The fall season is upon us and the markets are filled with advertising for Halloween, so our thoughts naturally turn to the recent stories of ghostwriting in medical journals. Here is a lighthearted take on that topic. This parody began on Margaret Soltan’s blog a few days ago, and it has just kept growing.
GHOSTING MATILDA
Once a jolly bagman signed on to some articles.
Corporate ghosts even promised him a fee.
And he sang as he watched and waited till they were in print,
These will be grand right up there on my CV.
Ghosting Matilda, ghosting Matilda,
Who’ll come a-ghosting Matilda with me?
And he sang as he watched and waited till they were in print,
These will be grand right up there on my CV.
This month it’s Janssen, next it’s Bristol-Myers Squibb.
Wyeth and Lilly soon might want to talk to me.
Novartis might sign me up, also AstraZeneca ─
Soon I’ll be famous like that guy at Emory.
Ghosting Matilda, ghosting Matilda,
Who’ll come a-ghosting Matilda with me?
Novartis might sign me up, also AstraZeneca ─
Soon I’ll be famous like that guy at Emory.
Up came an editor, looking for the telltale signs.
Ghost writing’s hard to cover up, you see.
And he found them in the documents: metadata do not lie ─
Bagman just sold his name and passed these off on me.
Ghosting Matilda, ghosting Matilda,
Who’ll come a-ghosting Matilda with me?
And he found them in the documents: metadata do not lie ─
Bagman just sold his name and passed these off on me.
Up jumped the bagman, pointing fingers right and left,
You’ll never prove that I lied, said he.
I will say that underlings failed to send disclosure forms;
Let them be blamed instead, while I get off scot-free.
Ghosting Matilda, ghosting Matilda,
Who’ll come a-ghosting Matilda with me?
I will say that underlings failed to send disclosure forms;
Let them be blamed instead, while I get off scot-free.
Out! said the editor, you’re now persona non grata.
So, too, the Dean and the Provost agreed.
Bagman’s ghost may be heard now, sighing in the library ─
Could have been grand right up there on my CV.
Ghosting Matilda, ghosting Matilda,
Who’ll come a-ghosting Matilda with me?
Bagman’s ghost may be heard now, sighing in the library ─
Could have been grand right up there on my CV.
Showing posts with label Bernard Carroll. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bernard Carroll. Show all posts
Friday, September 25, 2009
Saturday, July 18, 2009
STOSSEL and ACRE: WHERE'S the BEEF?
STOSSEL and ACRE – WHERE’S the BEEF?
Thomas Stossel from Harvard is at it again. As Daniel Carlat has humorously described, Stossel is planning the inaugural meeting next week of a group to counter those he calls pharmascolds. The group is named ACRE – Association of Clinical Researchers and Educators. Here is its website: http://www.acreonline.org/ For months, Stossel has been warning of the dire negative consequences that will result from tightened conflict of interest policies, but he has not presented any persuasive examples of damage to “productive relationships between industry and physicians involved in clinical research and educational outreach.” At the same time, Dr. Stossel has conveniently overlooked the shenanigans of the bad actors whom Senator Grassley exposed. Dr. Stossel is a blowhard, as I have described here before.
But wait! ACRE has found something! A News item in the July 2009 issue of Nature Medicine (“Conflict of interest rules seen by some as too stringent”) quoted one of the participants in the upcoming ACRE conference. Avi Markowitz, chief of oncology at UT Medical Branch, Galveston, came up with this example: Patients taking a Sanofi Aventis chemotherapy product may experience peripheral neuropathy, which can cause unpleasant sensations in the hands and feet. ‘Sanofi Aventis had been providing Markowitz and his UTMB colleagues with free blankets and gloves for those patients. Last fall, however, the university adopted stricter rules banning industry freebies. Now, Markowitz can’t even accept the unbranded blankets and gloves that Sanofi Aventis has offered to provide.’ Reading between the lines, it is a good bet that these items originally were branded.
Whatever. And never mind that the patients receiving chemotherapy at UTMB are doubtless billed a hefty facility fee that must include comfort items like blankets and gloves. Since when does a chief of oncology need to beg for these basic patient care provisions from drug companies?
Is this all that ACRE can come up with? The ACRE homepage warned sternly of “restrictive conflict of interest policies that often sever productive relationships between industry and physicians involved in clinical research and educational outreach.” Does Thomas Stossel’s whining and catastrophizing through ACRE come down to piffling items like blankets and gloves for chemotherapy patients? That’s it? Where’s the beef?
At least ACRE has the good sense not to include on its program the smooth operators whom Senator Grassley outed – like Nemeroff at Emory, Schatzberg at Stanford, Kuklo at Walter Reed, Keller at Brown, Biederman at Harvard. Not even Stossel has been brazen enough to try to defend them.
The Nature Medicine News item does close on a helpful note: 'Stossel would like to see abuses involving financial conflicts of interest treated more like cases of scientific misconduct. Rather than forcing everyone to abide by prohibitive rules, he says administrators should focus on weeding out those who misbehave.' I say Amen to that, even if it is a day late and a dollar short.
We have arrived at our present state of discomfiture because the leaders of academic institutions and professional societies looked the other way for too long. They failed to do their job of reining in the ethical outliers. Grassley had to do it for them. As a result, the rest of us will be burdened with new regulations for years to come. Those who did speak up years ago were ignored or demonized. As the saying goes, every group gets the leadership it deserves. Those in academic medicine had better not count on Stossel and ACRE to lead them out of the wilderness.
Bernard Carroll.
Thomas Stossel from Harvard is at it again. As Daniel Carlat has humorously described, Stossel is planning the inaugural meeting next week of a group to counter those he calls pharmascolds. The group is named ACRE – Association of Clinical Researchers and Educators. Here is its website: http://www.acreonline.org/ For months, Stossel has been warning of the dire negative consequences that will result from tightened conflict of interest policies, but he has not presented any persuasive examples of damage to “productive relationships between industry and physicians involved in clinical research and educational outreach.” At the same time, Dr. Stossel has conveniently overlooked the shenanigans of the bad actors whom Senator Grassley exposed. Dr. Stossel is a blowhard, as I have described here before.
But wait! ACRE has found something! A News item in the July 2009 issue of Nature Medicine (“Conflict of interest rules seen by some as too stringent”) quoted one of the participants in the upcoming ACRE conference. Avi Markowitz, chief of oncology at UT Medical Branch, Galveston, came up with this example: Patients taking a Sanofi Aventis chemotherapy product may experience peripheral neuropathy, which can cause unpleasant sensations in the hands and feet. ‘Sanofi Aventis had been providing Markowitz and his UTMB colleagues with free blankets and gloves for those patients. Last fall, however, the university adopted stricter rules banning industry freebies. Now, Markowitz can’t even accept the unbranded blankets and gloves that Sanofi Aventis has offered to provide.’ Reading between the lines, it is a good bet that these items originally were branded.
Whatever. And never mind that the patients receiving chemotherapy at UTMB are doubtless billed a hefty facility fee that must include comfort items like blankets and gloves. Since when does a chief of oncology need to beg for these basic patient care provisions from drug companies?
Is this all that ACRE can come up with? The ACRE homepage warned sternly of “restrictive conflict of interest policies that often sever productive relationships between industry and physicians involved in clinical research and educational outreach.” Does Thomas Stossel’s whining and catastrophizing through ACRE come down to piffling items like blankets and gloves for chemotherapy patients? That’s it? Where’s the beef?
At least ACRE has the good sense not to include on its program the smooth operators whom Senator Grassley outed – like Nemeroff at Emory, Schatzberg at Stanford, Kuklo at Walter Reed, Keller at Brown, Biederman at Harvard. Not even Stossel has been brazen enough to try to defend them.
The Nature Medicine News item does close on a helpful note: 'Stossel would like to see abuses involving financial conflicts of interest treated more like cases of scientific misconduct. Rather than forcing everyone to abide by prohibitive rules, he says administrators should focus on weeding out those who misbehave.' I say Amen to that, even if it is a day late and a dollar short.
We have arrived at our present state of discomfiture because the leaders of academic institutions and professional societies looked the other way for too long. They failed to do their job of reining in the ethical outliers. Grassley had to do it for them. As a result, the rest of us will be burdened with new regulations for years to come. Those who did speak up years ago were ignored or demonized. As the saying goes, every group gets the leadership it deserves. Those in academic medicine had better not count on Stossel and ACRE to lead them out of the wilderness.
Bernard Carroll.
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
INSTITUTE of MEDICINE REPORT on CONFLICT of INTEREST
INSTITUTE of MEDICINE REPORT on CONFLICT of INTEREST
Today we saw a new marker laid down in the arena called Conflict of Interest (COI). The Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences issued a report of its Committee on Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education and Practice. The report is comprehensive, even exhaustive, running to 353 pages. Gardner Harris in the New York Times today calls it “scolding,” “stinging,” and “damning.” The recommendations go well beyond any proposed in the recent past by medical schools or by other professional organizations. The NYT quoted David Rothman, president of the Institute on Medicine as a Profession at Columbia University: “With the I.O.M.’s endorsement, issues that were once controversial now are indisputable. Conflicts of interest in medicine are no longer acceptable.”
It will take some time for the field to digest the scope of the IOM recommendations. It will take even longer for the new standards to be implemented. For now, I offer just a few observations.
First, if the IOM hopes for maximum credibility then it might ought want to do some housecleaning. A few years ago I fired a shot across the bow of the IOM concerning COI. [Can the Institute of Medicine Review the FDA? Nature Medicine 11, 369 (1 April 2005) doi:10.1038/nm0405-369] Nothing much changed, and in the following years, national scandals erupted involving several of the issues I had highlighted. Prominent IOM members, who were well known to be poster boys for COI, were exposed by Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa). Their embarrassing behaviors included incomplete financial disclosures and noncompliance with NIH policy on financial conflict of interest. The exposés included Emory’s Charles Nemeroff and Stanford’s Alan Schatzberg. In both cases, administrative rearrangements have now been implemented. The case of Dr. Nemeroff has been referred by Senator Grassley to the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services. It is perhaps no accident that Dean Claudia Adkison of Emory and Dean Philip Pizzo of Stanford were included as external reviewers of the draft IOM report. Their insights would have been invaluable.
Another ongoing embarrassment for the IOM is Lester Crawford. He was the FDA Commissioner who resigned abruptly in 2005 and later pleaded guilty to criminal conflict of interest. He had been charged with falsely reporting information about his stock holdings in companies he was in charge of regulating. He received a sentence of three years of supervised probation and a fine of about $90,000. He is now senior counsel with a health care lobbying firm in Washington, DC. The Institute of Medicine does not help its image by continuing the membership of such a compromised individual.
As the Emory-Nemeroff and Stanford-Schatzberg cases unfolded it appeared that the respective institutions had themselves contributed to the problems, either through inaction or through studiously nontransparent procedures on disclosure. Stanford, for instance, apparently did not require faculty members to report the proceeds of stock sales, and when challenged the university invoked on-line financial reporting services and SEC filings as a sufficient substitute. Not surprisingly, because Stanford didn’t know about Dr. Schatzberg’s realized gain of some $109,000 from sale of founder’s stock in his biotech start-up company, Corcept Therapeutics, this information was not reported to NIH.
Recommendation 4.1 One of the IOM’s recommendations applies particularly to the Stanford-Schatzberg case. Recommendation 4.1 addresses the boundary between academia and commerce in the case of research involving human subjects. Here is the specific language:
“Academic medical centers and other research institutions should establish a policy that individuals generally may not conduct research with human participants if they have a significant financial interest in an existing or potential product or a company that could be affected by the outcome of the research. Exceptions to the policy should be made public and should be permitted only if the conflict of interest committee (a) determines that an individual’s participation is essential for the conduct of the research and (b) establishes an effective mechanism for managing the conflict and protecting the integrity of the research…” (page S-14).
Last year I posted several times about this issue in the Stanford-Schatzberg case. It is gratifying now to see the IOM affirm the importance of the boundary. The activities declared off-limits by the IOM include not only “recruiting subjects; obtaining informed consent; assessing the clinical end points;” but also “analyzing data; or writing the results, conclusions, and abstracts for publications reporting the findings of the study.” (page 4-17). In Stanford’s earlier plan for managing the conflict and protecting the integrity of the research, Dr. Schatzberg was free to engage in the latter group of activities. Indeed, his hands were all over the project when it came to responding to scientific critiques, managing the climate of professional opinion, attacking and threatening critics, promoting his company’s interest through review articles and press releases, slipping unpublished and non-peer-reviewed commercial data into academic reviews, and generally conducting commercially slanted public relations through academic outlets.
When Stanford adopts the IOM recommendations, such activities will be blocked. As I stated last year, “Review articles that assess a field and synthesize data form a crucial part of science that has to be off-limits to Dr. Schatzberg just as much as assessing patients in one of his clinical trials would be.”
We should congratulate the IOM committee members for their work, and we hope to see the field embrace their recommendations.
Bernard Carroll.
UPDATE 04-30-2009: The link provided earlier for the IOM report document is no longer operative. Here is where to go now for a copy of the report. This time it will cost you.
Thursday, April 2, 2009
In Defense of Psychiatric Diagnoses and Treatments
In Defense of Psychiatric Diagnoses and Treatments
The Boston Globe is out today with a story about conflicts of interest involving American Psychiatric Association guidelines for treating depression, mania, and schizophrenia – disorders for which the market in medications is said to be $25 billion annually. Conflicts abound, it seems, and the consequent implication is that industry influence has led to guidelines that “focus heavily on medications and give relatively little attention to nondrug treatments.”
The lead author of a forthcoming analysis, Lisa Cosgrove from the University of Massachusetts is quoted in the Globe as saying “…the lack of biological tests for mental disorders renders psychiatry especially vulnerable to industry influence." Maybe so, but it’s not just psychiatry. And this new study should not be taken to invalidate psychiatric diagnoses or to undermine the efficacy of psychiatric treatments.
The existence of disease is not predicated on having a biological test. It’s nice when we do have one, but there are many disorders throughout medicine, not just in psychiatry, for which there is no conclusively defining biological test. Think migraine. Think multiple sclerosis. Think chronic pain.
There is a distinguished tradition of clinical research, going back to the late 1950s, wherein disorders like depression, mania, and schizophrenia were studied for their genetic profiles, their clinically meaningful subtypes, their biological correlates, and their responses to treatments. This bottom-up approach yielded useful theories, which in turn led to better theories and to new treatments for depression, mania, and schizophrenia. Like any other branch of science, clinical science has a self-correcting function that distinguishes it from pseudo-science and propaganda. So, we welcome new theories even though most will not survive, and we welcome new diagnostic proposals and we welcome potential new treatments. All are subject to the test of independent confirmation, and nobody is surprised when many fall away.
Since around 1990 that tradition has been corrupted by Pharma and Pharma’s money. There is no shortage of examples regularly in the news. Academic key opinion leaders lost their ethical compass and, with or without a figleaf, devolved into spokespersons for industry. One is reminded of Julien Benda’s term la trahison des clercs. Instead of moving on from undistinguished and problematic new drugs, key opinion leaders work with the marketing departments of Pharma to promote and defend the brand. Remember the PsychNetters? Of course, psychiatry is not the only medical specialty corrupted in this way. Stents, anybody? Orthopedic devices, anybody?
Lost in the marketeering and propaganda since around 1990 is the discipline of clinical therapeutics. As one commentator put it, if there is no way to confirm biologically the existence of disease, then “…we cannot confirm with much confidence that this or that treatment treats mental disease.” It actually is possible to identify effective treatments for mental disease. We did it with lithium. We did it with the early antidepressant drugs. And we did it with the early antipsychotic drugs. There was room for improvement in all of these, but make no mistake – they were dramatic positive developments. Most of the work in the past 20 years, however, put marketing first and clinical therapeutics second. Humbug aside, the goal was not to improve the management of depression or mania or schizophrenia but to jump whatever bar the FDA was setting in order to get a product on the market. Indeed, the really hard clinical research issues were studiously avoided. Along the way, the clinical research enterprise became dominated by academic and for-profit contract research organizations in which, to put it gently, standards of recruitment of patients apparently suffered, so that response rates in placebo-treated patients skyrocketed. As a result, proving that a drug does work became harder, and the overall drug advantage over placebo in treating depression came into serious question. In effect, the corruption of clinical research standards has brought us to an epistemologic quagmire about the efficacy of today’s most popular antidepressant drugs.
As for the charge that psychiatrists and primary care physicians just throw drugs at mental health problems, that is nothing new. It is a reflection of the professional pragmatism that permeates medical practice. Think back to the 1950s when the new wonder drugs called antibiotics were handed out like Pez, mostly for people who did not really need them and who would not benefit from them. The working principle was misguided simplicity and pragmatism, which minimized and discounted the risks. Even today the over-use of antibiotics remains a public health concern. Just as in the 1950s patients with nonspecific upper respiratory symptoms were “given the benefit of the doubt” and were prescribed an antibiotic on the reasoning that it might help them while probably not hurting them, so today patients with nondescript depressive or anxiety symptoms are prescribed an SSRI drug on the same reasoning. The cost of this approach in wasted money, in unnecessary side effects, and in unproductive clinical management is non-trivial.
So, the issues are more nuanced than today’s Boston Globe story would suggest. For good and for ill, psychiatry is not so very different from the rest of medicine. Corruption and compromise respect no subspecialty boundaries. We can have reliable and valid knowledge of disease without a biological test. We can show efficacy of treatments for disorders that lack a biological test. But when simplistic pragmatism and cutting corners dominate in therapeutics and in clinical trials, then we are in trouble.
The Boston Globe is out today with a story about conflicts of interest involving American Psychiatric Association guidelines for treating depression, mania, and schizophrenia – disorders for which the market in medications is said to be $25 billion annually. Conflicts abound, it seems, and the consequent implication is that industry influence has led to guidelines that “focus heavily on medications and give relatively little attention to nondrug treatments.”
The lead author of a forthcoming analysis, Lisa Cosgrove from the University of Massachusetts is quoted in the Globe as saying “…the lack of biological tests for mental disorders renders psychiatry especially vulnerable to industry influence." Maybe so, but it’s not just psychiatry. And this new study should not be taken to invalidate psychiatric diagnoses or to undermine the efficacy of psychiatric treatments.
The existence of disease is not predicated on having a biological test. It’s nice when we do have one, but there are many disorders throughout medicine, not just in psychiatry, for which there is no conclusively defining biological test. Think migraine. Think multiple sclerosis. Think chronic pain.
There is a distinguished tradition of clinical research, going back to the late 1950s, wherein disorders like depression, mania, and schizophrenia were studied for their genetic profiles, their clinically meaningful subtypes, their biological correlates, and their responses to treatments. This bottom-up approach yielded useful theories, which in turn led to better theories and to new treatments for depression, mania, and schizophrenia. Like any other branch of science, clinical science has a self-correcting function that distinguishes it from pseudo-science and propaganda. So, we welcome new theories even though most will not survive, and we welcome new diagnostic proposals and we welcome potential new treatments. All are subject to the test of independent confirmation, and nobody is surprised when many fall away.
Since around 1990 that tradition has been corrupted by Pharma and Pharma’s money. There is no shortage of examples regularly in the news. Academic key opinion leaders lost their ethical compass and, with or without a figleaf, devolved into spokespersons for industry. One is reminded of Julien Benda’s term la trahison des clercs. Instead of moving on from undistinguished and problematic new drugs, key opinion leaders work with the marketing departments of Pharma to promote and defend the brand. Remember the PsychNetters? Of course, psychiatry is not the only medical specialty corrupted in this way. Stents, anybody? Orthopedic devices, anybody?
Lost in the marketeering and propaganda since around 1990 is the discipline of clinical therapeutics. As one commentator put it, if there is no way to confirm biologically the existence of disease, then “…we cannot confirm with much confidence that this or that treatment treats mental disease.” It actually is possible to identify effective treatments for mental disease. We did it with lithium. We did it with the early antidepressant drugs. And we did it with the early antipsychotic drugs. There was room for improvement in all of these, but make no mistake – they were dramatic positive developments. Most of the work in the past 20 years, however, put marketing first and clinical therapeutics second. Humbug aside, the goal was not to improve the management of depression or mania or schizophrenia but to jump whatever bar the FDA was setting in order to get a product on the market. Indeed, the really hard clinical research issues were studiously avoided. Along the way, the clinical research enterprise became dominated by academic and for-profit contract research organizations in which, to put it gently, standards of recruitment of patients apparently suffered, so that response rates in placebo-treated patients skyrocketed. As a result, proving that a drug does work became harder, and the overall drug advantage over placebo in treating depression came into serious question. In effect, the corruption of clinical research standards has brought us to an epistemologic quagmire about the efficacy of today’s most popular antidepressant drugs.
As for the charge that psychiatrists and primary care physicians just throw drugs at mental health problems, that is nothing new. It is a reflection of the professional pragmatism that permeates medical practice. Think back to the 1950s when the new wonder drugs called antibiotics were handed out like Pez, mostly for people who did not really need them and who would not benefit from them. The working principle was misguided simplicity and pragmatism, which minimized and discounted the risks. Even today the over-use of antibiotics remains a public health concern. Just as in the 1950s patients with nonspecific upper respiratory symptoms were “given the benefit of the doubt” and were prescribed an antibiotic on the reasoning that it might help them while probably not hurting them, so today patients with nondescript depressive or anxiety symptoms are prescribed an SSRI drug on the same reasoning. The cost of this approach in wasted money, in unnecessary side effects, and in unproductive clinical management is non-trivial.
So, the issues are more nuanced than today’s Boston Globe story would suggest. For good and for ill, psychiatry is not so very different from the rest of medicine. Corruption and compromise respect no subspecialty boundaries. We can have reliable and valid knowledge of disease without a biological test. We can show efficacy of treatments for disorders that lack a biological test. But when simplistic pragmatism and cutting corners dominate in therapeutics and in clinical trials, then we are in trouble.
Monday, January 12, 2009
THE ACADEMIC-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
THE ACADEMIC-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
As we approach a new presidential inauguration, a look back to 1961 is instructive for those concerned with the interface between academic medicine and industry. Here are the words of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, as he left the office of the presidency. He warned of the military-industrial complex:
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes.
Eisenhower’s basic insight was that national security is paradoxically threatened by an unchecked military-industrial complex because both partners commit to flawed paradigms out of misguided self-interest and perverse incentives.
Eisenhower went on to critique the academic-government complex in similar terms:
… research has become … more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.
… the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity…
The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded.
President Eisenhower’s prescience in 1961 has been confirmed. The dependence of universities and academic medical centers on federal funding is now a fact of life. In 2009 we see another variant on Eisenhower’s theme – the entry of for-profit corporations into academic medicine – with much the same dangers. Today the danger is that innovation is paradoxically retarded because both partners commit to flawed paradigms out of misguided self-interest and perverse incentives. As with federal funding, there has been no shortage of academic physicians to embrace the new stream of money from industry.
So, the dramas that have played out lately involving academic key opinion leaders compromised by their coziness with industry have good precedents. We could do worse than to remember President Eisenhower’s insights and warnings: human nature has not changed – only the players are different. Across at our neighbor ClinPsych is a fine summary of specific examples of these principles.
Bernard Carroll
Monday, November 3, 2008
MISSING in ACTION on MEDSCAPE
MISSING in ACTION on MEDSCAPE
Charles Nemeroff has been in the news lately, under investigation by Senator Grassley for allegedly violating NIH regulations on conflict of interest and disclosure. The fallout to date includes his severance from several NIH-funded projects at Emory University School of Medicine, a freeze of NIH funding for a major center grant, and his stepping down from Emory’s chair of psychiatry while an internal investigation proceeds. Some amazing documents were released by the Senator. Among other surprises, they contained a scathing critique of a Nemeroff publication by Emory’s Dean Claudia Adkison, and evidence that Dr. Nemeroff tried to get himself off the hook within Emory by smearing third parties and blaming them for harassment. Now that these internal documents have been released by the Senate Committee on Finance and then appeared in The New York Times, Dr. Nemeroff will have even more explaining to do.
The word is finally out. Dr. Nemeroff’s credibility is under a cloud, to say the least, and his influence is rapidly waning. After all, who wants to be associated with a suspect and a loser? In the hardnosed, commercial world of Continuing Medical Education, for instance, the signs are that Dr. Nemeroff is toast. Whereas he once coordinated multi-city traveling CME road shows and a parade of spots on CME websites like Medscape, his profile now is suffering. Go to this Medscape website, for instance. You will find that his current Expert Viewpoint spots are missing, replaced by the message, “This article is temporarily unavailable.”
Well, good for Medscape. They came in for their share of criticism, here and here, a while back. Now they deserve credit for displaying ethical standards. Meanwhile, we are waiting for another company called CME Outfitters to get the message. Dr. Nemeroff is slated to moderate a raft of new programs for this company in the coming weeks, sponsored by corporations like Pfizer, AstraZeneca, and Ortho-McNeil Janssen. CME Outfitters' logo, after all, is Education with Integrity. Sooner or later the pharmaceutical corporations, like the CME companies, will understand that they are not helping themselves by trotting out a shopworn and sleazy KOL figurehead like Nemeroff for their marketing efforts. And other KOLs who up to now were willing to "wet their beaks" in these CME forums controlled by the Boss of Bosses Nemeroff will now be leery of associating with him.
The fallout continues.
Bernard Carroll
Thursday, August 14, 2008
FOLLOW the MONEY, Part II
FOLLOW the MONEY, Part II
Recently we looked at some financial aspects of the boundary between Stanford University and Corcept Therapeutics. Dr. Alan Schatzberg, the chair of Stanford’s psychiatry department, received at least $510,000 from Corcept between 2000 and 2007. Senator Grassley asked why NIH received no disclosure from Stanford of Dr. Schatzberg’s realized gain from selling Corcept stock while he was Principal Investigator on a related NIH grant. The Senator also remarked on Stanford’s lowball estimate to him of Dr. Schatzberg’s equity in Corcept, currently between $5 million and $6 million.
Dr. Schatzberg is not the only academic to benefit from Corcept. Dr. Charles Nemeroff, a member of Corcept’s scientific advisory board, also did well. He exercised options to buy 60,000 shares on joining the board in 1998. Dr. Nemeroff diligently promoted Corcept’s drug. Following the style documented for Dr. Schatzberg, Dr. Nemeroff emphasized weak positive trends in the data while suppressing inconvenient negative analyses. In the fall of 2002, Dr. Nemeroff referred to the Stanford-NIH trials as “impressive studies indicating that ... (mifepristone)...is very effective in the treatment of psychotic depression.” The claims “impressive” and “very effective” are indefensible, and may even be fraudulent. Dr. Nemeroff’s exaggerated promotion occurred while the company prepared for its IPO, but he did not disclose his financial stake. Right after the 6-month SEC-mandated lockup period expired, Dr. Nemeroff sold 20,000 shares for $137,500. His cost was $6.60. Help me, what is the right term for this behavior?
A second member of the team who did well is Dr. Joseph Belanoff, Corcept’s co-founder and CEO. Like Dr. Schatzberg, he received around 3 million shares in 1998. Dr. Belanoff began selling as soon as the lock-up period ended. Between November 2004 and November 2006, Dr. Belanoff sold approximately 10,000 Corcept shares each month, realizing over $1 million. His cost for all those shares was around $80. An on-line financial service listed 6 additional quarterly sales, each of 30,000 shares, which netted over $900,000. Dr. Belanoff also received an ample corporate salary. His documented salary increased from $310,500 plus a 10% bonus in 2003 to $1,643,760 in salary ($411,008), bonus ($102,752), and stock options ($1,130,000) in 2007. Not bad, for someone with modest academic credentials.
Stanford University itself has a financial stake. Following a licensing fee of $47,000 that was paid to Stanford in 1999 along with 30,000 shares of stock, Corcept has been obligated to make non-refundable royalty payments of $50,000 a year. That adds up to $497,000 through 2008. Additional payments up to $250,000 are due to Stanford when certain drug development milestones are reached. Stanford has stated that it long ago divested itself of the Corcept stock. However, an on-line information service lists Stanford as a major shareholder as recently as 31 March 2008, with over 47,000 shares in the name of the Board of Trustees. In a second agreement, Stanford receives a $20,000 licensing fee, 1000 shares of Corcept stock, $10,000 a year in non-refundable royalties, and potential milestone payments of $350,000. All of this is in advance of any marketing of products by Corcept. So, Stanford is not exactly a disinterested administrator of the academic-corporate boundary between Dr. Schatzberg, NIH, and Corcept.
We should also note some unusual events involving Corcept stock movements. On 15 August 2005 Corcept stock received a research broker upgrade. Heavy selling followed the upgrade (volume was 613,000 shares, 31 standard deviations above the mean for the previous 10 trading days). For non-statistician readers, 3 standard deviations would tell us that the spike is almost certainly not consistent with the historical fluctuations in volume. So, a spike of 31 standard deviations means any such probability is astronomically small. The stock price moved up 34% from the previous day but quickly sank again. That same day, Dr. Schatzberg sold 15,597 shares for $109,179, at an intra-day high of $7 per share. The cost basis of those shares to him was $5.15.
On Friday 23 September 2005, heavy selling of Corcept stock occurred (871,700 shares). This volume was 35 standard deviations above the mean of the previous 10 trading days. On the following Monday, Corcept announced that a widely publicized study of mifepristone for Alzheimer disease was being halted prematurely for lack of progress. The company also announced slower than expected enrollment in a Phase III study of psychotic depression, for which they projected delayed announcement of results. Over the next month the stock price declined 16%.
These episodes of concentrated stock movement represent coincidences that remain to be explained. Was the August 2005 upgrade and selling spike in which Dr. Schatzberg participated a case of “pump and dump”? Was the September 2005 selling spike ahead of bad news a case of insider trading? Who did all that selling, and how did they know?
The questions just keep coming.
Recently we looked at some financial aspects of the boundary between Stanford University and Corcept Therapeutics. Dr. Alan Schatzberg, the chair of Stanford’s psychiatry department, received at least $510,000 from Corcept between 2000 and 2007. Senator Grassley asked why NIH received no disclosure from Stanford of Dr. Schatzberg’s realized gain from selling Corcept stock while he was Principal Investigator on a related NIH grant. The Senator also remarked on Stanford’s lowball estimate to him of Dr. Schatzberg’s equity in Corcept, currently between $5 million and $6 million.
Dr. Schatzberg is not the only academic to benefit from Corcept. Dr. Charles Nemeroff, a member of Corcept’s scientific advisory board, also did well. He exercised options to buy 60,000 shares on joining the board in 1998. Dr. Nemeroff diligently promoted Corcept’s drug. Following the style documented for Dr. Schatzberg, Dr. Nemeroff emphasized weak positive trends in the data while suppressing inconvenient negative analyses. In the fall of 2002, Dr. Nemeroff referred to the Stanford-NIH trials as “impressive studies indicating that ... (mifepristone)...is very effective in the treatment of psychotic depression.” The claims “impressive” and “very effective” are indefensible, and may even be fraudulent. Dr. Nemeroff’s exaggerated promotion occurred while the company prepared for its IPO, but he did not disclose his financial stake. Right after the 6-month SEC-mandated lockup period expired, Dr. Nemeroff sold 20,000 shares for $137,500. His cost was $6.60. Help me, what is the right term for this behavior?
A second member of the team who did well is Dr. Joseph Belanoff, Corcept’s co-founder and CEO. Like Dr. Schatzberg, he received around 3 million shares in 1998. Dr. Belanoff began selling as soon as the lock-up period ended. Between November 2004 and November 2006, Dr. Belanoff sold approximately 10,000 Corcept shares each month, realizing over $1 million. His cost for all those shares was around $80. An on-line financial service listed 6 additional quarterly sales, each of 30,000 shares, which netted over $900,000. Dr. Belanoff also received an ample corporate salary. His documented salary increased from $310,500 plus a 10% bonus in 2003 to $1,643,760 in salary ($411,008), bonus ($102,752), and stock options ($1,130,000) in 2007. Not bad, for someone with modest academic credentials.
Stanford University itself has a financial stake. Following a licensing fee of $47,000 that was paid to Stanford in 1999 along with 30,000 shares of stock, Corcept has been obligated to make non-refundable royalty payments of $50,000 a year. That adds up to $497,000 through 2008. Additional payments up to $250,000 are due to Stanford when certain drug development milestones are reached. Stanford has stated that it long ago divested itself of the Corcept stock. However, an on-line information service lists Stanford as a major shareholder as recently as 31 March 2008, with over 47,000 shares in the name of the Board of Trustees. In a second agreement, Stanford receives a $20,000 licensing fee, 1000 shares of Corcept stock, $10,000 a year in non-refundable royalties, and potential milestone payments of $350,000. All of this is in advance of any marketing of products by Corcept. So, Stanford is not exactly a disinterested administrator of the academic-corporate boundary between Dr. Schatzberg, NIH, and Corcept.
We should also note some unusual events involving Corcept stock movements. On 15 August 2005 Corcept stock received a research broker upgrade. Heavy selling followed the upgrade (volume was 613,000 shares, 31 standard deviations above the mean for the previous 10 trading days). For non-statistician readers, 3 standard deviations would tell us that the spike is almost certainly not consistent with the historical fluctuations in volume. So, a spike of 31 standard deviations means any such probability is astronomically small. The stock price moved up 34% from the previous day but quickly sank again. That same day, Dr. Schatzberg sold 15,597 shares for $109,179, at an intra-day high of $7 per share. The cost basis of those shares to him was $5.15.
On Friday 23 September 2005, heavy selling of Corcept stock occurred (871,700 shares). This volume was 35 standard deviations above the mean of the previous 10 trading days. On the following Monday, Corcept announced that a widely publicized study of mifepristone for Alzheimer disease was being halted prematurely for lack of progress. The company also announced slower than expected enrollment in a Phase III study of psychotic depression, for which they projected delayed announcement of results. Over the next month the stock price declined 16%.
These episodes of concentrated stock movement represent coincidences that remain to be explained. Was the August 2005 upgrade and selling spike in which Dr. Schatzberg participated a case of “pump and dump”? Was the September 2005 selling spike ahead of bad news a case of insider trading? Who did all that selling, and how did they know?
The questions just keep coming.
Wednesday, August 6, 2008
COMMERCIAL BIAS at STANFORD and CORCEPT
COMMERCIAL BIAS at STANFORD and CORCEPT
Stanford University has replaced Dr. Alan Schatzberg as Principal Investigator on his NIH grant that studies psychotic depression. This step followed persistent questions from Senator Grassley about conflicts of interest and financial disclosure. Dr. Schatzberg’s drug mifepristone has been in NIH-supported clinical trials at Stanford and in FDA-monitored trials sponsored by Corcept, the company Dr. Schatzberg founded.
The University emphasized “We want to put to rest confusion about the integrity of the research involving mifepristone.” Questions did arise following NIH-supported publications from Stanford in 2001 and 2002. Neither one found significant evidence of efficacy, yet both were repeatedly touted by Dr. Schatzberg and his associates as positive. The 2001 report had no significant findings even after attempts to cherry-pick the data. In the 2002 report the data were so weak that Dr. Schatzberg elected to present no statistical analyses of outcome at all. We now know from Corcept’s three negative FDA-monitored Phase III trials that the early challenges to mifepristone’s efficacy had merit (see Abstract #63). As Dr. Schatzberg should know, wishful thinking and hand waving are no substitute for quality data that are rigorously analyzed. Dr. Schatzberg is accountable for the unwarranted positive tone of those early publications. His later promotional claims reveal a commercial bias that has no place in academic medicine.
Scientists are required to present both the positive and the negative aspects of their research “fully and honestly.” Here is one example of this code (see item 2). Here is another (see item 15). The standard does not change when commerce is involved. The standard applies in review articles as much as in original reports. Did the Stanford-Corcept group meet this standard? That is the issue Stanford now confronts.
In a 2003 textbook that he coauthored (Manual of Clinical Psychopharmacology), Dr. Schatzberg made a clearly biased claim. He stated “Two recent studies of … (mifepristone) … by our group have demonstrated efficacy in the treatment of psychotic depression.” He was referring to the 2001 and 2002 Stanford-NIH publications. Dr. Schatzberg went on to state that “The effects were more pronounced on the psychosis than on the depression, but both were significantly improved within 7 days.”
The claim of “demonstrated efficacy” is categorically false. It may be fraudulent. Neither study achieved any accepted evidence of efficacy. The second claim also is categorically false. No quantitative data on significant improvement of psychotic symptoms or depression severity exist in the two studies for drug over placebo. Lack of efficacy is what the investigative journalist Paul Jacobs exposed so well, with the consultation of independent statisticians, in the San Jose Mercury News July 10, 2006.
These false claims in a well-known textbook promoted a positive climate of opinion for Dr. Schatzberg’s drug in the period leading up to Corcept’s planned IPO. Through the textbook, Dr. Schatzberg also promoted positive professional expectations in advance of the marketing of his drug. Moreover, in this American Psychiatric Press publication Dr. Schatzberg did not disclose his large financial interest.
The pattern of exaggerating positive trends in the data while suppressing mention of negative analyses has become a trademark of Stanford-Corcept publications. Dr. Schatzberg made similar unwarranted claims in a 2003 journal article. In 2006 Dr. Schatzberg did likewise in another APA Press publication (The American Psychiatric Publishing Textbook of Mood Disorders). Once again, Dr. Schatzberg used an APA Press textbook to talk up his drug’s prospects. Once again, Dr. Schatzberg did not disclose his own financial interest.
In 2006, Corcept’s CEO (Dr. Joseph Belanoff) and the former Chief Medical Officer (Dr. Charles DeBattista) published a review article on use of mifepristone in neuropsychiatric disorders. In violation of the journal publisher’s policy, the article was sourced only to Stanford University. These current and past Corcept officers did not disclose their financial interest or their relationship to the corporation. They highlighted the use of mifepristone in psychotic depression. Referring to the 2001 Stanford-NIH trial, they claimed “all five patients showed a substantial improvement in depression.” This claim is categorically false. The question of fraud arises again.
These examples illustrate what I have termed commercial promotion and branding through academic outlets. In all, 13 scientific journals, 4 textbooks, and other media have been tainted by these and similar misrepresentations. These biased claims in reference to the Stanford-NIH trials were also featured in press releases and press interviews while Corcept was raising private and public capital.
This pattern of bias raises questions of ethics, and of possible fraud. One could make the case that the misrepresentations described here do not fall under the safe harbor provisions of US securities law. It is one thing for entrepreneurs to speculate giddily about the potential of their product if the available scientific data are presented accurately (“fully and honestly”). In that circumstance, caveat investor applies. But it is an altogether different matter when entrepreneurs misrepresent the available scientific data by emphasizing positive trends while suppressing the inconvenient, negative aspects of the data. That is what Corcept did in discussing the 2002 Stanford-NIH trial in its SEC filing March 19, 2004 leading up to the IPO. That is also what Dr. Schatzberg and his associates did in the examples given above.
Dr. Schatzberg is slated to become president of the American Psychiatric Association in 2009. The APA would do well to reconsider his fitness for that office. We would have expected Dr. Schatzberg, who is also President of the American Psychiatric Press, the publishing arm of the APA, to understand that he and his corporate associates should discuss their scientific data “fully and honestly,” while being transparent about their competing financial interests. As for Stanford University, these academic biases and systemic conflicts of interest signal the need for a fresh look at the academic-corporate boundary.
Stanford University has replaced Dr. Alan Schatzberg as Principal Investigator on his NIH grant that studies psychotic depression. This step followed persistent questions from Senator Grassley about conflicts of interest and financial disclosure. Dr. Schatzberg’s drug mifepristone has been in NIH-supported clinical trials at Stanford and in FDA-monitored trials sponsored by Corcept, the company Dr. Schatzberg founded.
The University emphasized “We want to put to rest confusion about the integrity of the research involving mifepristone.” Questions did arise following NIH-supported publications from Stanford in 2001 and 2002. Neither one found significant evidence of efficacy, yet both were repeatedly touted by Dr. Schatzberg and his associates as positive. The 2001 report had no significant findings even after attempts to cherry-pick the data. In the 2002 report the data were so weak that Dr. Schatzberg elected to present no statistical analyses of outcome at all. We now know from Corcept’s three negative FDA-monitored Phase III trials that the early challenges to mifepristone’s efficacy had merit (see Abstract #63). As Dr. Schatzberg should know, wishful thinking and hand waving are no substitute for quality data that are rigorously analyzed. Dr. Schatzberg is accountable for the unwarranted positive tone of those early publications. His later promotional claims reveal a commercial bias that has no place in academic medicine.
Scientists are required to present both the positive and the negative aspects of their research “fully and honestly.” Here is one example of this code (see item 2). Here is another (see item 15). The standard does not change when commerce is involved. The standard applies in review articles as much as in original reports. Did the Stanford-Corcept group meet this standard? That is the issue Stanford now confronts.
In a 2003 textbook that he coauthored (Manual of Clinical Psychopharmacology), Dr. Schatzberg made a clearly biased claim. He stated “Two recent studies of … (mifepristone) … by our group have demonstrated efficacy in the treatment of psychotic depression.” He was referring to the 2001 and 2002 Stanford-NIH publications. Dr. Schatzberg went on to state that “The effects were more pronounced on the psychosis than on the depression, but both were significantly improved within 7 days.”
The claim of “demonstrated efficacy” is categorically false. It may be fraudulent. Neither study achieved any accepted evidence of efficacy. The second claim also is categorically false. No quantitative data on significant improvement of psychotic symptoms or depression severity exist in the two studies for drug over placebo. Lack of efficacy is what the investigative journalist Paul Jacobs exposed so well, with the consultation of independent statisticians, in the San Jose Mercury News July 10, 2006.
These false claims in a well-known textbook promoted a positive climate of opinion for Dr. Schatzberg’s drug in the period leading up to Corcept’s planned IPO. Through the textbook, Dr. Schatzberg also promoted positive professional expectations in advance of the marketing of his drug. Moreover, in this American Psychiatric Press publication Dr. Schatzberg did not disclose his large financial interest.
The pattern of exaggerating positive trends in the data while suppressing mention of negative analyses has become a trademark of Stanford-Corcept publications. Dr. Schatzberg made similar unwarranted claims in a 2003 journal article. In 2006 Dr. Schatzberg did likewise in another APA Press publication (The American Psychiatric Publishing Textbook of Mood Disorders). Once again, Dr. Schatzberg used an APA Press textbook to talk up his drug’s prospects. Once again, Dr. Schatzberg did not disclose his own financial interest.
In 2006, Corcept’s CEO (Dr. Joseph Belanoff) and the former Chief Medical Officer (Dr. Charles DeBattista) published a review article on use of mifepristone in neuropsychiatric disorders. In violation of the journal publisher’s policy, the article was sourced only to Stanford University. These current and past Corcept officers did not disclose their financial interest or their relationship to the corporation. They highlighted the use of mifepristone in psychotic depression. Referring to the 2001 Stanford-NIH trial, they claimed “all five patients showed a substantial improvement in depression.” This claim is categorically false. The question of fraud arises again.
These examples illustrate what I have termed commercial promotion and branding through academic outlets. In all, 13 scientific journals, 4 textbooks, and other media have been tainted by these and similar misrepresentations. These biased claims in reference to the Stanford-NIH trials were also featured in press releases and press interviews while Corcept was raising private and public capital.
This pattern of bias raises questions of ethics, and of possible fraud. One could make the case that the misrepresentations described here do not fall under the safe harbor provisions of US securities law. It is one thing for entrepreneurs to speculate giddily about the potential of their product if the available scientific data are presented accurately (“fully and honestly”). In that circumstance, caveat investor applies. But it is an altogether different matter when entrepreneurs misrepresent the available scientific data by emphasizing positive trends while suppressing the inconvenient, negative aspects of the data. That is what Corcept did in discussing the 2002 Stanford-NIH trial in its SEC filing March 19, 2004 leading up to the IPO. That is also what Dr. Schatzberg and his associates did in the examples given above.
Dr. Schatzberg is slated to become president of the American Psychiatric Association in 2009. The APA would do well to reconsider his fitness for that office. We would have expected Dr. Schatzberg, who is also President of the American Psychiatric Press, the publishing arm of the APA, to understand that he and his corporate associates should discuss their scientific data “fully and honestly,” while being transparent about their competing financial interests. As for Stanford University, these academic biases and systemic conflicts of interest signal the need for a fresh look at the academic-corporate boundary.
Friday, August 1, 2008
FOLLOW the MONEY
FOLLOW the MONEY
There is no sign of let-up in the scrutiny of Stanford University and Dr. Alan Schatzberg, who chairs the University’s department of psychiatry. Since Senator Grassley started asking questions last month, the explanations offered about Stanford’s management of this faculty member’s conflicts of interest vis à vis his NIH grants and his corporation (Corcept Therapeutics) have become non-viable. The story so far can be found here and here and here.
Senator Grassley was concerned that Stanford gave him lowball information about Dr. Schatzberg’s financial stake in Corcept, and no information about Dr. Schatzberg’s realized financial gains from selling Corcept stock. Inspection of Stanford’s answers to Sen. Grassley and of the University’s faculty disclosure forms reveals that they were not designed for transparency. Dr. Schatzberg’s realized gain of $109,000 in 2005 was not reported to Stanford and so was never reported to NIH as required or to Sen. Grassley in response to the senator’s request for information. As if these were not problems enough, the University’s claims that Dr. Schatzberg kept an appropriate distance from Stanford’s NIH-supported studies of his drug were challenged here and here.
Dr. Schatzberg’s faculty disclosure information released by Stanford is artfully opaque. The real story can only be pieced together from Corcept’s SEC filings, which, I remind readers, are not provided to the public in a spirit of disclosure but because they are required by law. Here are some revealing numbers aggregated from half a dozen or so documents on the SEC website.
Between 2000 and 2007, Dr. Schatzberg’s total compensation from Corcept, at a minimum, can be documented as $401,250. He received at least $52,500 for serving on the board of directors, and $348,750 for chairing Corcept’s Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). In addition, he realized income through selling shares worth $109,000. That adds up to more than $510,000.
While Dr. Schatzberg was earning almost $350,000 from Corcept for his work on the SAB, he was also being paid by NIH to do overlapping scientific work. Where was the boundary? The Stanford clinical trials of Dr. Schatzberg’s drug closely resembled Corcept’s trials in dosage, duration, and outcome measures. As the NIH-funded Principal Investigator at Stanford and as chair of the Corcept SAB, Dr. Schatzberg is accountable for the design of the trials conducted both at the University and by the corporation. To an exaggerated degree, the Stanford trials were touted as positive, whereas the Phase III trials conducted by Corcept were all negative. The scientific rationales put forth by Dr. Schatzberg through his NIH-supported studies of related clinical research questions were used by Corcept in raising capital and in pleading with the FDA for fast-track status. Many of the claims from these NIH-supported studies had a bearing on the potential market for Dr. Schatzberg’s drug – his expansive estimates of the prevalence of psychotic depression, for instance, and his unwarranted claim that his drug acted to “re-set” a key, depression-related, brain-hormone system on which his drug acts. There was even a revolving door for junior faculty between Stanford and the corporation. One junior faculty member worked on the Stanford studies, then went full-time to Corcept for about 2 years as its Chief Medical Officer, then returned to the Stanford faculty ranks. Now another former junior faculty member is Corcept’s CMO. Dr. Schatzberg has the power to influence the academic careers of these individuals. Hello! Is there a conflict of interest here? Does it seem that there really was no boundary?
There is no sign of let-up in the scrutiny of Stanford University and Dr. Alan Schatzberg, who chairs the University’s department of psychiatry. Since Senator Grassley started asking questions last month, the explanations offered about Stanford’s management of this faculty member’s conflicts of interest vis à vis his NIH grants and his corporation (Corcept Therapeutics) have become non-viable. The story so far can be found here and here and here.
Senator Grassley was concerned that Stanford gave him lowball information about Dr. Schatzberg’s financial stake in Corcept, and no information about Dr. Schatzberg’s realized financial gains from selling Corcept stock. Inspection of Stanford’s answers to Sen. Grassley and of the University’s faculty disclosure forms reveals that they were not designed for transparency. Dr. Schatzberg’s realized gain of $109,000 in 2005 was not reported to Stanford and so was never reported to NIH as required or to Sen. Grassley in response to the senator’s request for information. As if these were not problems enough, the University’s claims that Dr. Schatzberg kept an appropriate distance from Stanford’s NIH-supported studies of his drug were challenged here and here.
Dr. Schatzberg’s faculty disclosure information released by Stanford is artfully opaque. The real story can only be pieced together from Corcept’s SEC filings, which, I remind readers, are not provided to the public in a spirit of disclosure but because they are required by law. Here are some revealing numbers aggregated from half a dozen or so documents on the SEC website.
Between 2000 and 2007, Dr. Schatzberg’s total compensation from Corcept, at a minimum, can be documented as $401,250. He received at least $52,500 for serving on the board of directors, and $348,750 for chairing Corcept’s Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). In addition, he realized income through selling shares worth $109,000. That adds up to more than $510,000.
While Dr. Schatzberg was earning almost $350,000 from Corcept for his work on the SAB, he was also being paid by NIH to do overlapping scientific work. Where was the boundary? The Stanford clinical trials of Dr. Schatzberg’s drug closely resembled Corcept’s trials in dosage, duration, and outcome measures. As the NIH-funded Principal Investigator at Stanford and as chair of the Corcept SAB, Dr. Schatzberg is accountable for the design of the trials conducted both at the University and by the corporation. To an exaggerated degree, the Stanford trials were touted as positive, whereas the Phase III trials conducted by Corcept were all negative. The scientific rationales put forth by Dr. Schatzberg through his NIH-supported studies of related clinical research questions were used by Corcept in raising capital and in pleading with the FDA for fast-track status. Many of the claims from these NIH-supported studies had a bearing on the potential market for Dr. Schatzberg’s drug – his expansive estimates of the prevalence of psychotic depression, for instance, and his unwarranted claim that his drug acted to “re-set” a key, depression-related, brain-hormone system on which his drug acts. There was even a revolving door for junior faculty between Stanford and the corporation. One junior faculty member worked on the Stanford studies, then went full-time to Corcept for about 2 years as its Chief Medical Officer, then returned to the Stanford faculty ranks. Now another former junior faculty member is Corcept’s CMO. Dr. Schatzberg has the power to influence the academic careers of these individuals. Hello! Is there a conflict of interest here? Does it seem that there really was no boundary?
Then there is information in the SEC filings about stock held in the name of Dr. Schatzberg’s two children. In January 2002 Dr. Schatzberg was listed as the beneficial owner of 3,605,215 shares. This number included 360,000 shares held of record by each of his two children, over which Dr. Schatzberg had voting control. By December 31, 2004 the number of shares declared for each child had contracted to 300,000. A reasonable inference is that 60,000 shares may have been sold on behalf of each child at some time between early 2002 and the end of 2004. It may be that the original count of 360,000 shares per child was stated in error, but that seems unlikely. Corcept consummated its stock IPO in April 2004 at a price of $12.00 per share. When Dr. Schatzberg sold his own shares in 2005 he realized a price of $7.00 per share. We don’t know for sure what price any shares sold on behalf of Dr. Schatzberg’s children may have brought, because these are apparently not listed as insider trades. Up to the end of 2004 they could have fetched anything between $11.00 and around $5.50. If they fetched $7.00 then as much as $840,000 may have been realized for the Schatzberg family. The cost to Dr. Schatzberg for these 120,000 shares was $40.
So now we are looking at something between at least $510,000 and potentially around $1,350,000 realized by Dr. Schatzberg and his family from Corcept between 2000 and 2007. As I detailed before, Dr. Schatzberg also made 2 determined but unsuccessful runs at selling shares for $7-11 million during the corporation’s IPO attempts. Keep in mind that all of this would be OPM – other people’s money. And Dr. Schatzberg was already being paid by Stanford and NIH. What did Dr. Schatzberg contribute to the greater good in return for this corporate bonanza? You be the judge. To many appalled observers it looks like gaming the system.
This case bids fair to become a landmark that convinces NIH and the Universities to get real about academic-corporate boundaries. Senator Grassley issued a new round of questions to both Stanford and NIH yesterday. And as Ed Silverman reports this afternoon, Stanford has now replaced Dr. Schatzberg as Principal Investigator on the NIH grant.
Friday, July 25, 2008
MANAGING CONFLICTS of INTEREST at STANFORD
MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AT STANFORD
The case of Stanford University and Dr. Alan Schatzberg, chairman of Stanford’s department of psychiatry, continues to raise questions. You can see previous discussions here. The questions concern transparency at the academic-corporate boundary, reporting conflicts of interest to NIH, and Stanford’s “management” of a faculty member known to have a significant conflict. The conflict involves a company Dr. Schatzberg founded (Corcept Therapeutics), a drug called mifepristone that Corcept has in clinical trials for depression, and NIH-supported studies of the same drug at Stanford.
Stanford’s position is that Dr. Schatzberg “has not been involved in managing or conducting any human subjects research involving Mifepristone …” Dr. Schatzberg’s 2006 published disclaimer stated “…Dr Schatzberg played no direct role in the recruitment, assessment, or follow-up of subjects enrolled in this study. Dr Schatzberg was not directly involved in the analysis of data stemming from this research.” Stanford represented that this disclaimer applies also to earlier publications with Dr. Schatzberg as co-author.
This disclaimer is hardly credible, considering the responsibilities of NIH-funded Principal Investigators. I pointed out many of the inconsistencies before. Now there is new evidence that Dr. Schatzberg failed to maintain an arm’s-length relationship to the projects at Stanford.
In a 2008 review article, Dr. Schatzberg discussed the Stanford projects in ways that contradict the claim of an arm’s-length relationship. This article acknowledged Dr. Schatzberg’s NIH grant support at Stanford. Corcept Therapeutics was not acknowledged as a source of funding. The first concern is that, if Dr. Schatzberg’s relationship to the Stanford studies is as Stanford claimed, then he has no business publishing a NIH-supported review article that portrays his drug’s prospects in a favorable light. Hello! Is there a conflict of interest here? Review articles that assess a field and synthesize data form a crucial part of science that has to be off-limits to Dr. Schatzberg just as much as assessing patients in one of his clinical trials would be. His many favorable, even exaggerated, articles, reviews and commentaries since he founded Corcept should have come under this proscription. So much for Stanford’s “management” of the conflict. Dr. Schatzberg certainly had a role in managing the research supported by NIH at Stanford – he managed the climate of scientific opinion for his drug and he managed the tone of the NIH-supported publications from Stanford.
Second, Dr. Schatzberg made a claim of efficacy for his drug that differed from what was originally reported in an NIH-supported Stanford study. He claimed a 31% decrease of symptom ratings with a scale called the BPRS. The original report does not confirm that claim. From the published data tabulated in the report, the reduction of symptom severity was 20%. Readers can easily check that for themselves. So, in a current scientific review article Dr. Schatzberg deviated from the published record. He also inflated by half the efficacy estimate for his drug. Hello! Is there a conflict of interest here?
Third, this false claim indicates that Dr. Schatzberg performed and published his own reanalysis of the primary data from an NIH-funded Stanford study. He didn’t get the number 31% from the published article. Yet Stanford says he had no part in managing or conducting the research or in analyzing any data. So here we have an NIH-funded Principal Investigator, with a clear conflict of interest, who supposedly remains at arm’s length from the project, accessing the primary data files, running a new analysis himself, and publishing an exaggerated new efficacy result for his drug that does not match what he published previously as a co-author. That is inconsistent with Stanford’s defense of Dr. Schatzberg. Hello! Is there a conflict of interest here?
Fourth, in this review article Dr. Schatzberg presented the first data on mifepristone blood levels in a peer reviewed journal, along with an elaborate scientific argument for the importance of the blood level as a moderator of response. These blood level data came from Corcept’s clinical trials, but the target blood level stated by Dr. Schatzberg did not correspond to SEC filings and press releases from Corcept. The administrative issue here is how Stanford justifies the presentation and discussion of original scientific data by a Principal Investigator who is supposedly insulated from the scientific work of the project in order to avoid bias. Dr. Schatzberg’s discussion of the new data and his scientific arguments about blood levels form a crucial part of the scientific platform for his drug’s current prospects, and as such must be off limits, just as assessing patients in one of his clinical trials would be off limits under Stanford’s policy. Hello! Is there a conflict of interest here?
This current example undercuts the assertions by Stanford and Dr. Schatzberg that his conflicts of interest have been “managed” by the University. Dr. Schatzberg may not have assessed any patients in Stanford’s trials of mifepristone, but he has had the lead role in responding to scientific critiques, where he clearly was the manager. He also has had the lead role in selling the mifepristone story to the scientific community and in shaping the tone of the NIH-supported Stanford publications that Corcept relied on to raise capital. Hello! Is there a conflict of interest here? How does Stanford justify these academic-commercial boundary violations, and why does NIH not act on the known conflicts of interest? That was Senator Grassley’s question to Dr. Zerhouni today.
The case of Stanford University and Dr. Alan Schatzberg, chairman of Stanford’s department of psychiatry, continues to raise questions. You can see previous discussions here. The questions concern transparency at the academic-corporate boundary, reporting conflicts of interest to NIH, and Stanford’s “management” of a faculty member known to have a significant conflict. The conflict involves a company Dr. Schatzberg founded (Corcept Therapeutics), a drug called mifepristone that Corcept has in clinical trials for depression, and NIH-supported studies of the same drug at Stanford.
Stanford’s position is that Dr. Schatzberg “has not been involved in managing or conducting any human subjects research involving Mifepristone …” Dr. Schatzberg’s 2006 published disclaimer stated “…Dr Schatzberg played no direct role in the recruitment, assessment, or follow-up of subjects enrolled in this study. Dr Schatzberg was not directly involved in the analysis of data stemming from this research.” Stanford represented that this disclaimer applies also to earlier publications with Dr. Schatzberg as co-author.
This disclaimer is hardly credible, considering the responsibilities of NIH-funded Principal Investigators. I pointed out many of the inconsistencies before. Now there is new evidence that Dr. Schatzberg failed to maintain an arm’s-length relationship to the projects at Stanford.
In a 2008 review article, Dr. Schatzberg discussed the Stanford projects in ways that contradict the claim of an arm’s-length relationship. This article acknowledged Dr. Schatzberg’s NIH grant support at Stanford. Corcept Therapeutics was not acknowledged as a source of funding. The first concern is that, if Dr. Schatzberg’s relationship to the Stanford studies is as Stanford claimed, then he has no business publishing a NIH-supported review article that portrays his drug’s prospects in a favorable light. Hello! Is there a conflict of interest here? Review articles that assess a field and synthesize data form a crucial part of science that has to be off-limits to Dr. Schatzberg just as much as assessing patients in one of his clinical trials would be. His many favorable, even exaggerated, articles, reviews and commentaries since he founded Corcept should have come under this proscription. So much for Stanford’s “management” of the conflict. Dr. Schatzberg certainly had a role in managing the research supported by NIH at Stanford – he managed the climate of scientific opinion for his drug and he managed the tone of the NIH-supported publications from Stanford.
Second, Dr. Schatzberg made a claim of efficacy for his drug that differed from what was originally reported in an NIH-supported Stanford study. He claimed a 31% decrease of symptom ratings with a scale called the BPRS. The original report does not confirm that claim. From the published data tabulated in the report, the reduction of symptom severity was 20%. Readers can easily check that for themselves. So, in a current scientific review article Dr. Schatzberg deviated from the published record. He also inflated by half the efficacy estimate for his drug. Hello! Is there a conflict of interest here?
Third, this false claim indicates that Dr. Schatzberg performed and published his own reanalysis of the primary data from an NIH-funded Stanford study. He didn’t get the number 31% from the published article. Yet Stanford says he had no part in managing or conducting the research or in analyzing any data. So here we have an NIH-funded Principal Investigator, with a clear conflict of interest, who supposedly remains at arm’s length from the project, accessing the primary data files, running a new analysis himself, and publishing an exaggerated new efficacy result for his drug that does not match what he published previously as a co-author. That is inconsistent with Stanford’s defense of Dr. Schatzberg. Hello! Is there a conflict of interest here?
Fourth, in this review article Dr. Schatzberg presented the first data on mifepristone blood levels in a peer reviewed journal, along with an elaborate scientific argument for the importance of the blood level as a moderator of response. These blood level data came from Corcept’s clinical trials, but the target blood level stated by Dr. Schatzberg did not correspond to SEC filings and press releases from Corcept. The administrative issue here is how Stanford justifies the presentation and discussion of original scientific data by a Principal Investigator who is supposedly insulated from the scientific work of the project in order to avoid bias. Dr. Schatzberg’s discussion of the new data and his scientific arguments about blood levels form a crucial part of the scientific platform for his drug’s current prospects, and as such must be off limits, just as assessing patients in one of his clinical trials would be off limits under Stanford’s policy. Hello! Is there a conflict of interest here?
This current example undercuts the assertions by Stanford and Dr. Schatzberg that his conflicts of interest have been “managed” by the University. Dr. Schatzberg may not have assessed any patients in Stanford’s trials of mifepristone, but he has had the lead role in responding to scientific critiques, where he clearly was the manager. He also has had the lead role in selling the mifepristone story to the scientific community and in shaping the tone of the NIH-supported Stanford publications that Corcept relied on to raise capital. Hello! Is there a conflict of interest here? How does Stanford justify these academic-commercial boundary violations, and why does NIH not act on the known conflicts of interest? That was Senator Grassley’s question to Dr. Zerhouni today.
Sunday, July 20, 2008
SCHATZBERG DISCLOSURE
SCHATZBERG DISCLOSURES
Questions continue to buzz about Dr. Alan Schatzberg’s and Stanford’s claims that he complied with the university’s disclosure requirements. Dr. Schatzberg is chair of Stanford’s department of psychiatry and the founder of a company called Corcept Therapeutics. I have commented previously on the University’s (mis)management of Dr. Schatzberg’s conflict of interest vis a vis Corcept and his NIH funding.
The two most informative documents released by Stanford University are dated 23 May 2008 and 25 June 2008. The first is an amended response to Senator Charles Grassley. The second is a public statement concerning Sen. Grassley’s investigation of Dr. Schatzberg through the Senate Finance Committee.. The complete texts are available on-line here: http://ucomm.stanford.edu/news/052308conflict_of_interest.pdf (1)
and here http://ucomm.stanford.edu/news/062508conflict_of_interest.pdf (2)
Additional perspective is to be found in an article in the Stanford Daily here:
http://www.stanforddaily.com/article/2008/7/10/senatorTargetsSchatzbergForConflictOfInterest (3)
Stanford’s policy requires that
This explanation is laughable. Since when does a University rely on SEC filings and online financial reporting services to learn about the transactions and financial conflicts of its faculty members in order to discharge its fiduciary duty to disclose these transactions to NIH?
Even worse, the American Psychiatric Association has parroted Stanford’s assertion that Dr. Schatzberg made the required disclosures. In an interview with the New York Times, Dr. Nada L. Stotland, president of the psychiatric association, said the group had studied Mr. Grassley’s letter and Stanford’s response and agreed with Stanford. Dr. Schatzberg will take over as president of the association as planned, she said. The association and the University here are being disingenuous – treating an ethical issue as a technical legalism. But even on legally technical grounds their case fails. Is that the standard that Stanford and the APA wish to state for the record?
Once again, it is time for Stanford to get real about the boundary between commerce and academia. And, in view of the unjustified promotion of their commercial interest by Dr. Schatzberg and his corporate associates through academic outlets, it is time for the American Psychiatric Association to grasp the nettle and to reconsider Dr. Schatzberg’s fitness to serve as president in 2009.
Questions continue to buzz about Dr. Alan Schatzberg’s and Stanford’s claims that he complied with the university’s disclosure requirements. Dr. Schatzberg is chair of Stanford’s department of psychiatry and the founder of a company called Corcept Therapeutics. I have commented previously on the University’s (mis)management of Dr. Schatzberg’s conflict of interest vis a vis Corcept and his NIH funding.
The two most informative documents released by Stanford University are dated 23 May 2008 and 25 June 2008. The first is an amended response to Senator Charles Grassley. The second is a public statement concerning Sen. Grassley’s investigation of Dr. Schatzberg through the Senate Finance Committee.. The complete texts are available on-line here: http://ucomm.stanford.edu/news/052308conflict_of_interest.pdf (1)
and here http://ucomm.stanford.edu/news/062508conflict_of_interest.pdf (2)
Additional perspective is to be found in an article in the Stanford Daily here:
http://www.stanforddaily.com/article/2008/7/10/senatorTargetsSchatzbergForConflictOfInterest (3)
Stanford’s policy requires that
“Disclosure of potential conflicts of interest at the time of any transaction,Likewise, the Stanford Daily reported that
such as when the faculty member receives a research grant or gift or has
intellectual property licensed, is a critical component of our conflict of
interest policy. Transactional disclosures of conflicts of interest are required
when submitting a grant, negotiating a contract, during licensing activities,
submitting protocols for human subjects research or animal research, entering
into material transfer agreements or collaboration agreements, receiving gifts
or entering into procurement activities. … Our standard for a significant
financial interest is whether the faculty member has received $10,000 or more in
income, holds $10,000 or more in equity in equity for publicly traded companies
or has any equity if the company is privately held. This ad hoc disclosure is
used to mitigate, manage or remove such specific conflicts, and, for all
research funded by NIH, as a basis for reporting to NIH. All such conflicts are
also reported in the annual disclosure, and thus are also part of the University
information on conflict of interest (emphases added) (1).
“the University said in its letter to Grassley that it holds a “zero-dollarThe sale of Corcept Therapeutics stock by Dr. Schatzberg in 2005 was not reported to the University. (1) Dr. Schatzberg’s attempted sales of stock in 2002 and 2004 in connection with Corcept’s planned stock IPOs also were not reported to the University. (1) Proceeds of the 2005 sale to Dr. Schatzberg were over $109,000. Projected proceeds of the failed attempts to sell stock during the IPOs were $7-11 million. In terms of the policy described above, these must be considered “transactions” and “income” and “financial gains.” Stanford did not document compliance by Dr. Schatzberg with University policy. The stock sale is not mentioned in Dr. Schatzberg’s 2005 disclosure to the University. (1) Indeed, Stanford prevaricated on this issue by stating “…information about his stock ownership and stock sales was publicly disclosed through SEC filings and is available online through financial reporting services.” (2)
threshold for disclosure.” This requires that faculty members divulge any and
all financial gains made through outside interactions that could have bearing on
what they are doing on campus.” (3)
This explanation is laughable. Since when does a University rely on SEC filings and online financial reporting services to learn about the transactions and financial conflicts of its faculty members in order to discharge its fiduciary duty to disclose these transactions to NIH?
Even worse, the American Psychiatric Association has parroted Stanford’s assertion that Dr. Schatzberg made the required disclosures. In an interview with the New York Times, Dr. Nada L. Stotland, president of the psychiatric association, said the group had studied Mr. Grassley’s letter and Stanford’s response and agreed with Stanford. Dr. Schatzberg will take over as president of the association as planned, she said. The association and the University here are being disingenuous – treating an ethical issue as a technical legalism. But even on legally technical grounds their case fails. Is that the standard that Stanford and the APA wish to state for the record?
Once again, it is time for Stanford to get real about the boundary between commerce and academia. And, in view of the unjustified promotion of their commercial interest by Dr. Schatzberg and his corporate associates through academic outlets, it is time for the American Psychiatric Association to grasp the nettle and to reconsider Dr. Schatzberg’s fitness to serve as president in 2009.
Monday, July 14, 2008
SCHATZBERG, STANFORD and the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION
14 July 2008
SCHATZBERG, STANFORD and the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION
The chairman of psychiatry at Stanford University, Dr. Alan Schatzberg, is still in the news for his problems at the boundary of commerce and academia. The New York Times reported that Dr. Schatzberg believes constraints on researchers trying to develop drugs “will mean less opportunities to help patients with severe illnesses.” Just as patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel, so patient welfare is the last refuge of the dodgy medical entrepreneur.
What exactly does Dr. Schatzberg mean by “constraints”? Does he object to transparency as a “constraint”? Would he feel “constrained” by the need to disclose his stock sales to his academic institution? The Stanford Daily commented recently that Stanford policy “requires that faculty members divulge any and all financial gains made through outside interactions that could have bearing on what they are doing on campus.” One reason for this requirement is so that the institution can disclose these financial dealings to NIH, which funds Dr. Schatzberg’s academic work that dovetails with his corporation’s research. It is difficult to reconcile Dr. Schatzberg’s protestations of compliance with the non-reporting of his stock sale valued at over $100,000 (not to mention his efforts to sell stock valued at $7-11 million).
Would Dr. Schatzberg and his corporate associates feel “constrained” by the requirement to disclose their competing financial interests when touting the company’s drug in scientific journals, textbooks, educational media, and press interviews? The record is clear that they have repeatedly failed to do so.
Would Dr. Schatzberg and his corporate associates feel “constrained” by the canons of science that frown on exaggerated claims and hyperbole in the service of their business enterprise? The record is clear that they have repeatedly overstated the evidence for their drug’s prospects. These exaggerated claims were touted by the corporation when raising capital.
Would Dr. Schatzberg feel “constrained” by the societal expectation to refrain from gaming the entrepreneurial reward system? He appeared to believe he was entitled to cash out $7-11 million of other people’s money before actually producing anything of redeeming social value.
If this is what Dr. Schatzberg means by “constraints” then his fitness for the office of president of the American Psychiatric Association needs to be reconsidered.
SCHATZBERG, STANFORD and the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION
The chairman of psychiatry at Stanford University, Dr. Alan Schatzberg, is still in the news for his problems at the boundary of commerce and academia. The New York Times reported that Dr. Schatzberg believes constraints on researchers trying to develop drugs “will mean less opportunities to help patients with severe illnesses.” Just as patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel, so patient welfare is the last refuge of the dodgy medical entrepreneur.
What exactly does Dr. Schatzberg mean by “constraints”? Does he object to transparency as a “constraint”? Would he feel “constrained” by the need to disclose his stock sales to his academic institution? The Stanford Daily commented recently that Stanford policy “requires that faculty members divulge any and all financial gains made through outside interactions that could have bearing on what they are doing on campus.” One reason for this requirement is so that the institution can disclose these financial dealings to NIH, which funds Dr. Schatzberg’s academic work that dovetails with his corporation’s research. It is difficult to reconcile Dr. Schatzberg’s protestations of compliance with the non-reporting of his stock sale valued at over $100,000 (not to mention his efforts to sell stock valued at $7-11 million).
Would Dr. Schatzberg and his corporate associates feel “constrained” by the requirement to disclose their competing financial interests when touting the company’s drug in scientific journals, textbooks, educational media, and press interviews? The record is clear that they have repeatedly failed to do so.
Would Dr. Schatzberg and his corporate associates feel “constrained” by the canons of science that frown on exaggerated claims and hyperbole in the service of their business enterprise? The record is clear that they have repeatedly overstated the evidence for their drug’s prospects. These exaggerated claims were touted by the corporation when raising capital.
Would Dr. Schatzberg feel “constrained” by the societal expectation to refrain from gaming the entrepreneurial reward system? He appeared to believe he was entitled to cash out $7-11 million of other people’s money before actually producing anything of redeeming social value.
If this is what Dr. Schatzberg means by “constraints” then his fitness for the office of president of the American Psychiatric Association needs to be reconsidered.
Sunday, June 29, 2008
STANFORD, SCHATZBERG and CORCEPT THERAPEUTICS: RECOGNIZING and MANAGING CONFLICTS
STANFORD, SCHATZBERG and CORCEPT THERAPEUTICS: RECOGNIZING and MANAGING CONFLICTS
The case of Stanford University and Dr. Alan Schatzberg, chairman of Stanford’s department of psychiatry, has been in the news for a week. Senator Grassley raised concerns about conflicts of interest, reporting of same, and Stanford’s policies. In play are a company called Corcept Therapeutics that Dr. Schatzberg founded, and a drug called Mifepristone or RU 486 that is in clinical trials for a severe form of depression. Interest in this case is especially high because Dr. Schatzberg is the president-elect of the American Psychiatric Association. Daniel Carlat, Clin Psych, and University Diaries have had cogent commentaries on the wider implications of this breaking issue.
The University issued a statement in response to Sen. Grassley. This statement asserted that Dr. Schatzberg has fully complied with the University’s rigorous conflict of interest policy and that Dr. Schatzberg “has not been involved in managing or conducting any human subjects research involving Mifepristone, a pharmaceutical that Corcept licenses for the treatment of psychotic major depression.”
Stanford’s account of Dr. Schatzberg’s arm’s-length role in Stanford’s NIH-supported studies of RU 486 (mifepristone) for depression is questionable, if not disingenuous. Dr. Schatzberg’s patent application filing for use of RU 486 in depression occurred in 1997, and he founded the corporation Corcept Therapeutics in 1998. He was a member of the board of directors from 1998 to 2007. He has chaired the corporation’s scientific advisory board since 1998.
There is reason to believe that Dr. Schatzberg had a key role in Stanford’s clinical trials of Corcept’s drug reported in 2001, 2002, and 2006. He was a co-author on all three publications, and there was no disclaimer about his role until 2006. This disclaimer is hardly credible. As Principal Investigator on the NIH grants, Dr. Schatzberg was expected to supervise the junior faculty and research staff at Stanford who recruited, assessed, and treated patients in the studies of RU 486. He was responsible for the choice of outcome measures, about which questions have been raised. He was responsible for the quality of the reported data analyses, which were, frankly, inexpert, when they were provided at all. Above all, he was responsible for the tone of the NIH-supported Stanford publications that claimed Corcept’s drug is effective.
If there were any doubt that Dr. Schatzberg’s hands were all over these Stanford studies, one only has to see the record of his leading role in responding to scientific critiques of their design, execution, analysis, and interpretation. He was clearly the manager.
Moreover, the record is clear that Corcept relied on the NIH-supported Stanford publications for positive claims to enable the corporation to raise capital (well over $100 million by now, with nothing to show for it). Corcept’s own Phase III clinical trials have been uniformly negative. For this strategy to succeed, the Stanford trials had to be portrayed as positive. As Paul Jacobs detailed in the San Jose Mercury News in 2006, using independent statistical experts, Dr. Schatzberg and his Stanford/Corcept colleagues made seriously exaggerated claims for the drug’s efficacy in their 2001 and 2002 publications. These exaggerated claims have been assiduously repeated by Dr. Schatzberg, by Stanford faculty members answerable to him, and by academic members of Corcept’s scientific advisory board in many scientific journals and textbooks. All these testimonials are compromised. The effect of these repeated, unjustified, claims is to raise the profile of the corporation and of the drug. It amounts to public relations and branding through academic outlets. Roy Poses on this site has dissected the scientific credibility of claims for the utility of RU 486 in depression.
Far from being removed from the scientific debate about Corcept’s drug, Dr. Schatzberg has had the leading role in “selling” the story to the scientific community, in “defending the brand” against scientific criticisms, and in providing his corporation a plausible story line to attract new capital. It was Dr. Schatzberg who talked about how the drug “may be the equivalent of shock treatments in a pill” in a 2002 Stanford press release. There is no clear boundary between Dr. Schatzberg’s NIH-supported academic roles and his service to the corporation he founded. As for not being involved in the management of the Stanford projects, Dr. Schatzberg acknowledged to Paul Jacobs of the San Jose Mercury News “that he has considerable influence over the junior faculty members doing the studies. As chairman of psychiatry, he helps set their salaries and can affect their career advancement. And he continues as a co-author of the resulting papers.”
I have already commented on Dr. Schatzberg’s efforts to sell large parcels of Corcept stock during the company’s IPO attempts. Had these efforts been successful, Dr. Schatzberg would have benefited by $7-11 million, while still retaining over 2 million shares of Corcept stock. This aspect of the issue troubles many people. In our capitalist system, considered so necessary for developing innovative drugs, nobody complains when an entrepreneur makes a fortune inventing a useful product. Dr. Schatzberg’s apparent intent, however, was to reach for the reward before contributing any product of redeeming social value. The prospects of RU 486 succeeding as a useful treatment of psychotic depression are close to zero. People view such behavior as gaming the system. Moreover, under Stanford’s existing rules, these projected stock sales might never have been reported.
Are these significant conflicts of interest? Yes. Have they “influence(d) the conduct of medical research” at Stanford (quoting now from Stanford’s June 24 statement)? Yes. Dr. Schatzberg’s NIH grants dovetail with the efforts of his corporation, and the corporation used data from the NIH-grant-supported projects for commercial promotion. Had the corporation not existed, these particular grants likely would not have been initiated or would have had different scientific emphases. Has Dr. Schatzberg’s research “been compromised by his financial stake”? Yes. His academic publications on depression and RU 486 are compromised by exaggerated and self-serving claims for his corporation’s drug. Senator Grassley is right: it is time for Stanford to get real about corporate-academic boundaries.
The case of Stanford University and Dr. Alan Schatzberg, chairman of Stanford’s department of psychiatry, has been in the news for a week. Senator Grassley raised concerns about conflicts of interest, reporting of same, and Stanford’s policies. In play are a company called Corcept Therapeutics that Dr. Schatzberg founded, and a drug called Mifepristone or RU 486 that is in clinical trials for a severe form of depression. Interest in this case is especially high because Dr. Schatzberg is the president-elect of the American Psychiatric Association. Daniel Carlat, Clin Psych, and University Diaries have had cogent commentaries on the wider implications of this breaking issue.
The University issued a statement in response to Sen. Grassley. This statement asserted that Dr. Schatzberg has fully complied with the University’s rigorous conflict of interest policy and that Dr. Schatzberg “has not been involved in managing or conducting any human subjects research involving Mifepristone, a pharmaceutical that Corcept licenses for the treatment of psychotic major depression.”
Stanford’s account of Dr. Schatzberg’s arm’s-length role in Stanford’s NIH-supported studies of RU 486 (mifepristone) for depression is questionable, if not disingenuous. Dr. Schatzberg’s patent application filing for use of RU 486 in depression occurred in 1997, and he founded the corporation Corcept Therapeutics in 1998. He was a member of the board of directors from 1998 to 2007. He has chaired the corporation’s scientific advisory board since 1998.
There is reason to believe that Dr. Schatzberg had a key role in Stanford’s clinical trials of Corcept’s drug reported in 2001, 2002, and 2006. He was a co-author on all three publications, and there was no disclaimer about his role until 2006. This disclaimer is hardly credible. As Principal Investigator on the NIH grants, Dr. Schatzberg was expected to supervise the junior faculty and research staff at Stanford who recruited, assessed, and treated patients in the studies of RU 486. He was responsible for the choice of outcome measures, about which questions have been raised. He was responsible for the quality of the reported data analyses, which were, frankly, inexpert, when they were provided at all. Above all, he was responsible for the tone of the NIH-supported Stanford publications that claimed Corcept’s drug is effective.
If there were any doubt that Dr. Schatzberg’s hands were all over these Stanford studies, one only has to see the record of his leading role in responding to scientific critiques of their design, execution, analysis, and interpretation. He was clearly the manager.
Moreover, the record is clear that Corcept relied on the NIH-supported Stanford publications for positive claims to enable the corporation to raise capital (well over $100 million by now, with nothing to show for it). Corcept’s own Phase III clinical trials have been uniformly negative. For this strategy to succeed, the Stanford trials had to be portrayed as positive. As Paul Jacobs detailed in the San Jose Mercury News in 2006, using independent statistical experts, Dr. Schatzberg and his Stanford/Corcept colleagues made seriously exaggerated claims for the drug’s efficacy in their 2001 and 2002 publications. These exaggerated claims have been assiduously repeated by Dr. Schatzberg, by Stanford faculty members answerable to him, and by academic members of Corcept’s scientific advisory board in many scientific journals and textbooks. All these testimonials are compromised. The effect of these repeated, unjustified, claims is to raise the profile of the corporation and of the drug. It amounts to public relations and branding through academic outlets. Roy Poses on this site has dissected the scientific credibility of claims for the utility of RU 486 in depression.
Far from being removed from the scientific debate about Corcept’s drug, Dr. Schatzberg has had the leading role in “selling” the story to the scientific community, in “defending the brand” against scientific criticisms, and in providing his corporation a plausible story line to attract new capital. It was Dr. Schatzberg who talked about how the drug “may be the equivalent of shock treatments in a pill” in a 2002 Stanford press release. There is no clear boundary between Dr. Schatzberg’s NIH-supported academic roles and his service to the corporation he founded. As for not being involved in the management of the Stanford projects, Dr. Schatzberg acknowledged to Paul Jacobs of the San Jose Mercury News “that he has considerable influence over the junior faculty members doing the studies. As chairman of psychiatry, he helps set their salaries and can affect their career advancement. And he continues as a co-author of the resulting papers.”
I have already commented on Dr. Schatzberg’s efforts to sell large parcels of Corcept stock during the company’s IPO attempts. Had these efforts been successful, Dr. Schatzberg would have benefited by $7-11 million, while still retaining over 2 million shares of Corcept stock. This aspect of the issue troubles many people. In our capitalist system, considered so necessary for developing innovative drugs, nobody complains when an entrepreneur makes a fortune inventing a useful product. Dr. Schatzberg’s apparent intent, however, was to reach for the reward before contributing any product of redeeming social value. The prospects of RU 486 succeeding as a useful treatment of psychotic depression are close to zero. People view such behavior as gaming the system. Moreover, under Stanford’s existing rules, these projected stock sales might never have been reported.
Are these significant conflicts of interest? Yes. Have they “influence(d) the conduct of medical research” at Stanford (quoting now from Stanford’s June 24 statement)? Yes. Dr. Schatzberg’s NIH grants dovetail with the efforts of his corporation, and the corporation used data from the NIH-grant-supported projects for commercial promotion. Had the corporation not existed, these particular grants likely would not have been initiated or would have had different scientific emphases. Has Dr. Schatzberg’s research “been compromised by his financial stake”? Yes. His academic publications on depression and RU 486 are compromised by exaggerated and self-serving claims for his corporation’s drug. Senator Grassley is right: it is time for Stanford to get real about corporate-academic boundaries.
Thursday, June 19, 2008
MEDSCAPE'S CME ETHICS, PART II
19 June 2008
MEDSCAPE’S CME ETHICS, PART II
A few days ago I discussed Medscape’s parasitic use of professional organizations to embellish its mediocre CME offerings – “highlights” of the closed 2007 ACNP annual meeting, for example. One of the responses to my post called attention to Dr. George D. Lundberg’s video editorial of 13 June 2008, denouncing attacks on commercially sponsored CME activities. Among other claims, Dr. Lundberg, a past editor-in-chief of JAMA, stated that Medscape “follow(s) rules that prevent bias and improper influence.” He went on to boast that Medscape is “the largest single source of CE for health professionals” and that “We are just going to keep doing what we are doing. It is good. We are clean. Our work is transparent…. We welcome analysis and criticism. We function in the best interests of patients …” These words were spoken before Daniel Carlat and I published our critiques of Medscape a few days later (see here and here and here).
There seems to be a right hand – left hand problem at Medscape. Though I take Dr. Lundberg at his word about his intentions, I invite him to defend the products that actually appear under his oversight as editor-in-chief. Let’s look at a case study of an “Expert Interview” published on-line June 9, 2008 under the tagline Medscape Perspectives on the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 161st Annual Meeting, May 3-8, 2008, Washington, DC. A boilerplate legal disclaimer noted, “This activity is not sanctioned by, nor a part of, the American Psychiatric Association. Conference news does not receive grant support and is produced independently.”
The “Expert Interview” for our case study is titled “Pharmacologic Options for Treatment-Resistant Depression…” The featured expert is Charles Nemeroff, chairman of Emory University’s department of psychiatry. Dr. Nemeroff is well known for ethical controversy. In 2003 the Nature Publishing Group revised their policies on disclosure of financial conflicts of interest in the wake of Dr. Nemeroff’s widely publicized nondisclosures. In 2006 Dr. Nemeroff resigned as editor of the journal Neuropsychopharmacology after he failed to disclose conflicts pertinent to a review article he co-authored and placed in his own journal. As is always true of case studies, the devil is in the details if we wish to understand just how sly and subtle was the spinning. Here are some of the issues that arise from Dr. Nemeroff’s Expert Interview on Medscape.
1. Internal contradiction. The legal disclaimer noted above states that there was no grant support and that the conference news items were produced independently. However, Dr. Nemeroff’s featured item prominently acknowledges an unrestricted educational grant from Bristol-Myers Squibb Company and Otsuka America Pharmaceutical, Inc. These two companies jointly market aripiprazole, a member of a drug class highlighted by Dr. Nemeroff in his Expert Interview.
2. Infomercial format. The Expert Interview by Dr. Nemeroff resembles nothing so much as Lindsay Wagner promoting the Select Comfort Sleep Number Bed in television advertisements. Promotional statements are made without scientific backup.
3. Disease mongering. In this interview, Dr. Nemeroff backed away from his earlier strict definition of treatment-resistant depression (TRD), proclaiming that in his current view 40% to 50% of depressed patients have treatment resistance. This sleight of hand naturally expands the market for the agents he later promotes as augmenting agents.
4. The primary care “hook.” Dr. Nemeroff introduced a professional “hook” to primary care physicians, emphasizing the association of depression with cardiovascular disease. This strategy is a component of disease mongering. Dr. Nemeroff’s discussion of this association had approximately zero educational value. Why did Medscape not insist on more substantive content?
5. Inappropriate drug recommendation. In discussing the switch strategy from one antidepressant class to another for resistant depression, Dr. Nemeroff included a recommendation for nefazodone. That drug was withdrawn by Bristol-Myers Squibb Company several years ago because of hepatic toxicity. What kind of “expert” makes such a recommendation? And what kind of editorial oversight by Medscape waves through such an incompetent statement?
6. Uncritical reliance on uncontrolled studies. In discussing switch of antidepressant drugs, Dr. Nemeroff noted that in phase II of the STAR*D trial 25% of patients switched from citalopram to sertraline responded. Dr. Nemeroff’s discussion of that result was inadequate. He invoked a dubiously relevant effect of sertraline on the dopamine transporter (when you are stuck for an answer, invoke neurochemical mythology) but he ignored the default hypothesis that 25% would have been the placebo response rate had STAR*D been designed to include placebo control groups. This default hypothesis assumes that all SSRI drugs are basically similar in terms of efficacy. For an educational item in Medscape or anywhere else, this aspect of the Expert Interview falls short of expected standards.
7. Pushing dangerous drugs. Dr. Nemeroff has been a leader in promoting use of second generation antipsychotic (SGA) drugs as augmenting agents for resistant depression. I have commented previously on his promotion of risperidone for this purpose, here and here. Others have raised serious questions about his reports. Overall, Dr. Nemeroff promotes these drugs by exaggerating their efficacy and glossing over their toxicity in resistant depression.
8. False statements. In this Expert Interview, Dr. Nemeroff leads off his discussion of SGA drugs for TRD with an endorsement of risperidone. The 2 published references to risperidone in TRD have major scientific flaws. Indeed, the study by Rapaport et al (reference 12 in this interview)was retracted. Nevertheless, Dr. Nemeroff still claims this study supports his position on SGA use in TRD. Does Dr. Nemeroff not read the retractions of his own publications (by his own “research team”)? How naïve are Medscape’s editors to be ignorant of these retractions?
9. Talking up the sponsor’s product. In reviewing the toxicity of SGA drugs for TRD, Dr. Nemeroff found something negative to say about the side effects of olanzapine, quetiapine, and risperidone. However, he made no mention of aripiprazole’s side effects, even though he emphasized its recent approval by the FDA for TRD. How convenient, as BMS-Otsuka sponsored his Medscape spot. Where were Medscape’s editors, described by George Lundberg as working to prevent bias and improper influence?
10. Glossing over weak efficacy. Though Dr. Nemeroff endorsed aripiprazole for TRD, he neglected to discuss the weak efficacy of this drug. The Number Needed to Treat for remission with aripiprazole in TRD is a disappointing 10. The studies cited by Dr. Nemeroff only compared aripiprazole against placebo. Dr. Nemeroff surely knows that just beating placebo does not qualify a drug as clinically useful. Dr. Nemeroff neglected to address the comparative efficacy of aripiprazole versus established treatments of TRD, such as lithium augmentation. The available evidence suggests that patients will do better on lithium and that aripiprazole would not be the first line choice, especially in primary care. Where were Medscape’s editors?
11. Reckless promotion of SGAs early in the course of TRD. Dr. Nemeroff emphatically stated he is not opposed to the early use of SGAs for TRD. Here especially he resembled Lindsay Wagner. A conscientious educator would weigh the risks and benefits of the early and broad use of SGA drugs in TRD. Dr. Nemeroff did no such thing. He simply opined. Why did Medscape’s editors allow him to get away with this reckless promotion? There does not appear to have been any effective editorial oversight of this publication.
12. For Dr. Nemeroff to promote early use of SGAs in TRD is reckless because of the serious toxicity associated with these drugs. Where is the discussion of akathisia (26% in the most recent study of aripiprazole in TRD)? Where is the discussion of emergent suicidality associated with akathisia in depression? Where is the discussion of tardive dyskinesia caused by aripiprazole (5% within 12 months in schizophrenia, and quite possibly higher in mood disordered patients)? Where is the discussion of neuroleptic malignant syndrome associated with SGAs like aripiprazole? Where is the discussion of weight gain with aripiprazole in TRD (significantly greater than with placebo)? Where is the overall analysis of risk versus benefit? Where were Medscape’s editors? Who at Medscape was looking out for “the best interests of patients”?
13. Incomplete disclosures. Dr. Nemeroff has a long history of recidivism concerning failure to disclose pertinent financial conflicts of interest. His record in this instance continues that sordid tradition. He failed to disclose that he is currently chairing a national series of CME meetings promoting aripiprazole for TRD, sponsored by, you guessed it, Bristol-Myers Squibb/Otsuka. Perhaps he thinks that because the money is laundered through a Medical Education Communications Company he doesn’t need to disclose it. Tell that to Joseph Biederman, who was called to task last week by Senator Grassley’s Senate Finance Committee for exactly that obfuscation. Dr. Nemeroff also failed to disclose his support from Janssen for studying risperidone in TRD. He failed to disclose his association with CeNeRx, that is developing MAO inhibitors, mentioned favorably in his interview. There is more, but these examples will suffice. Doesn’t Medscape know by now that Dr. Nemeroff cannot be relied on to report his conflicts appropriately? Does Medscape have knowledgeable professionals or ciphers in its editorial office?
So, this sleazy example illustrates many of the systemic problems that Medscape will need to correct if it hopes to remain credible. This documentation gives the lie to Dr. Lundberg’s claims that “We are clean. Our work is transparent.” One suggestion is for Medscape to abandon the degenerate form of scientific journalism exemplified by “Expert Interviews” and News items. In their present formats they cannot be truly educational and balanced items. They do not qualify for CME credit, as I verified with the company. They are simply vehicles for promoting sponsors’ products. And the Medscape staff seem to think their job is to ensure that the spin is firmly in place. Does George Lundberg really intend that?
MEDSCAPE’S CME ETHICS, PART II
A few days ago I discussed Medscape’s parasitic use of professional organizations to embellish its mediocre CME offerings – “highlights” of the closed 2007 ACNP annual meeting, for example. One of the responses to my post called attention to Dr. George D. Lundberg’s video editorial of 13 June 2008, denouncing attacks on commercially sponsored CME activities. Among other claims, Dr. Lundberg, a past editor-in-chief of JAMA, stated that Medscape “follow(s) rules that prevent bias and improper influence.” He went on to boast that Medscape is “the largest single source of CE for health professionals” and that “We are just going to keep doing what we are doing. It is good. We are clean. Our work is transparent…. We welcome analysis and criticism. We function in the best interests of patients …” These words were spoken before Daniel Carlat and I published our critiques of Medscape a few days later (see here and here and here).
There seems to be a right hand – left hand problem at Medscape. Though I take Dr. Lundberg at his word about his intentions, I invite him to defend the products that actually appear under his oversight as editor-in-chief. Let’s look at a case study of an “Expert Interview” published on-line June 9, 2008 under the tagline Medscape Perspectives on the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 161st Annual Meeting, May 3-8, 2008, Washington, DC. A boilerplate legal disclaimer noted, “This activity is not sanctioned by, nor a part of, the American Psychiatric Association. Conference news does not receive grant support and is produced independently.”
The “Expert Interview” for our case study is titled “Pharmacologic Options for Treatment-Resistant Depression…” The featured expert is Charles Nemeroff, chairman of Emory University’s department of psychiatry. Dr. Nemeroff is well known for ethical controversy. In 2003 the Nature Publishing Group revised their policies on disclosure of financial conflicts of interest in the wake of Dr. Nemeroff’s widely publicized nondisclosures. In 2006 Dr. Nemeroff resigned as editor of the journal Neuropsychopharmacology after he failed to disclose conflicts pertinent to a review article he co-authored and placed in his own journal. As is always true of case studies, the devil is in the details if we wish to understand just how sly and subtle was the spinning. Here are some of the issues that arise from Dr. Nemeroff’s Expert Interview on Medscape.
1. Internal contradiction. The legal disclaimer noted above states that there was no grant support and that the conference news items were produced independently. However, Dr. Nemeroff’s featured item prominently acknowledges an unrestricted educational grant from Bristol-Myers Squibb Company and Otsuka America Pharmaceutical, Inc. These two companies jointly market aripiprazole, a member of a drug class highlighted by Dr. Nemeroff in his Expert Interview.
2. Infomercial format. The Expert Interview by Dr. Nemeroff resembles nothing so much as Lindsay Wagner promoting the Select Comfort Sleep Number Bed in television advertisements. Promotional statements are made without scientific backup.
3. Disease mongering. In this interview, Dr. Nemeroff backed away from his earlier strict definition of treatment-resistant depression (TRD), proclaiming that in his current view 40% to 50% of depressed patients have treatment resistance. This sleight of hand naturally expands the market for the agents he later promotes as augmenting agents.
4. The primary care “hook.” Dr. Nemeroff introduced a professional “hook” to primary care physicians, emphasizing the association of depression with cardiovascular disease. This strategy is a component of disease mongering. Dr. Nemeroff’s discussion of this association had approximately zero educational value. Why did Medscape not insist on more substantive content?
5. Inappropriate drug recommendation. In discussing the switch strategy from one antidepressant class to another for resistant depression, Dr. Nemeroff included a recommendation for nefazodone. That drug was withdrawn by Bristol-Myers Squibb Company several years ago because of hepatic toxicity. What kind of “expert” makes such a recommendation? And what kind of editorial oversight by Medscape waves through such an incompetent statement?
6. Uncritical reliance on uncontrolled studies. In discussing switch of antidepressant drugs, Dr. Nemeroff noted that in phase II of the STAR*D trial 25% of patients switched from citalopram to sertraline responded. Dr. Nemeroff’s discussion of that result was inadequate. He invoked a dubiously relevant effect of sertraline on the dopamine transporter (when you are stuck for an answer, invoke neurochemical mythology) but he ignored the default hypothesis that 25% would have been the placebo response rate had STAR*D been designed to include placebo control groups. This default hypothesis assumes that all SSRI drugs are basically similar in terms of efficacy. For an educational item in Medscape or anywhere else, this aspect of the Expert Interview falls short of expected standards.
7. Pushing dangerous drugs. Dr. Nemeroff has been a leader in promoting use of second generation antipsychotic (SGA) drugs as augmenting agents for resistant depression. I have commented previously on his promotion of risperidone for this purpose, here and here. Others have raised serious questions about his reports. Overall, Dr. Nemeroff promotes these drugs by exaggerating their efficacy and glossing over their toxicity in resistant depression.
8. False statements. In this Expert Interview, Dr. Nemeroff leads off his discussion of SGA drugs for TRD with an endorsement of risperidone. The 2 published references to risperidone in TRD have major scientific flaws. Indeed, the study by Rapaport et al (reference 12 in this interview)was retracted. Nevertheless, Dr. Nemeroff still claims this study supports his position on SGA use in TRD. Does Dr. Nemeroff not read the retractions of his own publications (by his own “research team”)? How naïve are Medscape’s editors to be ignorant of these retractions?
9. Talking up the sponsor’s product. In reviewing the toxicity of SGA drugs for TRD, Dr. Nemeroff found something negative to say about the side effects of olanzapine, quetiapine, and risperidone. However, he made no mention of aripiprazole’s side effects, even though he emphasized its recent approval by the FDA for TRD. How convenient, as BMS-Otsuka sponsored his Medscape spot. Where were Medscape’s editors, described by George Lundberg as working to prevent bias and improper influence?
10. Glossing over weak efficacy. Though Dr. Nemeroff endorsed aripiprazole for TRD, he neglected to discuss the weak efficacy of this drug. The Number Needed to Treat for remission with aripiprazole in TRD is a disappointing 10. The studies cited by Dr. Nemeroff only compared aripiprazole against placebo. Dr. Nemeroff surely knows that just beating placebo does not qualify a drug as clinically useful. Dr. Nemeroff neglected to address the comparative efficacy of aripiprazole versus established treatments of TRD, such as lithium augmentation. The available evidence suggests that patients will do better on lithium and that aripiprazole would not be the first line choice, especially in primary care. Where were Medscape’s editors?
11. Reckless promotion of SGAs early in the course of TRD. Dr. Nemeroff emphatically stated he is not opposed to the early use of SGAs for TRD. Here especially he resembled Lindsay Wagner. A conscientious educator would weigh the risks and benefits of the early and broad use of SGA drugs in TRD. Dr. Nemeroff did no such thing. He simply opined. Why did Medscape’s editors allow him to get away with this reckless promotion? There does not appear to have been any effective editorial oversight of this publication.
12. For Dr. Nemeroff to promote early use of SGAs in TRD is reckless because of the serious toxicity associated with these drugs. Where is the discussion of akathisia (26% in the most recent study of aripiprazole in TRD)? Where is the discussion of emergent suicidality associated with akathisia in depression? Where is the discussion of tardive dyskinesia caused by aripiprazole (5% within 12 months in schizophrenia, and quite possibly higher in mood disordered patients)? Where is the discussion of neuroleptic malignant syndrome associated with SGAs like aripiprazole? Where is the discussion of weight gain with aripiprazole in TRD (significantly greater than with placebo)? Where is the overall analysis of risk versus benefit? Where were Medscape’s editors? Who at Medscape was looking out for “the best interests of patients”?
13. Incomplete disclosures. Dr. Nemeroff has a long history of recidivism concerning failure to disclose pertinent financial conflicts of interest. His record in this instance continues that sordid tradition. He failed to disclose that he is currently chairing a national series of CME meetings promoting aripiprazole for TRD, sponsored by, you guessed it, Bristol-Myers Squibb/Otsuka. Perhaps he thinks that because the money is laundered through a Medical Education Communications Company he doesn’t need to disclose it. Tell that to Joseph Biederman, who was called to task last week by Senator Grassley’s Senate Finance Committee for exactly that obfuscation. Dr. Nemeroff also failed to disclose his support from Janssen for studying risperidone in TRD. He failed to disclose his association with CeNeRx, that is developing MAO inhibitors, mentioned favorably in his interview. There is more, but these examples will suffice. Doesn’t Medscape know by now that Dr. Nemeroff cannot be relied on to report his conflicts appropriately? Does Medscape have knowledgeable professionals or ciphers in its editorial office?
So, this sleazy example illustrates many of the systemic problems that Medscape will need to correct if it hopes to remain credible. This documentation gives the lie to Dr. Lundberg’s claims that “We are clean. Our work is transparent.” One suggestion is for Medscape to abandon the degenerate form of scientific journalism exemplified by “Expert Interviews” and News items. In their present formats they cannot be truly educational and balanced items. They do not qualify for CME credit, as I verified with the company. They are simply vehicles for promoting sponsors’ products. And the Medscape staff seem to think their job is to ensure that the spin is firmly in place. Does George Lundberg really intend that?
Sunday, June 15, 2008
MEDSCAPE'S CME ETHICS
17 June 2008
MEDSCAPE’S CME ETHICS
Like global warming, the erosion of professional values and medical education by commerce shows no sign of slowing. The latest scandals involve Medscape. Medscape is a medical communications company that produces and distributes CME programs and other quasi-educational offerings, such as “Expert Interviews” and News items. A subsidiary of WebMD, Medscape is accredited by ACCME, and it relies on drug company money for its production costs. Medscape also displays multiple advertisements on every web page. Medscape uses salaried and contract medical writers to produce the “educational material.” The content is pedestrian, mainly because it makes no pretense of really educating – it is primarily a vehicle for promoting the sponsors’ products with varying degrees of slyness and subtlety, as Daniel Carlat has documented here http://carlatpsychiatry.blogspot.com/2008/06/medscapes-cme-corruption.html#links Some items are academic wallpaper, non-promotional pieces designed to create an appearance of commitment to education. For most featured items, Key Opinion Leaders (KOLs) are hired to push the material. These KOLs are paid for their roles, although Medscape never says so, much less discloses how much it pays. If they wish to be engaged regularly, the KOLs know they need to stay “on message.” These are standard arrangements in today’s amoral world of CME. Daniel Carlat recently published a fine exposé of Medscape’s corruption of CME standards (link above).
An especially distasteful practice is Medscape’s use of the names, reputations, and credibility of major professional societies to give its indifferent CME offerings and infomercials more pizzaz. Just to give two examples, Medscape web pages are currently hijacking the public images of both the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology (ACNP), featuring highlights of these organizations’ annual meetings as CME and other items. These “highlights” from the APA and ACNP meetings are offered by Medscape FOR CME CREDIT!!! For us to call this presumptuous would be an understatement. For Medscape to dress it up with sanctimonious statements about avoiding conflict of interest is insufferable.
Both APA and ACNP annual meetings are closed events, so how does a commercial CME outfit like Medscape get its hands on these restricted materials? The most likely explanation is that venal KOLs accept Medscape payments for producing puff pieces with the organizational tagline (highlights of the APA/ACNP meeting!). In effect, these KOLs trade on their membership in professional organizations for personal gain in return for “authoring” Medscape-produced CME items, “Expert Interviews” and News pieces. How tacky is that? The KOLs who “authored” mini-manuscripts or provided “Expert Interviews” for Medscape’s “highlights” of the 2007 ACNP annual meeting, whether as infomercials or wallpaper, should know better. You can find them here and in the associated links: http://www.medscape.com/viewprogram/8683
Medscape is paid by Pharma to produce these items. The APA 2008 annual meeting highlights on Medscape’s website were supported by an “independent educational grant” from Shire and by an “unrestricted educational grant” from Bristol-Myers Squibb Company/Otsuka America Pharmaceuticals, Inc. It is a good bet that Medscape shares none of that revenue with the APA. Likewise, the ACNP 2007 annual meeting “highlights” were supported by an “independent educational grant” from Vanda Pharmaceuticals. We can be sure ACNP saw none of that revenue.
So what we have is Medscape profiting from Pharma sponsors while juicing up their mediocre CME offerings with tag lines to “highlights” of the APA and ACNP annual meetings. How tacky can you get? How tacky? This tacky: Here is the disclaimer published by Medscape’s lawyers regarding the ACNP meeting.
Legal Disclaimer
The materials presented here do not reflect the views of Medscape or the companies providing unrestricted educational grants. These materials may discuss uses and dosages for therapeutic products that have not been approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration. A qualified healthcare professional should be consulted before using any therapeutic product discussed. All readers or continuing education participants should verify all information and data before treating patients or employing any therapies described in this educational activity.
The materials presented here were prepared by independent authors under the editorial supervision of Medscape and do not represent a publication of the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology. These materials and the related activity are not sanctioned by the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology or the commercial supporter of the conference and do not constitute an official part of that conference.
Copyright © 2008 Medscape.
An additional disclaimer states, “This activity is not sanctioned by, nor a part of, the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology.” Well, fine. If it wasn’t sanctioned, why is Medscape splashing it over its web pages? I am confident ACNP gave Medscape no such authorization.
One hopes that APA and ACNP will publicly disown this corrupt use of their names and reputations for commerce by Medscape. The situation with APA is problematic because the incoming APA president, Alan Schatzberg, has been a frequent “Expert Interviewee” on Medscape. It remains to be seen whether his compromise and conflict will affect the organization’s response.
So, nobody at Medscape is accountable for the bias and bs in these items, even though they were written by Medscape staff and contractors. Medscape’s disclaimer tells us to go after the “independent authors.” That’s exactly what I intend to do in my next posting. Meanwhile, if Medscape wants credibility it will need to clean up its act. A good place to start would be to stop using these compromised KOLs who push infomercials and who provide soothing wallpaper. The real solution would be for Medscape to stop its skimming and money laundering activities altogether. Perhaps that is hoping for too much. Or they could just run naked advertising and they won’t need to bother with ACCME requirements. On the other hand, self-respecting health care professionals can just say no to Medscape’s kind of crap.
And what exactly does an “independent educational grant” mean, anyway? We will examine that trope in my next posting, which features the poster boy for compromised KOLs in psychiatry, Charles Nemeroff, MD from Emory University’s department of psychiatry. In that example, Medscape joins forces with Nemeroff to promote an entirely new level of sleaze. Stay tuned.
MEDSCAPE’S CME ETHICS
Like global warming, the erosion of professional values and medical education by commerce shows no sign of slowing. The latest scandals involve Medscape. Medscape is a medical communications company that produces and distributes CME programs and other quasi-educational offerings, such as “Expert Interviews” and News items. A subsidiary of WebMD, Medscape is accredited by ACCME, and it relies on drug company money for its production costs. Medscape also displays multiple advertisements on every web page. Medscape uses salaried and contract medical writers to produce the “educational material.” The content is pedestrian, mainly because it makes no pretense of really educating – it is primarily a vehicle for promoting the sponsors’ products with varying degrees of slyness and subtlety, as Daniel Carlat has documented here http://carlatpsychiatry.blogspot.com/2008/06/medscapes-cme-corruption.html#links Some items are academic wallpaper, non-promotional pieces designed to create an appearance of commitment to education. For most featured items, Key Opinion Leaders (KOLs) are hired to push the material. These KOLs are paid for their roles, although Medscape never says so, much less discloses how much it pays. If they wish to be engaged regularly, the KOLs know they need to stay “on message.” These are standard arrangements in today’s amoral world of CME. Daniel Carlat recently published a fine exposé of Medscape’s corruption of CME standards (link above).
An especially distasteful practice is Medscape’s use of the names, reputations, and credibility of major professional societies to give its indifferent CME offerings and infomercials more pizzaz. Just to give two examples, Medscape web pages are currently hijacking the public images of both the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology (ACNP), featuring highlights of these organizations’ annual meetings as CME and other items. These “highlights” from the APA and ACNP meetings are offered by Medscape FOR CME CREDIT!!! For us to call this presumptuous would be an understatement. For Medscape to dress it up with sanctimonious statements about avoiding conflict of interest is insufferable.
Both APA and ACNP annual meetings are closed events, so how does a commercial CME outfit like Medscape get its hands on these restricted materials? The most likely explanation is that venal KOLs accept Medscape payments for producing puff pieces with the organizational tagline (highlights of the APA/ACNP meeting!). In effect, these KOLs trade on their membership in professional organizations for personal gain in return for “authoring” Medscape-produced CME items, “Expert Interviews” and News pieces. How tacky is that? The KOLs who “authored” mini-manuscripts or provided “Expert Interviews” for Medscape’s “highlights” of the 2007 ACNP annual meeting, whether as infomercials or wallpaper, should know better. You can find them here and in the associated links: http://www.medscape.com/viewprogram/8683
Medscape is paid by Pharma to produce these items. The APA 2008 annual meeting highlights on Medscape’s website were supported by an “independent educational grant” from Shire and by an “unrestricted educational grant” from Bristol-Myers Squibb Company/Otsuka America Pharmaceuticals, Inc. It is a good bet that Medscape shares none of that revenue with the APA. Likewise, the ACNP 2007 annual meeting “highlights” were supported by an “independent educational grant” from Vanda Pharmaceuticals. We can be sure ACNP saw none of that revenue.
So what we have is Medscape profiting from Pharma sponsors while juicing up their mediocre CME offerings with tag lines to “highlights” of the APA and ACNP annual meetings. How tacky can you get? How tacky? This tacky: Here is the disclaimer published by Medscape’s lawyers regarding the ACNP meeting.
Legal Disclaimer
The materials presented here do not reflect the views of Medscape or the companies providing unrestricted educational grants. These materials may discuss uses and dosages for therapeutic products that have not been approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration. A qualified healthcare professional should be consulted before using any therapeutic product discussed. All readers or continuing education participants should verify all information and data before treating patients or employing any therapies described in this educational activity.
The materials presented here were prepared by independent authors under the editorial supervision of Medscape and do not represent a publication of the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology. These materials and the related activity are not sanctioned by the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology or the commercial supporter of the conference and do not constitute an official part of that conference.
Copyright © 2008 Medscape.
An additional disclaimer states, “This activity is not sanctioned by, nor a part of, the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology.” Well, fine. If it wasn’t sanctioned, why is Medscape splashing it over its web pages? I am confident ACNP gave Medscape no such authorization.
One hopes that APA and ACNP will publicly disown this corrupt use of their names and reputations for commerce by Medscape. The situation with APA is problematic because the incoming APA president, Alan Schatzberg, has been a frequent “Expert Interviewee” on Medscape. It remains to be seen whether his compromise and conflict will affect the organization’s response.
So, nobody at Medscape is accountable for the bias and bs in these items, even though they were written by Medscape staff and contractors. Medscape’s disclaimer tells us to go after the “independent authors.” That’s exactly what I intend to do in my next posting. Meanwhile, if Medscape wants credibility it will need to clean up its act. A good place to start would be to stop using these compromised KOLs who push infomercials and who provide soothing wallpaper. The real solution would be for Medscape to stop its skimming and money laundering activities altogether. Perhaps that is hoping for too much. Or they could just run naked advertising and they won’t need to bother with ACCME requirements. On the other hand, self-respecting health care professionals can just say no to Medscape’s kind of crap.
And what exactly does an “independent educational grant” mean, anyway? We will examine that trope in my next posting, which features the poster boy for compromised KOLs in psychiatry, Charles Nemeroff, MD from Emory University’s department of psychiatry. In that example, Medscape joins forces with Nemeroff to promote an entirely new level of sleaze. Stay tuned.
Friday, February 29, 2008
Dr. Stossel Sounds Off
DR. STOSSEL SOUNDS OFF
Thomas Stossel, MD, Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School, has released another opinionated piece this week on academics’ conflicts of interest. It appears in this week’s British Medical Journal. Like his previous rants, this one combines tangentiality, circumstantial thinking, illogical thinking, false assumptions, smears, insults, and the demonizing of those with contrary opinions. Roy Poses did an excellent job of exposing Stossel’s rhetorical smoke and mirrors, so I will not belabor this point.
The central pathology in Dr. Stossel’s rant is his denial or minimization of current ethical problems in academic-corporate relationships in medicine. If he wishes to be taken seriously, he should familiarize himself with case studies of the corporate corruption of medicine. Contrary to Stossel’s assertion that these problems don’t exist, here is a link that describes the corruption of a major journal by key opinion leaders in cahoots with Pharma executives: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/01/antipsychotic-drugs-for-depression.html . Every sleazy deceit in the book was in play here.
There are similar problems in continuing medical education events that are funded by drug and device corporations. See here: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/01/variations-on-theme-of-sleaze.html
The main player in these unsavory instances is a member of the Institute of Medicine of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. This individual is an ethical recidivist who has been outed multiple times for failure to disclose salient conflicts of interest; who was forced to resign the editorship of a major medical journal; and who was forced to retract false statements that favored his corporate clients (otherwise known as shilling). Dr. Stossel notwithstanding, the rest of us are appalled by such tastelessly venal spectacles at the highest level of American medicine. Is it any wonder that the likes of Dr. Stossel are viewed as challenged?
Thomas Stossel, MD, Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School, has released another opinionated piece this week on academics’ conflicts of interest. It appears in this week’s British Medical Journal. Like his previous rants, this one combines tangentiality, circumstantial thinking, illogical thinking, false assumptions, smears, insults, and the demonizing of those with contrary opinions. Roy Poses did an excellent job of exposing Stossel’s rhetorical smoke and mirrors, so I will not belabor this point.
The central pathology in Dr. Stossel’s rant is his denial or minimization of current ethical problems in academic-corporate relationships in medicine. If he wishes to be taken seriously, he should familiarize himself with case studies of the corporate corruption of medicine. Contrary to Stossel’s assertion that these problems don’t exist, here is a link that describes the corruption of a major journal by key opinion leaders in cahoots with Pharma executives: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/01/antipsychotic-drugs-for-depression.html . Every sleazy deceit in the book was in play here.
There are similar problems in continuing medical education events that are funded by drug and device corporations. See here: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/01/variations-on-theme-of-sleaze.html
The main player in these unsavory instances is a member of the Institute of Medicine of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. This individual is an ethical recidivist who has been outed multiple times for failure to disclose salient conflicts of interest; who was forced to resign the editorship of a major medical journal; and who was forced to retract false statements that favored his corporate clients (otherwise known as shilling). Dr. Stossel notwithstanding, the rest of us are appalled by such tastelessly venal spectacles at the highest level of American medicine. Is it any wonder that the likes of Dr. Stossel are viewed as challenged?
Tuesday, January 22, 2008
Variations on a Theme of Sleaze
VARIATIONS ON A THEME OF SLEAZE
A few days ago I posted on corrupt reports in two medical journals, where key opinion leaders (KOLs) and corporate employees misrepresented the potential of Janssen’s atypical antipsychotic (AAP) drug risperidone for depression. One of these reports appeared in a general medical journal, Annals of Internal Medicine (AIM), which confirms the designs of the corporate marketers: by volume, treatment of depression now is centered in primary care. Considering the weak efficacy data, the dubious risk-benefit profile, and the inferiority of AAP drugs to other options, there is no justification for the broad and early adjunctive use of these agents for depression in primary care. The Eli Lilly Company, which markets the combination of olanzapine and fluoxetine in a single pill (Symbyax), has the same objective. Other companies are moving rapidly into this market space.
Combining AAP drugs with antidepressants takes us back to the bad old days of antidepressant-antipsychotic drug combinations like Triavil in the1960s and 1970s, when we learned that depressed patients are especially susceptible to a serious adverse event known as tardive dyskinesia (TD) caused by antipsychotic drugs. While the risk of TD is less than with the early antipsychotic agents, it is still unacceptably high with AAP drugs for patients who are unlikely to show meaningful clinical benefit, as I detailed earlier. In adult patients with schizophrenia the risk of TD with olanzapine treatment is about 2.5% at 1 year. In children and adolescents treated with AAP drugs for 6 months the risk is an alarming 6% (Wonodi I et al Movement Disorders 2007; 22: 1777). In patients with mood disorder, these figures are likely to be higher. And this is before one even begins to factor in the metabolic toxicity of AAP drugs (weight gain, obesity, insulin resistance, and Type II diabetes mellitus)! Patients are not well served when AAP drugs are pushed for treating depression in primary care.
Medical journals are not the only compromised medium. Continuing Medical Education (CME) is a second front in the campaign to expand the AAP drug market. The standard formula calls for corporate sponsorship channeled through an “unrestricted educational grant” to a medical education communications company (MECC). The MECC employs writers to prepare the “educational content,” and academic KOLs are recruited to deliver this content. The KOLs are chosen for their willingness to be “on message” for the corporate sponsor. If they go “off message” they know they will not be invited back. The talk of “unrestricted grants” is window dressing. The MECC also secures the imprimatur of a nationally accredited CME sponsor, typically an academic institution. The sponsor is paid to certify that the CME program meets the standards of the Accreditation Council on Continuing Medical Education (ACCME). Everybody turns a buck: the MECC and its staff are handsomely paid (CME is now a multi-billion dollar business); the KOLs are generously rewarded with honoraria and perquisites; the academic sponsor is well paid by the MECC; the ACCME receives dues from the academic sponsor; the audience obtains free CME credits rather than having to pay for these required educational experiences; and the corporate sponsor gets what it considers value for its marketing dollar.
ACCME standards include clear identification of off-label drug use; full and fair disclosure of clinical trial results, warts and all; and clinical guidance to the audience about risks, benefits, and treatment options. It is not an exaggeration to say that these standards are more often honored in the breach than in the observance. That is because CME events have been degraded to little more than thinly veiled advertising, built around promoting a product rather than around education. So corrupted has the process become that the Macy Foundation recently recommended that industry financing of CME be ended, “whether such support is provided directly or indirectly through subsidiary agencies.” See Daniel Carlat for more on this topic. Is this position alarmist? Consider the following examples of corruption in CME.
A widely advertised CME program appeared on-line 6 November 2007, titled Treatment-Refractory Depression: Is there a Role for Atypical Antipsychotics? Note the leading question and the product category focus. The program was developed by the MECC PeerView Institute for Medical Education, and it was sponsored by the Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior at UCLA, which certified CME credits. Like the journal articles I discussed last week, this CME program is marked by a concatenation of deceits. The major messages were, augment earlier rather than later; AAP drugs are “an emerging therapeutic option” for augmentation (note the branding language); and AAP drugs are efficacious. None of these messages is based on credible evidence.
The first sleight of hand was the leadoff presentation, which featured the STAR*D study results concerning remission and response rates to adjunctive treatments or switching after various levels of treatment failure. The data naturally suggest unmet needs in treating depression (a favorite theme of marketers). The unspoken implication of this academic veneer is that the later studies described in the CME program were comparable to the STAR*D study in terms of case material, which is not so. Recruitment to STAR*D was explicitly different from recruitment to the usual experimercial sponsored by a drug company, where many cases come from contract research organizations, not from clinical referral streams. Moreover, STAR*D was a purely descriptive study that by design could not identify specific treatment effects.
Charles B. Nemeroff, MD, PhD from Emory University (yes, the same) discussed short term use of AAP drugs. His presentation is a model of being economical with the truth. Dr. Nemeroff has clearly mastered the art of accommodating his many corporate clients. He discussed 4 atypical antipsychotic drugs as augmenting agents for nonresponding depression. When discussing olanzapine he went beyond his short term remit to suggest that long term treatment is efficacious, yet he neglected to address the neurological or metabolic toxicity of long term olanzapine. When discussing risperidone he did not disclose that he was senior author of the major report he described and cited; he neglected to disclose the retractions he and Mark Rapaport from Cedars-Sinai Medical Center had been obliged to publish; he neglected to disclose that treatment with risperidone beyond 6 weeks was no more efficacious than placebo. That aspect was discussed by another speaker, who repeated Dr. Nemeroff’s now-retracted and discredited claims for significant long term preventive efficacy of risperidone in a subgroup of patients. Dr. Nemeroff made further claims about risperidone improving sexual function in patients receiving an SSRI antidepressant but he failed to disclose that beyond 6 weeks risperidone impaired sexual function in women who were receiving the SSRI; he backed up his claims about risperidone and sexual functioning by citing his publication in his own journal Neuropsychopharmacology that contained no data whatsoever on the matter; and he neglected to address the metabolic toxicity of risperidone that the corporation disclosed on ClinicalTrials.gov. He also falsely stated that the short term efficacy of risperidone in nonresponding depression was demonstrated in a controlled study, citing his own open-label study. These problems were called to the attention of the Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior at UCLA. In response, the CME program was revised on January 11, 2008. Dr. Nemeroff’s material now contained a different citation that again contained no data concerning sexual side effects. They removed the claim that the short term efficacy of risperidone had been established in a controlled trial (although by then the problematic report of this very issue in AIM had been published for over 2 months). The inadequate discussion of the toxicity of risperidone in Dr. Nemeroff’s trial was unchanged, and another speaker continued to repeat the retracted and discredited claims of Dr. Nemeroff for significant long term preventive efficacy of risperidone in a subgroup of patients. No explanation of the changes made on January 11, 2008 in the on-line materials was provided by UCLA to CME readers who had studied the erroneous and biased material for more than 2 months. Other speakers made passing reference to the metabolic toxicity of AAP drugs but only in a perfunctory way that had no educational value, like what we see in direct-to-consumer advertising. Nobody mentioned the risk of TD.
As the Macy Foundation report makes clear, CME providers are expected to give learners guidance on the risk-benefit balance of new treatments. It is disingenuous of Dr. Nemeroff to talk up risperidone for short term treatment of these difficult depressions by exaggerating the benefit, downplaying the risks, avoiding comparison with alternative treatments, and glossing over the problem of longer term loss of efficacy. These are clear violations of ACCME principles.
When discussing aripiprazole for nonresponding depression, Dr. Nemeroff once again was economical with the truth. Note that Bristol-Myers Squibb, the marketer of aripiprazole, sponsored this PeerView/UCLA program. To document his claims about aripiprazole, Dr. Nemeroff cited one Abstract from the American Psychiatric Association meeting in May 2007. That does not meet ACCME standards of documentation for learners, most of whom would be unable to access the cited Abstract (not that it would tell them much even if they could). For some reason, Dr. Nemeroff did not inform learners that the complete report of the aripiprazole study had appeared in June 2007 (Berman RM et al. J Clin Psychiatry 2007;68: 843-853), fully 5 months before the CME event went on-line. From that readily available report it is clear that the Number Needed to Treat (NNT) for response with aripiprazole is 10, which compares unfavorably with a NNT of 4 for lithium, the best established augmenting option in placebo-controlled trials. A NNT of 10 means a clinician would need to treat 10 patients with aripiprazole before obtaining one remission that would not have occurred anyway with placebo. That does not constitute compelling clinical benefit. Dr. Nemeroff did not candidly discuss these troubling data. Dr Nemeroff provided his CME audience none of the remission or response data from the published aripiprazole study, though these data were readily available. These omissions of published, highly relevant information signify disrespect for his audience by Dr. Nemeroff, incompetence by the MECC, and failure of due diligence by the accrediting institution, UCLA, to ensure that accurate, balanced information and adequate documentation are provided. Likewise, no substantive risk-benefit analysis was provided to guide CME learners, and there was no meaningful discussion by Dr. Nemeroff of the metabolic toxicity of aripiprazole. The published report tells us that 7.1% of patients treated with aripiprazole gained more than 7% body weight, a very significant difference (p < 0.01) from the placebo treated patients (1.2%). Dr. Nemeroff did not share that information with the CME audience. Instead, he slyly minimized the appearance of the problem by showing a mean weight gain of only 2 kg with aripiprazole. In addition, the neuromotor toxicity of aripiprazole was remarkable (23.1% akathisia and 27.5% extrapyramidal symptoms). Dr. Nemeroff gave the CME audience no guidance about that problem or about its unblinding effect in the trial. Why do highly paid KOLs behave in this way? Do they think nobody will notice?
A final insult to CME learners in this program was the disclaimer that “The Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior at UCLA is responsible for the selection of this report’s topics, the preparation of editorial content, and the distribution of this report” but “No responsibility is taken for errors or omissions in these reports.” Well, then, who is responsible? Why not UCLA, considering the ACCME standards and the fees UCLA received for sponsoring this CME activity through an “educational grant” from Bristol-Myers Squibb Company? Overall, it is difficult to avoid the impression that this so-called CME activity is a meretricious infomercial for Dr. Nemeroff’s corporate clients rather than a balanced educational event that aims to give practitioners considered guidance on a difficult clinical problem.
Will these revelations slow the marketing-inspired momentum for use of atypical antipsychotic drugs in depression? Not likely. Indeed, a new road show is right now getting under way, bringing the good news about atypical antipsychotic drugs in depression to CME audiences in Miami, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, and New York. Why now? Has some new insight been achieved that requires urgent communication to physicians? No. The road show has been launched now because aripiprazole was recently approved by the FDA for the secondary indication of adjunctive treatment in depression. It’s all about marketing. The faculty speakers are the usual suspects – KOLs and KOL wannabes who enjoy cozy or nepotistic relationships with the chairman. The funding is through another “educational grant” from the marketers of aripiprazole. The CME sponsor is an outfit in Texas that knows how the CME game is played. And the chairman of this new enterprise? Why, none other than the compromised Dr. Charles Nemeroff from Emory University. Why are we not surprised?
A few days ago I posted on corrupt reports in two medical journals, where key opinion leaders (KOLs) and corporate employees misrepresented the potential of Janssen’s atypical antipsychotic (AAP) drug risperidone for depression. One of these reports appeared in a general medical journal, Annals of Internal Medicine (AIM), which confirms the designs of the corporate marketers: by volume, treatment of depression now is centered in primary care. Considering the weak efficacy data, the dubious risk-benefit profile, and the inferiority of AAP drugs to other options, there is no justification for the broad and early adjunctive use of these agents for depression in primary care. The Eli Lilly Company, which markets the combination of olanzapine and fluoxetine in a single pill (Symbyax), has the same objective. Other companies are moving rapidly into this market space.
Combining AAP drugs with antidepressants takes us back to the bad old days of antidepressant-antipsychotic drug combinations like Triavil in the1960s and 1970s, when we learned that depressed patients are especially susceptible to a serious adverse event known as tardive dyskinesia (TD) caused by antipsychotic drugs. While the risk of TD is less than with the early antipsychotic agents, it is still unacceptably high with AAP drugs for patients who are unlikely to show meaningful clinical benefit, as I detailed earlier. In adult patients with schizophrenia the risk of TD with olanzapine treatment is about 2.5% at 1 year. In children and adolescents treated with AAP drugs for 6 months the risk is an alarming 6% (Wonodi I et al Movement Disorders 2007; 22: 1777). In patients with mood disorder, these figures are likely to be higher. And this is before one even begins to factor in the metabolic toxicity of AAP drugs (weight gain, obesity, insulin resistance, and Type II diabetes mellitus)! Patients are not well served when AAP drugs are pushed for treating depression in primary care.
Medical journals are not the only compromised medium. Continuing Medical Education (CME) is a second front in the campaign to expand the AAP drug market. The standard formula calls for corporate sponsorship channeled through an “unrestricted educational grant” to a medical education communications company (MECC). The MECC employs writers to prepare the “educational content,” and academic KOLs are recruited to deliver this content. The KOLs are chosen for their willingness to be “on message” for the corporate sponsor. If they go “off message” they know they will not be invited back. The talk of “unrestricted grants” is window dressing. The MECC also secures the imprimatur of a nationally accredited CME sponsor, typically an academic institution. The sponsor is paid to certify that the CME program meets the standards of the Accreditation Council on Continuing Medical Education (ACCME). Everybody turns a buck: the MECC and its staff are handsomely paid (CME is now a multi-billion dollar business); the KOLs are generously rewarded with honoraria and perquisites; the academic sponsor is well paid by the MECC; the ACCME receives dues from the academic sponsor; the audience obtains free CME credits rather than having to pay for these required educational experiences; and the corporate sponsor gets what it considers value for its marketing dollar.
ACCME standards include clear identification of off-label drug use; full and fair disclosure of clinical trial results, warts and all; and clinical guidance to the audience about risks, benefits, and treatment options. It is not an exaggeration to say that these standards are more often honored in the breach than in the observance. That is because CME events have been degraded to little more than thinly veiled advertising, built around promoting a product rather than around education. So corrupted has the process become that the Macy Foundation recently recommended that industry financing of CME be ended, “whether such support is provided directly or indirectly through subsidiary agencies.” See Daniel Carlat for more on this topic. Is this position alarmist? Consider the following examples of corruption in CME.
A widely advertised CME program appeared on-line 6 November 2007, titled Treatment-Refractory Depression: Is there a Role for Atypical Antipsychotics? Note the leading question and the product category focus. The program was developed by the MECC PeerView Institute for Medical Education, and it was sponsored by the Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior at UCLA, which certified CME credits. Like the journal articles I discussed last week, this CME program is marked by a concatenation of deceits. The major messages were, augment earlier rather than later; AAP drugs are “an emerging therapeutic option” for augmentation (note the branding language); and AAP drugs are efficacious. None of these messages is based on credible evidence.
The first sleight of hand was the leadoff presentation, which featured the STAR*D study results concerning remission and response rates to adjunctive treatments or switching after various levels of treatment failure. The data naturally suggest unmet needs in treating depression (a favorite theme of marketers). The unspoken implication of this academic veneer is that the later studies described in the CME program were comparable to the STAR*D study in terms of case material, which is not so. Recruitment to STAR*D was explicitly different from recruitment to the usual experimercial sponsored by a drug company, where many cases come from contract research organizations, not from clinical referral streams. Moreover, STAR*D was a purely descriptive study that by design could not identify specific treatment effects.
Charles B. Nemeroff, MD, PhD from Emory University (yes, the same) discussed short term use of AAP drugs. His presentation is a model of being economical with the truth. Dr. Nemeroff has clearly mastered the art of accommodating his many corporate clients. He discussed 4 atypical antipsychotic drugs as augmenting agents for nonresponding depression. When discussing olanzapine he went beyond his short term remit to suggest that long term treatment is efficacious, yet he neglected to address the neurological or metabolic toxicity of long term olanzapine. When discussing risperidone he did not disclose that he was senior author of the major report he described and cited; he neglected to disclose the retractions he and Mark Rapaport from Cedars-Sinai Medical Center had been obliged to publish; he neglected to disclose that treatment with risperidone beyond 6 weeks was no more efficacious than placebo. That aspect was discussed by another speaker, who repeated Dr. Nemeroff’s now-retracted and discredited claims for significant long term preventive efficacy of risperidone in a subgroup of patients. Dr. Nemeroff made further claims about risperidone improving sexual function in patients receiving an SSRI antidepressant but he failed to disclose that beyond 6 weeks risperidone impaired sexual function in women who were receiving the SSRI; he backed up his claims about risperidone and sexual functioning by citing his publication in his own journal Neuropsychopharmacology that contained no data whatsoever on the matter; and he neglected to address the metabolic toxicity of risperidone that the corporation disclosed on ClinicalTrials.gov. He also falsely stated that the short term efficacy of risperidone in nonresponding depression was demonstrated in a controlled study, citing his own open-label study. These problems were called to the attention of the Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior at UCLA. In response, the CME program was revised on January 11, 2008. Dr. Nemeroff’s material now contained a different citation that again contained no data concerning sexual side effects. They removed the claim that the short term efficacy of risperidone had been established in a controlled trial (although by then the problematic report of this very issue in AIM had been published for over 2 months). The inadequate discussion of the toxicity of risperidone in Dr. Nemeroff’s trial was unchanged, and another speaker continued to repeat the retracted and discredited claims of Dr. Nemeroff for significant long term preventive efficacy of risperidone in a subgroup of patients. No explanation of the changes made on January 11, 2008 in the on-line materials was provided by UCLA to CME readers who had studied the erroneous and biased material for more than 2 months. Other speakers made passing reference to the metabolic toxicity of AAP drugs but only in a perfunctory way that had no educational value, like what we see in direct-to-consumer advertising. Nobody mentioned the risk of TD.
As the Macy Foundation report makes clear, CME providers are expected to give learners guidance on the risk-benefit balance of new treatments. It is disingenuous of Dr. Nemeroff to talk up risperidone for short term treatment of these difficult depressions by exaggerating the benefit, downplaying the risks, avoiding comparison with alternative treatments, and glossing over the problem of longer term loss of efficacy. These are clear violations of ACCME principles.
When discussing aripiprazole for nonresponding depression, Dr. Nemeroff once again was economical with the truth. Note that Bristol-Myers Squibb, the marketer of aripiprazole, sponsored this PeerView/UCLA program. To document his claims about aripiprazole, Dr. Nemeroff cited one Abstract from the American Psychiatric Association meeting in May 2007. That does not meet ACCME standards of documentation for learners, most of whom would be unable to access the cited Abstract (not that it would tell them much even if they could). For some reason, Dr. Nemeroff did not inform learners that the complete report of the aripiprazole study had appeared in June 2007 (Berman RM et al. J Clin Psychiatry 2007;68: 843-853), fully 5 months before the CME event went on-line. From that readily available report it is clear that the Number Needed to Treat (NNT) for response with aripiprazole is 10, which compares unfavorably with a NNT of 4 for lithium, the best established augmenting option in placebo-controlled trials. A NNT of 10 means a clinician would need to treat 10 patients with aripiprazole before obtaining one remission that would not have occurred anyway with placebo. That does not constitute compelling clinical benefit. Dr. Nemeroff did not candidly discuss these troubling data. Dr Nemeroff provided his CME audience none of the remission or response data from the published aripiprazole study, though these data were readily available. These omissions of published, highly relevant information signify disrespect for his audience by Dr. Nemeroff, incompetence by the MECC, and failure of due diligence by the accrediting institution, UCLA, to ensure that accurate, balanced information and adequate documentation are provided. Likewise, no substantive risk-benefit analysis was provided to guide CME learners, and there was no meaningful discussion by Dr. Nemeroff of the metabolic toxicity of aripiprazole. The published report tells us that 7.1% of patients treated with aripiprazole gained more than 7% body weight, a very significant difference (p < 0.01) from the placebo treated patients (1.2%). Dr. Nemeroff did not share that information with the CME audience. Instead, he slyly minimized the appearance of the problem by showing a mean weight gain of only 2 kg with aripiprazole. In addition, the neuromotor toxicity of aripiprazole was remarkable (23.1% akathisia and 27.5% extrapyramidal symptoms). Dr. Nemeroff gave the CME audience no guidance about that problem or about its unblinding effect in the trial. Why do highly paid KOLs behave in this way? Do they think nobody will notice?
A final insult to CME learners in this program was the disclaimer that “The Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior at UCLA is responsible for the selection of this report’s topics, the preparation of editorial content, and the distribution of this report” but “No responsibility is taken for errors or omissions in these reports.” Well, then, who is responsible? Why not UCLA, considering the ACCME standards and the fees UCLA received for sponsoring this CME activity through an “educational grant” from Bristol-Myers Squibb Company? Overall, it is difficult to avoid the impression that this so-called CME activity is a meretricious infomercial for Dr. Nemeroff’s corporate clients rather than a balanced educational event that aims to give practitioners considered guidance on a difficult clinical problem.
Will these revelations slow the marketing-inspired momentum for use of atypical antipsychotic drugs in depression? Not likely. Indeed, a new road show is right now getting under way, bringing the good news about atypical antipsychotic drugs in depression to CME audiences in Miami, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, and New York. Why now? Has some new insight been achieved that requires urgent communication to physicians? No. The road show has been launched now because aripiprazole was recently approved by the FDA for the secondary indication of adjunctive treatment in depression. It’s all about marketing. The faculty speakers are the usual suspects – KOLs and KOL wannabes who enjoy cozy or nepotistic relationships with the chairman. The funding is through another “educational grant” from the marketers of aripiprazole. The CME sponsor is an outfit in Texas that knows how the CME game is played. And the chairman of this new enterprise? Why, none other than the compromised Dr. Charles Nemeroff from Emory University. Why are we not surprised?
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