently designed under the leadership of the HIT industry", which is to say, poorly.

I commented on this report in my prior post "Yet Another Study Shows Health IT Does Not Bat The Ball Out of the Park; And, is HIT an Issue of States' Rights?" at this link.

These results are also in line with the 2009 National Research Council report, the highest scientific authority in the U.S. that involved Octo Barnett and other health IT pioneers. The NRC report calls current approaches to health IT "insufficient" and calls for major redesign of health IT to support clinicians' cognitive needs.

From the NRC report:

Most importantly, current health care IT systems offer little cognitive support; clinicians spend a great deal of time sifting through large amounts of raw data (such as lab and other test results) and integrating it with their medical knowledge to form a whole picture of the patient. Many care providers told the committee that data entered into their IT systems was used mainly to comply with regulations or to defend against lawsuits, rather than to improve care. As a result, valuable time and energy is spent managing data as opposed to understanding the patient.

And this was from the country's most advanced centers in terms of healthcare IT.

As to cost savings, there's the Nov. 2009 “Hospital Computing and the Costs and Quality of Care: A National Study” (Amer J Med 123:1; 40-46) by Himmelstein and Woolhandler at Harvard Medical School, that also concluded “as currently implemented, hospital computing might [very] modestly improve process measures of quality but not administrative or overall costs."

There's also the June 2009 Wharton School of Business article "Information Technology: Not a Cure for the High Cost of Health Care" that I wrote about at this HC Renewal post.

Typical of the recalcitrant, recidivist IT industry, Lieber goes on to blame doctors:

"... there is a resistance on the part of some to recognize the professional clinical advantage that these systems give them, many default to 'This is designed for billing, not clinical outcomes.'"

Never does he consider that doctors might have good reasons to avoid the technology - as in, to protect the lives of the patients in their trust. (When they see user-hostile HIT products from major vendors such as these, who can blame them?)

He then waves off "glitches" - the kind that result in untold clinician inconvenience and disruption, and have resulted in an unknown but "tip of the iceberg" rate of patient injury and death per the FDA - by stating that:

"There is a range of systems out there, just as in any kind of product line, ranging from poor to mediocre to excellent."

His merchant computing, card tabulator/data processing mindset reveals itself in this statement. Unfortunately, health IT, as in other medical devices, IS NOT JUST ANY KIND OF PRODUCT LINE. Malfunctions and poor design do not simply cause a truckload of candy bars to be delivered to the wrong merchant.

As in pharma and other medical devices, when trade group leaders of the HIT medical device companies are unaware of current research, dismiss it, and blame end users, or simply are liars, that industry deserves serious academic and governmental scrutiny.

-- SS

CCHIT Has Company

It appears CCHIT, an offspring of the large HIT trade association HIMSS, won't get its wish for Health IT Certification hegemony. I think the outcome of a multidisciplinary HIT policy workgroup's deliberations on this issue reasonable:

Aug. 17, 2009

iHealthBeat.org

Policy Committee OKs Plan To Establish Multiple EHR Certifiers

On Friday, the [HHS] Health IT Policy Committee adopted recommendations that called for multiple entities to certify electronic health record systems, Health Data Management reports.

The committee's certification and adoption work group issued the recommendations (Goedert [1], Health Data Management , 8/14).

To receive official certification, EHR systems must meet a minimum set of criteria and achieve the "meaningful use" objectives of the federal economic stimulus package. Under the stimulus law, health care providers who demonstrate meaningful use of EHRs will receive Medicare and Medicaid incentive payments (O'Harrow, Washington Post , 8/15).

Recommendations

The work group recommended that:

* Certification criteria allow for open-source software;
* Certification processes should let health care organizations qualify for EHR subsidies under Stark Law exceptions that allow organizations to subsidize the cost of EHRs for physicians;
* Certification should last for four years;
* Multiple groups perform HHS certification under a single set of criteria;
* The National Institute for Standards and Technology should participate in accreditation and certification decisions;
* The Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT should define certification criteria;
* ONC should create an accreditation process for certification groups;
* Officials develop alternative certification processes for self-developed software; and
* Vendors are required to receive certification from only one group ( Health Data Management , 8/14).

The work group said it envisions the establishment of 10 to 12 different EHR certification groups, in addition to the Certification Commission for Health IT (Manos, Healthcare IT News , 8/14).

The recommendations now go to HHS for consideration ( Health Data Management, 8/14).

The workgroup said CCHIT is too closely aligned with the health IT industry, noted that the industry trade group HIMSS helped found CCHIT, and noted that CCHIT's members includes several people with ties to HIMSS and health IT companies. They were clearly uncomfortable with the potential conflicts of interest, especially if CCHIT gained sole responsibility for HIT "certification." [A term I put in quotes since it really is "features qualification" at this point, not certification such as a physician receives after passing Specialty Boards - ed.]

Having been on the receiving end of CCHIT bullying myself ("Open letter to Mark Leavitt, Chairman, Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Technology on Penalties For Use of Non-Certified HIT"), it's clear most Americans don't like bullies, especially bullying from powerful lobbying organizations such as HIMSS and its progeny. (It's also become clear they don't like 1000+ page healthcare reform plans shoved, unread, down their throats by political bullies.)

By the way, since the July 21, 2009 publication of my JAMA letter "Health Care Information Technology, Hospital Responsibilities, and Joint Commission Standards" and Koppel and Kreda's reply, pointing out the terrible situation that HIT "defects nondisclosure" and "hold harmless" clauses create for hospital executives, physicians and patients, I have heard from the Joint Commission, but not from HIMSS.

Perhaps HIMSS leadership believes I have nothing worthy to add to the discussion. (Perhaps another 'Open Letter' is called for.)

-- SS

HIMSS: Hospital CIO's Should Not Only Manage Healthcare IT, But Also Biomedical Engineering

I have written in the past about the territoriality of the IT department in hospitals, observing that the departments I was exposed to seemed more political than the clinical departments themselves. This territoriality came at the expense of clinicians' and patients' best interests.

This phenomenon seems to go beyond the confines of the hospital IT shop, perhaps as a manifestation of the IT culture. For example:

Other have observed - unapprovingly so - how the health IT trade group HIMSS, via a massive lobbying effort and via its offspring, the CCHIT, has sought to gain hegemony over health IT through a "certification" process, a service for which CCHIT desires to be the sole provider.

It's become worse. Now control over biomedical instrumentation (which includes such safety critical devices as ventilators, cardiac and other physiologic monitors, heart-lung machines, radiological devices, etc.) is sought.

In the June 2009 HIMSS analytics report "Devices in Hospitals" (link to PDF):

Page 7:

... It appears that the IS department [a.k.a. IT department, or Management Information Systems department - ed.] is becoming the key support department for interfaced intelligent medical devices. This is a natural extension as IS departments build and support a cadre of interfaces to improve the collection and use of data within the hospital.

Then at the end of the report, in the Conclusion, a leap of logic of gargantuan proportions:

What is less clear at this time is whether the biomedical operations will be placed under the IS department for management. We believe that it should be , ala the movement of responsibility for telecommunications to the CIO when telecommunications and information technologies merged in the last 15 years .

Au contraire ... it is very clear to those who know what they're doing that this is a very bad analogy and suggests HIMSS does not understand the vast differences between the discipline and functions of biomedical engineering, versus the IT department role of management of computer and other ICT's (information and communications technologies). I find this astonishing.

Having done a clerkship in biomedical engineering in medical school, and being somewhat knowledgeable about electronics as an FCC-licensed radio amateur at the Extra class (highest certification attainable by a series of FCC examinations), I find the HIMSS Analytics position risible and dangerous. It suggests a desire to expand territory even further into an area for which CIO's and hospital IT personnel are even less qualified - indeed, far less qualified - than clinical IT.

Apparently, CCHIT wants to have hegemony over "certification" of clinical IT, and the parent organization HIMSS through its research arm opines IT should also take over "medical devices" (while still excluding clinical IT from that categorization to avoid regulation, of course).

As I first asked over ten years ago after observing IT personnel in hospitals :

Who, exactly, are the IT personnel in hospitals, and what, exactly, in their backgrounds qualifies them for major involvement in clinical affairs, let alone leadership roles regarding safety-critical clinical devices?

Perhaps the Joint Commission, FDA, and other regulators need to start asking the same question.

-- SS

On the Pitfalls of Going Electronic: Should Physicians Reject Hospital EMRs?

Yes, I believe they should, and with a spine, especially when they're lousy and their design and implementation have been led by people with superficial "certification" and/or no clinical credentials whatsoever. And sometimes no discernible IT credentials, either, unless you consider the "school of hard knocks" a credential.

(More on the credentials issue below. Also see my website "Common Examples of Healthcare IT Difficulties" for more on these issues.)

A viewpoint article was just published in the NEJM by Harvard physicians Pamela Hartzband, M.D. and Jerome Groopman, M.D. entitled "Off the Record — Avoiding the Pitfalls of Going Electronic" (NEJM 358:1656-1658, April 17, 2008).

The authors note:

... The ultimate goal of the electronic medical record — a technological solution being championed by the Bush administration, the presidential candidates, and New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, as well as Google, Microsoft, and many insurance companies — is to make all patient information immediately accessible and easily transferable and to allow its essential elements to be held by both physician and patient. The history, physical exam findings, medications, laboratory
results, and all physicians' opinions will be collected in one place and available at a single keystroke. And there is no doubt that these records offer many benefits. We worry, however, that they are being touted as a panacea for nearly all the ills of modern medicine. Before blindly embracing electronic records, we should consider their current limitations and potential downsides.

As we have increasingly used electronic medical records in our hospital and received them from other institutions, we've noticed several serious problems with the way in which notes and letters are crafted. Many times, physicians have clearly cut and pasted large blocks of text, or even complete notes, from other physicians; we have seen portions of our own notes inserted verbatim into another doctor's note. This is, in essence, a form of clinical plagiarism with potentially deleterious consequences for the patient.

Residents, rushing to complete numerous tasks for large numbers of patients, have sometimes pasted in the medical history and the history of the present illness from someone else's note even before the patient arrives at the clinic. Efficient? Yes. Useful? No. This capacity to manipulate the electronic record makes it far too easy for trainees to avoid taking their own histories and coming to their own conclusions about what might be wrong. Senior physicians also cut and paste from their own notes, filling each note with the identical medical history, family history, social history, and review of systems. Though it may be appropriate to repeat certain information, often the primary motivation for such blanket copying is to pass scrutiny for billing. Unfortunately, these kinds of repetitive notes dull the reader, hiding the important new data.

Writing in a personal and independent way forces us to think and formulate our ideas. Notes that are meant to be focused and selective have become voluminous and templated, distracting from the key cognitive work of providing care. Such charts may satisfy the demands of third-party payers, but they are the product of a word processor, not of physicians' thoughtful review and analysis. They may be "efficient" for the purpose of documentation but not for creative clinical thinking.

In effect, the doctors have keenly observed that not only do EMR's impair documentation and thinking by seasoned professionals, especially those pressed for time, but the use of these technologies impairs the training of the next generation of physicians. I benefited much through learning how to properly document medical observations, findings, differential diagnoses, treatment plans, and other high level cognitive processes. IT designed by non clinicians with the maintenance of payor profit as a principal motivator may be, in effect, causing a further dilution in the quality of medical training. Social informatics predicts such unexpected adverse outcomes of any new information and communications technology (ICT).

However, the current environment of irrational exuberance over Health IT, as well as the potential for capital transfer from the healthcare to the IT and payer sectors and the motivators and conflicts this generates among hospital management, consultants, regulators and others, has had a marked blinding effect.

The NEJM authors also note:

Similarly, electronic medical records can reproduce all of a patient's laboratory results, often dropping them in automatically. There is no selectivity, because it takes human effort to wade through all the data and isolate the information that is pertinent to the patient's current problems. Although the intent may be to ensure thoroughness, in the new electronic sea of results, it becomes difficult to find those that are truly relevant.

A colleague at a major cancer center that recently switched to electronic medical records said that chart review during rounds has become nearly worthless. He bemoaned the vain search through meaningless repetition in multiple notes for the single line that represented a new development. "It's like `Where's Waldo?'" he said bitterly. Ironically, he has started to handwrite a list of new developments on index cards so that he can refer to them at the bedside.

...The worst kind of electronic medical record requires filling in boxes with little room for free text. Although completing such templates may help physicians survive a report-card review, it directs them to ask restrictive questions rather than engaging in a narrative-based, open-ended dialogue. Such dialogue can be key to making the correct diagnosis and to understanding which treatment best fits a patient's beliefs and needs.

... These problems, we believe, will only worsen, for even as we are pressed to see more patients per hour and to work with greater "efficiency," we must respond to demands for detailed documentation to justify our billing and protect ourselves from lawsuits. Though the electronic medical record serves these exigencies, it simultaneously risks compromising care by fostering a generic approach to diagnosis and treatment.

I agree with these assessments, especially for hospital based enterprise EMR's forced on doctors by management.

Physician leadership of HIT projects would be of great benefit. However, here's what typical healthcare organizational leaders have to say about physician leadership of HIT initiatives, in this case Denis Baker, the CIO of Sarasota Memorial Hospital, a major medical center on the Gulf Coast of Florida in an interview here:

I think that physicians bring a certain aspect to the job, but I don’t think they necessarily know how a hospital works. I think they know how their practice works and how they interact with the hospital, but I don’t think they absolutely know what nursing does, or any of the ancillary departments, and what they do.

Worse, as far as I can tell, the CIO making that statement appears to lack formal education in medicine, information systems, information technology and biomedical information science i.e., informatics. (I was unable to find any such credentials but will correct this if mistaken.)

Stereotypes of physicians do not come any more patronizing than that.

Oh, wait ... yes they do.

His statement is little different than a decade ago when I wrote this essay about stereotypes and observed others in influential positions holding marginalizing views of physicians - and indeed of professional education of any kind:

Several healthcare MIS Recruitment firms have published interesting views on healthcare MIS leadership, views that most clinicians will not identify with. " I don't think a degree gets you anything ," says healthcare recruiter Lion Goodman, president of the Goodman Group in San Rafael, California about CIO's and other healthcare MIS staffers.

Healthcare MIS recruiter Betsy Hersher of Hersher Associates , Northbrook, Illinois, agreed, stating " There's nothing like the school of Hard Knocks ." (Who's Growing CIO's, Healthcare Informatics, Nov. 1998, p. 88).

In seeking out CIO talent, recruiter Lion Goodman " doesn't think clinical experience yields [hospital] IT people who have broad enough perspective . Physicians in particular make poor choices for CIOs. They don't think of the business issues at hand because they're consumed with patient care issues ," according to Goodman.

It appears there's been little change in ten years.

Oh, wait ... yes there has been "change."

"Specialists" and "managers" in HIT projects now undergo certification by vendor-centric groups such as the Health Information Management Systems Society HIMSS.

Here's a description of the value of certication as a HIMSS Certified Professional in Healthcare Information and Management Systems (CPHIMS):

CPHIMS status provides both internal and external rewards. As a Certified Professional in Healthcare Information and Management Systems, you:

• Distinguish yourself from your peers as certified in healthcare information and management systems;
• Expand your career opportunities;
• Signal that you have mastered proven, broad-based concepts through successful completion of the Certified Professional in Healthcare Information and Management Systems Examination;
• Provide yourself with skills and tools to help you make a difference in your career, your organization, and your community;
• Enjoy the pride of recognition of knowing that you are among the elite in a critical field of healthcare; and
• Have a premier credential based on a sound assessment to distinguish yourself in an increasingly competitive marketplace.

Wow! "You are among the elite" after taking this exam!

Here are the eligibility standards:

Baccalaureate degree plus five (5) years of associated information and management systems experience*, three (3) of those years in healthcare.

Graduate degree plus three (3) years of associated information and management systems experience*, two (2) of those years in healthcare.

*Associated information and management systems experience includes experience in the following functional areas: administration/management, clinical information systems, e-health, information systems, or management engineering.

And now, the certification instrument:

The CPHIMS credential is awarded to individuals who demonstrate eligibility for the Certification Program and who successfully complete a qualifying examination. The examination consists of 115 multiple-choice test items, presented during a 2-hour session. Scoring is based on 100 items pre-selected for desirable psychometric characteristics. The additional 15 test items are included as pretest items. Performance on pretest items does not affect a candidate’s score.

That is the certification that will be used to hire more "experts" in HIT.

This is pathetic. My exams to become a licensed ham radio operator were more challenging. I consider such a credential unmeritorious at best, fraudulent at worst. (I haven't even inquired as to costs.)

However, medical credentialing exams are just a bit more thorough.

By several orders of magnitude, that is.

In conclusion, medicine is in very sad shape when in an era of out of control technology costs ($100 million for an EMR?), unclear benefit and irrational exuberance over HIT it's demanded of physicians that they use tools designed by business IT personnel, processes and methodologies best known for failure, produced by an industry rife with conflicts, whose leaders often lack substantive credentials, patronize those who do, produce ill-conceived and/or shoddy products whose use is mandated by non-clinician hospital managers and that as the NEJM writers note, impair medical practice and education.

-- SS